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ABSTRACT
The accepted view of dispute resolution during the twelfth and early thirteenth 
century is to either dismiss the possibility altogether due to a scarcity of 
documents or to look backward from the later thirteenth century and beyond, 
measuring the records o f the twelfth century and early thirteenth against the more 
prolific and more detailed records of later periods. This has led to the widely 
accepted conclusion that either the means of resolving disputes in the earlier 
period were less sophisticated, less developed versions of later legal systems, or 
that the earlier period was in a legal dark age where the light of reason and 
systematic approaches to law had not yet developed.
The evidence discussed here shows, however, that there were systematic 
approaches to both preventing disputes and resolving those that did occur. The 
documents are not in the format that came to be accepted in later periods, nor are 
they worded as later legal documents would be. But that there were legal 
decisions being made according to norms, customs and rules that were 
consistently applied is clear.
Using complexity theory as a means of analysis allows us to see the patterns and 
the systematic approaches, not in a system wide context, but at the level of 
decision making, where these rules, norms and customs were applied to the facts 
by one or more decision makers in order to achieve a just result. This approach 
affirms the underlying concept of justice that drives any legal system, whether a 
more modern, well doeumented legal structure or one where the records are not so 
abundant.
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CHAPTER I
COMPLEXITY AS A MEANS OF ANALYSIS
Scots law has been perceived as following the model set forth in Justinian’s 
Institutes.* Thus, the traditional divisions, between the law of persons, things 
and actions, have permeated the approach to the law’s past as well as the 
approach to the present and any future changes. But this approach, 
necessarily systematic, is essentially external. That is, it views the law from 
the outside, observing where such and such an action or law more properly 
fits by what it affects, or its subject matter. This approach is greatly 
facilitated by written records, and in particular, by the existence of the 
systematic approach to reporting cases, reinforced by generations o f lawyers 
and historians who have learnt to conceptualise the law within this 
framework. Law properly understood, however, works first at the individual 
level, between people who seek a perceived just outcome. The process that 
occurs at the individual level, and specifically in the decision-making, gives a 
more fundamental structure to the legal process. Understanding what happens 
at this microcosmic, internal level provides a way into those areas where the
' Eric Descheemaeker, ‘Mapping the Common Law: on a Recent English Attempt and Its 
Links with Scottish Jurisprudence’, 115 Juridical Review  2003, 295-311.
records fail to give the details modern lawyers expect, or fail to give them in 
the traditional format.
Complexity theory^ provides a model with which to understand this structure 
and place it in context. The elements of the model are those that make up the 
decision making process itself in any legal setting: the law, facts and the 
decision-maker. The factors to be examined within this model are the words 
used in the documents, the shifts or changes in the roles of those who made 
the decisions regarding disputes, and the types of documents used to record 
them. Specifically, what words are used to describe a law, custom, norm or 
rule? Who is making decisions, the king or one of his officials? Or are the 
decisions made by one or more ‘wise men’ of the community? And perhaps 
most importantly, since it impacted perceptions of all three factors, what type 
of documents were used to record transactions either in an attempt to prevent 
disputes or to memorialize the outcome?
There were changes in each of these factors. All of them are important in 
examining the records concerning matters that occurred in the period before
 ^ It should be understood that there is no attempt to force an understanding o f physics into a 
legal model. The theory provides a way o f  translating the decision-making process into a 
geometric model which can be shown to repeat without exact replication, providing 
continuity and the perception o f linearity. This has been tested for example, in an 
examination o f legal decision-making in the United Nations Security Council and in the 
International Criminal Tribunals. E. O’Sullivan, Non-Linear Decision Making in 
International Law, unpublished LLM dissertation, University o f Glasgow, 2001 and ‘Law 
and Chaos; Legal Argument as a Non-Linear Process’, in Law and History: Current Legal 
Issues, 2003, Vol. 6, eds. Andrew Lewis and Michael Lobban, (Oxford, 2004), 433-451.That 
research focused on decision making within a modern legal system.
the thirteenth centuiy, before ‘organised justice was dispensed in this land.’^  
The documentary evidence from the twelfth century is not in a format that 
readily complies with the case report format imposed on the thirteenth century 
material by Lord Cooper/ But examining the evidence shows that there was 
a pattern, however incompletely captured and reflected in the records. The 
evidence supports the conclusion that decision-making with regard to property 
rights in the twelfth century, just as in modern legal systems, was primarily 
concerned with an underlying concept of justice which acts, then as now, as a 
sort of strange attractor or focal point of the decision making process. An 
analysis o f the Scottish material within this framework demonstrates that the 
process as well as methods for preventing and resolving disputes evident in 
the charters, place Scotland in the mainstream of the European legal tradition 
during this period. ‘Historians have tended to underemphasise the element of 
decision-making and negotiation that lies behind charters.’  ^ Behind every 
charter, there were decisions taken, negotiations and agreements which may 
not be clearly set out in the charters produced as a result of these interactions. 
Understanding the process of decision-making which lies behind twelfth and 
thirteenth century charters may allow for a greater appreciation of the forces 
acting upon the individuals involved, and the significance of the charters to 
those individuals.^
 ^ Lord Cooper o f  Culross, Select Scottish Cases o f  the Thirteenth Century (Edinburgh, 1944), 
xxiii [Cooper, Select Cases].
Ibid.
® Paul Hyams, ‘Charters and the Early Common Law’, Journal o f  Legal History, Vol. 12, No. 
3 (1991), 173-89, 174.
Ibid.
Conceptually, reasoning follows the format, ‘if a, then b \  This is the 
template applied not only to reasoning in general, but legal reasoning in 
particular/ This linear construct is insufficient, however, in trying to 
understand the process of legal reasoning as it occurs because it is one 
dimensional and static. It is also inadequate for the same reasons, as a means 
of explaining the unpredictable elements found in any dynamical system (one 
which changes over time) and for any attempt at predicting the course of the 
decision making process for any length of time. Because this construct is 
inadequate but widely used and taught, it leads to misconceptions. These 
misconceptions have influenced how the charter evidence of the prevention 
and resolution of disputes has been interpreted.
The perception of linearity, whether in legal decision-making or in other 
areas, has impacted how information about decisions is organised and 
processed. This in turn influences the language used when such decisions are 
discussed, which reinforces the construct. That is, decisions follow one 
another in a straight line, and show continual progression. This may be seen 
in a modern context in the references to precedent, to a case ‘and its progeny’, 
or to a line of cases. Historically, the emphasis on the gradual, seemingly 
inexorable increase in standardization, especially with reference to charter 
format and language, demonstrates the same misprision.
’ Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford, 1995), 19-52.
But linearity is not the only construct of progression. There are at least two 
other models that have been reflected in the literature, especially in the 
twentieth century. The other models discussed here are the periodic or 
oscillating model, and in the late twentieth century, the chaotic model, 
formally known as complexity theory. The oscillating model is similar to the 
‘boom-bust’ approach to history, where progress is made, but by a series of 
fluctuations between two states of being. Chaotic or complex systems operate 
in a non-linear fashion, leaving one with a situation that is perhaps predictable 
in the short term, but not for any appreciable length of time. Such systems are 
very sensitive to initial conditions, so that a small change or difference at the 
beginning of two similar situations can have an exponentially disproportionate 
impact on outcome. This is sometimes referred to as the ‘butterfly effect’. In 
this essay, the terms chaos and complexity will be used interchangeably.^
Each of these models, the linear, periodic and complex, are constrained by an 
attractor. This can be conceived as a point to which the system continually 
reverts. The attractor draws the decisions in each of these systems to it and 
results in the overall structure of the map itself. For a linear model, the 
attractor would be a fixed point. For the oscillating model, the attractor would
® Much has been written about complexity theory. For more detailed and scientific 
explanations, the following may be consulted: .1. Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science 
(New York, 1987); D. Ruelle, Chance and Chaos (Princeton, 1991); N. K, Hayles, Chaos and  
Order (Chicago, 1991); D. Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences: An 
Introduction (London, 1998); Chaos Theory in the Social Sciences: Foundations and 
Applications, eds. L. Douglas Kiel and Euel E lliott, (Ann Arbor, 1996).
be a closed loop, also fixed/ It would be set between the two consistent 
points'** and ‘correct’ for the perceived deviation in any decision making 
process. For the third, complex model the attractor is not fixed. It in fact 
shifts in response to the decisions previously made, and is therefore an 
integral part of the process. This ‘strange attractor’, if graphed, would appear 
as a variety of unique shapes, characterized by a recognisably repeating form, 
which does not retrace the previous path. Thus, while the first two systems 
would create a graph of a line or a graph that moved between two fixed 
parameters, the complex system would appear as a graph that goes up and 
down (and around) in no fixed or predictable pattern."
For each o f these models, the attractor is the element which guides the overall 
structure or pattern. If the linear model and the oscillating model are 
inadequate, one is left with the complexity model. The attractor which 
determines the overall structure of a complex system must be one equally 
applicable at any time period, and fundamental to the perceived integrity of 
the system. For legal decision-making, this ‘strange attractor’ is a concept of 
justice. As Bassiouni notes,
[a] concept of justice and a justice system have characterized every
society throughout the thirty-five or so recorded civilizations over the
 ^Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science, 134-138.
Kiel and Elliot, Chaos Theory in the Social Sciences: Foundations and Applications (Ann 
Arbor, 1996), 7.
” Ruelle, Chance and Chaos, chapter 10, especially 60-65.
past 40,000 years. This enduring presence evidences that justice is
both a human and a social value.
The concept of justice changes continually, but is nevertheless recognisable, 
and it is that which the system continually is drawn towards and repeats 
without (necessarily) exact replication. It is also the concept that readjusts the 
system when it has gone too far in any direction. In effect, the system is 
‘drawn’ toward the concept of justice, with each decision that is made.'^
Notwithstanding the chaotic, or complex nature of these decisions, there is a 
pattern, determined in part by this underlying concept of justice. Justice acts 
as a unifying force, the ‘strange attractor’ which is not rigidly fixed. 
Decision-making does follow a pattern, regardless of context. It does have 
the same elements involved and the same underlying concept. It is this 
evolving concept o f justice which accounts for the flexibility and 
unpredictability of decisions. It is also what makes a necessity to lawyers (re­
interpretation of prior decisions), a perversion to historians (who object to the 
re-working o f history to fit the present).*"*
M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Combating Impunity For International Crimes”, 71 U.Colo.L Rev. 
409 (2000), 420.
This differentiation between stable (linear), stable periodic (oscillating) and chaotic (non­
linear, non-periodic) is not the only way o f describing these systems, nor the most complex. 
Ruelle adds a further level o f  the ‘superimpostition o f two or more oscillations (or modes), 
then chaos.’ Ruelle, Chance and Chaos, 83-84.
The Collected Papers ofF. W. Maitland, ed. H. A. L. Fisher (ed.), 3 vols. (Cambridge, 
1911), 1,491.
This strange attractor, labelled here a concept of justice, may be compared to 
Dworkin’s*^  concept of integrity, or MacCormick’s**’ theory o f coherence. It 
is that which continually draws the individual decision, made within the 
system, back to within the recognizable overall structure, back to within 
recognizable boundaries. Even though complex systems are essentially 
unpredictable, there is an overall pattern, an overall recognisable structure. 
The strange attractor is that which in an organic, dynamic way, maintains this 
structure. This strange attractor, the concept of justice in this analysis, 
evolves over time but is understood by decision-makers at every level of the 
process.
Chaotic or complex regimes ‘function within defined parameters’. This 
means that there is stability in the chaotic system, even though it appears 
disorderly.*^ The system generates repeating forms that do not retrace 
previous forms. These forms are said to be ‘self-similar’. That means that at 
whatever scale one examines them, they appear to look the same. Another 
name for these self-similar forms is fractal.*^
In law and in any decision-making process, whatever the venue, an example 
o f one of these self-similar forms, or fractal, might be the description of the
'^Ronald Dworkin, La\\>’s Empire (Oxford, 1998), 11.
'®Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory {Oxïoxé, 1995), McCormick, 107. 
'^L. Douglas Kiel and Euel Elliott, Chaos Theory in the Social Sciences: Foundations and  
Applications (Ann Arbor, 1996), 7.
D. Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences: An Introduction (London, 1998), 
172.
process of decision-making itself. At whatever level, and whatever scale of 
magnitude, the process, from the decision an attorney or party makes in 
formulating a legal argument to the decision a judge makes in any given case, 
to the decision a group makes in a legislative or quasi-legislative body, the 
parameters are the same. The factors that impact on the decision are the 
established facts determined to be relevant, the law, and the decision-maker, 
whoever that may be. Visually, this legal ‘fractal’ might be conceived as a 
triangle, repeated endlessly at every level o f the legal decision-making 
process. The sides to this triangle are ‘facts’, ‘law (or rule)’, and ‘decision- 
maker(s)’. Looking at the process from further away, the facts that have been 
presented to the decision-maker have been themselves decided by a previous 
decision-maker. The rules or laws to be applied by the ultimate decision­
maker have often been determined by the one presenting the question in the 
first place. Thus, for each ‘side’ of the triangle, there would be another 
triangle informing the ultimate facts, rules or law, and decision-maker.
Although self-similar, no two decisions are ever exactly the same. Likewise, 
at any level o f the legal process one chooses to examine, this same fractal 
appears. Whether it is a royal court or sheriff court, or a legislative body of 
any size, the paradigm applies. If one understands this ‘fractal’ quality of 
legal decision making, one begins to understand that chaotic behaviour ‘is 
globally stable, but locally unstable.’*^  Thus, a rule of law or norm may be
Kiel and Elliott. Chaos Theory in the Social Sciences, 7.
10
generally (globally) applicable, but specifically (locally) it may not apply to 
the instant case. Further, even if it were to be found to apply to the specific 
case, it may not be applied as those who formulated the rule or have adopted 
the norm anticipated.
This process is easier to discern when looking at modern cases. The facts, the 
law and the issues involved are usually laid out injudicial opinions in a well 
recognised (and linear) format. For the most part, one cannot say this about 
twelfth-century charters. Part of the problem is the charter material itself. It 
does not follow a rigid format as most modern judicial decisions do.
Although many of the charters are formulaic, and can be categorised by type 
and often labelled as to the underlying action, they are not structured as 
modern documents, legal or otherwise. The format changes over time, 
however, and becomes more linear in presentation, supporting the concept of 
linear progression.
This leads to another term: ‘dynamical’.^ ** Dynamical systems are those 
which evolve through time. Because the system or process is dynamic, 
meaning it changes over time, there is an inherent instability within the 
process itself. In a dynamical system, the change is not linear, nor is it static.
This is not quite the same as dynamic. ‘Dynamic’ may be either a noun or an adjective, 
and is used to describe how something changes over time. ‘Dynamical’ is an adjective used 
to describe a system together with rules for how this system changes or evolves over time. 
See David J. Wright, ‘Introduction to Dynamical Systems’,
http://www.math.okstate.edu/mathdept/dvnamics/lecnotes/node2.html. Although there are 
other definitions, this is one o f the clearest.
11
Individuals however operate conceptually as if they are in a purely 
deterministic or static system. They assume that if they do the same thing 
today as they did yesterday, they will get the same result. And most of the 
time, in many situations, they do get essentially the same result. But it is 
never the exact same result.
These expectations of achieving a particular result impact not only how one 
would proceed in a particular matter, but how one perceives what has gone 
before. Thus there may be a level of tension between the perceptions of past 
events and how one should proceed in the face of these perceptions. And this 
is as true for the twelfth and early thirteenth century as it is for the modern 
legal world. This is apparent in the citing of precedent in the modern world, 
and in the reference to prior acts and donations during the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries. This would include references to prior charters as seen in 
some of David Ts charters,^* or the objections voiced by the earl of Dunbar in 
his dispute with Melrose Abbey when the judge or decision-maker fails to 
meet his expectations regarding procedural r u l e s . T h i s  tension is 
compounded by the unpredictability inherent in dealing with factors beyond 
one’s control.
Another example of this might be the papal court in the twelfth century. R.A. 
Fletcher, in his discussions of the relations between various Spanish bishops
G.W.S. Barrow, The Charters q/Dav/(7 /  (Woodbridge, 1999), nos. 9, 10, 11.
T. Thomson, Liber Sancte Marie de Melros {Melrose Liber) (Edinburgh, 1837), no.101.
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and the papal court, demonstrated that while bribes were often required to 
achieve one’s aims,^^ they were no guarantee. Factors such as the untimely 
death of someone thought to be favourable to one’s cause "^* or the 
interventions of a local or regional ruler^^ could interfere with the best-laid 
plans.
The lack of predictability in relations with the papal see is demonstrated in 
two very different circumstances dating from the twelfth century. The first 
concerns the many and convoluted steps taken by Bishop Diego Gelmirez to 
obtain the rank of metropolitan for the see of Santiago de Compostela. The 
road to promotion was a long one, starting in 1095 when the current bishop of 
Compostela obtained the papal privilege Et decretorum synodalium at 
C l e rmont , and  it was confirmed in 1101.
Diego Gelmirez made several visits to Rome, and sent emissaries when he 
could not go himself.^^ He used allies both in Spain and abroad to further his 
cause, and was not hesitant to use the pecuniary route when deemed 
expedient. As mentioned above, untimely deaths and unforeseen events could 
impact the outcome, with little or no control possible. Gelmirez’s object, to 
get metropolitan status for Compostela, was successful, but took several
R.A. Fletcher, Saint Jam es’s Catapult (Oxford, 1984), 199, 201, 205. Indications o f bribes 
could range from being ‘urged to be suitably grateful’ to ‘prudently’ bestowing a prebend on 
someone in a position o f  power, or even outright request for ‘presents’.
^^ Fl etcher. Saint Jam es’s Catapult, 197-198.
Ibid, 199.
Ibid, 195.
Ibid, 196-199.
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years, and was by no means a straight road. What is known about the politics, 
the favours, bribes and untimely events comes from two primary sources: the 
Historia Compostellana, which is essentially a gesta of the life and deeds of 
Diego Gelmirez, and the papal records that survive."®
The second case is perhaps the most extreme example that illustrates this 
principle o f unpredictability. The inconsistency of papal decisions and 
unpredictability of events clearly has an effect on the outcome in the dispute 
over the bishopric of Zamora between the three archbishoprics, Santiago de 
Compostela, Toledo and Braga. All had claims to Zamora as a suffragan. 
Santiago de Compostela’s claim was based on the fact that Zamora was part 
o f the bishopric of Salamanca up to 1120. In 1121, when Zamora was 
formally established as a diocese, it was given rights over lands which had 
been in the diocese of Astorga, a suffragan of Braga.^^ The matter is 
complicated further by Zamora’s bishop, Bernardo. He had been a part of the 
entourage of the archbishop of Toledo. Toledo thus had this basis for 
claiming Zamora as well as its claim to metropolitan status over all bishops in 
Spain who did not have a metropolitan,^*^
The dispute between the three archbishoprics lasted from the 1120’s 
throughout the rest of the twelfth centuiy. In the course of the next 60 years
Ibid, chapter VIII, 192-222.
Fletcher, The Episcopate in the Kingdom o f  Leon in the Twelfth Century (Oxford, 1978), 
195.
Ibid, 196.
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or so, various representatives of the three bishoprics sought and obtained a 
number o f rulings, some of which were contradictory. The first ruling was 
obtained by Alo, bishop of Asturga. Zamora had been given lands which 
previously had belonged to Asturga, and Asturga wanted them back. Alo 
petitioned Cardinal Deusdedit in 1123, at the council of Valladolid. Cardinal 
Deusdedit ruled that Bishop Bernardo of Zamora would remain in position 
and continue to administer the lands he currently had until either his death or 
transfer to another see. Deusdedit also ruled that after Bernardo died, the 
bishopric of Zamora would be abolished. After Bishop Bernardo’s death or 
transfer to another see the territories would revert to Astorga.^'
Although this decision was reversed in part by Calixtus II, sometime before 
his death on 13 December 1124, it did not stop Braga from claiming Zamora 
as one of its own suffragans. Then Lucius II (12/03/1144-15/2/1145) declared 
that Zamora was the suffragan of Toledo. Bishop Bernardo of Zamora 
remained in office until his death in 1149. At that time, the archbishop of 
Toledo consecrated Esteban as bishop of Zamora, in violation of the portion 
of Deusdedit’s ruling that Zamora would be abolished after Bernardo’s death, 
which had not been reversed or rescinded. As a result o f this, Braga appealed 
to the Pope.^^ The archbishop of Braga then made his obedience to Toledo as 
primate in May 1150. In January 1151, Bishop Esteban appears to have been 
at the papal curia and in June of the same year. Pope Eugenius III rebuked the
V\ClQ,h&\\ Episcopate, 196.
Ibid, 197.
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archbishop of Toledo for consecrating the bishop of Zamora. Toledo was 
summoned to Rome for an investigation. Whether or not he actually went to 
Rome is uncertain and Archbishop Raimundo died in August 1152/^ His 
successor Juan went to Rome for consecration. While the archbishop elect of 
Toledo was in Rome, the archbishop of Braga was also there and Pope 
Eugenius III heard their arguments over Zamora. He reversed the decision of 
Lucius II and ruled that Zamora was a suffragan of Braga.^"*
There were problems, however. Bishop Esteban refused to profess obedience 
to Braga, in part because the archbishop of Braga was suspended from office 
and Braga’s suffragans were absolved from the duty to submit to the 
archbishop for several years.®  ^ In addition, Santiago de Compostela 
continued to claim Zamora as one of its suffragans. Pope Alexander III had 
determined that Compostela could command (call, assemble, convene), and 
that Zamora ought to respond to Compostela. This was a reversal o f his 
confirmation of Zamora as a suffragan of Braga of 1163. This decision 
probably happened some time after 1172-1173.®^ Apparently, Compostela 
claimed that Braga had never exercised possession over Zamora (Bishop 
Esteban’s continued refusal to submit) and so should give up any claim to 
Zamora.
Ibid, 197, 198. 
Ibid, 198.
Ibid, 198, 199. 
Ibid, 199.
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Alexander III commissioned three bishops to hear the dispute between 
Compostela and Braga, probably in 1180/1181. These three were suffragans 
o f the three archbishops who had any claim to Zamora. They were: Porto 
(Braga), Avila (Compostela) and Tarazona (Toledo). Alexander III died in 
August 1181, and the commission was renewed by Lucius III.^  ^ One of the 
delegates, the bishop of Avila also died and he was replaced by the bishop of 
Salamanca, another suffragan of Compostela. The delegates met at Coria and 
rendered a decision, but the bishop of Porto could not attend. The remaining 
delegates acted without him. In addition, the archbishop of Braga did not 
appear. The others proceeded with the case without Braga and without the 
delegate which was suffragan of Braga. Compostela presented her claim 
unopposed and the delegates ruled that Zamora was a suffragan of 
Compostela.^®
Braga’s complaints about how this was conducted might lead one to think that 
the decision had been predetermined, or fixed. She claimed that the original 
hearing was to be held at Alcanices but was changed to Coria which was more 
inaccessible to Braga. Braga also implied that Porto was excluded from the 
decision-making deliberately.®^ Braga’s complaints about how the 
proceedings were conducted may or may not have influenced Urban Ill’s 
decision regarding the confirmation of the delegates’ decision sought by 
Compostela. Urban III ordered John of Brecscia and John of Bergamo to
Ibid, 200.
Ibid,
Ibid, 201.
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investigate only the decision of the delegates, and to confirm or refute the 
"sententia' o f the judges delegates. Braga refused to be limited by the Pope’s 
mandate to the two, and reopened the entire issue. Compostela, already in the 
position of having won the issue before the delegates, simply pushed forward 
on its request for confirmation. A report was made to the Pope by John of 
Brescia, who had affirmed the sentence in favour of Compostela but nothing 
was done until Innocent III addressed the matter."^^
In 1199, Innocent III reviewed the entire proceedings. His ruling neither 
confirmed Zamora to Compostela as had been recommended by John of 
Brescia, nor did he deny the rights of Compostela."^' He also ruled that John 
o f Brescia’s ruling should not prejudice Braga. Shortly after the ruling. 
Innocent III appointed three more delegates to hear the whole suit, should 
Braga wish to pursue it."'® Apparently, Braga never did.
These examples demonstrate that papal decisions, made by the most highly 
trained legal minds of the time, and in the most record intensive forum, were 
not always consistent, and the reasons for particular decisions were not 
predictable or even logical. The success of petitions to the papal court for the 
same or similar concessions depended upon many factors, not least of which 
were the favour of the pope and important people at his court, and the policies
Ibid, 201.
Ibid, 202.
Ibid, 202.
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of the then current pope. These same accounts show that there is a lack of 
consistency in the results obtained for what appear to be similar goals."'®
This lack of exactitude normally may not seem to matter, but sometimes, it 
makes all the difference. If it is understood that the system is inherently 
unstable, even when things look the same, then one may have a greater 
appreciation of the fact that all situations are different, and what happened 
once will not happen in exactly the same way again. While this may at first 
not seem to apply to historical situations and historical documents, it does. 
The events and the records themselves may not change, but the information 
about them and about the individuals making decisions in medieval Scotland 
may very well change. And the perceptions and interpretations of legal 
historians continually change. If there is an understanding of the stochastic 
element in the decision-making process, one can no longer accept the 
conclusion that the decisions taken in a particular case, whether in Spain or in 
Scotland, were directly the result of a grand design of Christian unity 
throughout the west or even of ‘Normanisation’ in Scotland. Nor can one rest 
comfortably on the assumption that the perceived linearity and progress 
towards centralisation was inevitable,
David Ruelle points out, in Chance and Chaos, ‘Chaos...is quite a pervasive 
feature of natural phenomena.’"'"' This theory has been applied to several
Fletcher, Episcopate (Oxford, 1978), especially chapter 2, 31-86 and chapter 5, 181-220; 
and Saint Jam es’s Catapult (Oxford, 1984), chapter VIII, 192-222.
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fields, but as Ruelle notes, when it is being applied to social sciences, 
economics, history or other ‘soft sciences’, the analysis ‘will necessarily be 
somewhat fuzzy and qualitative.’"'® This is in part due to the subjectivity 
involved in assigning numerical values to non-numerical phenomena, such as 
behaviour, or words. Chaos theory, applied to non-physical systems, ‘appears 
to provide a means for understanding and examining many of the 
uncertainties, non-linearities and unpredictable aspects of social systems 
behaviour.’"'^  ‘That chaos may be a part of elementary politics is evidenced 
by highly exploratory work in the fields of electrical behavior, {sic\ game 
theory, axiomatic choice theory, and conflict analysis.’"'® As any system 
which includes interactions between humans can be classified as a ‘social 
system’, applying this theory to decision making in the prevention and 
resolution of disputes in twelfth and thirteenth century Scotland may allow 
legal historians to see the events which have occurred and the decisions which 
have been made from a new perspective.
There are several ways in which chaos theory or complexity is described. 
When analysed within a particular system, such as a legal system, any 
inconsistencies seem to reduce to a problem of semantics rather than inherent 
conflicts within the theory itself. One explanation states that systems may be 
predictable in the short term, but not in the long term. Another approach
David Ruelle, Chance and Chaos (Princeton, 1991), 80.
Ibid.
Ibid, quoting from S. Krasner, (ed). The Ubiquity o f Chaos (Washington DC, 1990).
T, A, Brown, “Non-linear Politics”, in Chaos Theory in the Social Sciences: Foundations 
and Applications, eds. Kiel and Douglas, (Ann Arbor, 1997), 119.
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States that while predictions of where the system will go are very difficult, 
there is an overall pattern, which is discernable. Another explanation is that 
‘chaos theory describes the manner in which even very simple systems can 
behave in unpredictable ways in response to two kinds of factors: extreme 
sensitivity to initial conditions-for example, when a person misses a bus that 
runs every ten minutes and for that reason misses a train that runs every hour; 
and recursion-the feeding back of previous outcomes into the determination 
of the next set of results’/® This recursion is what some authors have labelled 
‘functional folding’, or self referencing. These are not Luhmann’s"'^  or 
Teubner’s®*' self referential systems, however. Their approach is more 
cybernetic; a basic assumption of their work is that law and the legal system 
are not dynamic, nor are they organic or focused upon the individual decision­
maker. The application of chaos theory to decision-making and legal 
reasoning here presupposes both of these.
It has been noted before in the legal literature that the courts are extremely 
complex systems. Chaos theory attempts to explain that complex, dynamic 
systems are examples of order masquerading as disorder, that is, they are 
unpredictable, but not unstructured.®' Reynolds, in his article ‘Chaos and the
4^0. H. Reynolds, ‘Chaos and the Court’, 91 Colum. L. Rev, 110, 111.
N. Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’, Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 83, 
Nos. 1&2, 136-150(1989).
G. Teubner, ‘ Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’, Law and Society 
Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1983), 239-285.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, ‘Chaos and the Court’, 91Cohun. L. Rev. 110, 112.
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Court’, discusses the applicability of chaos theory to law, more particularly to 
a discussion of the patterns in legal decision-making within the court system.
Others have written about this theory and its application to international 
relations, politics, and economics, as well as to courts systems, and to the 
legal process itself. This thesis seeks to take the application one step further. 
Chaos or complexity theory may elucidate the mechanisms of legal reasoning 
which may lead to greater understanding of the process of legal decision­
making. This reasoning process may be analysed in the same way, whether 
the time period being examined is the twelfth century or the twenty-first 
century. Dworkin has noted that, ‘[i]f we understand the nature of our legal 
argument better, we know better what kind of people we are’.®® Likewise,
‘the structure of judicial argument is typically more explicit, and judicial 
reasoning has an influence over other forms of legal discourse that is not fully 
reciprocal’.®® Because the purpose behind the prevention and resolution of 
disputes is essentially the same regardless of time, complexity theory is useful 
as a tool to understand the dynamics of the process whether it occurs in the 
present or in medieval Scotland. Because the underlying motivating factor, 
the strange attractor, is the same, there is a coherence in the process that is not 
constrained by the fact that the events are historical rather than current. 
Decision-making does follow a pattern, regardless of context. It does involve
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire, Oxford (1998), 11.
Ibid, 15.
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the same elements and the same underlying concept which lends coherence to 
the procedures.
In the context of dispute prevention and resolution, if one accepts the gradual 
development theory, whereby Scotland has marched along the same path 
(albeit slightly behind) as England and by 1250 has a centralised and 
recognisable legal system, one should expect to see this linear development 
reflected in the charters. If the oscillating model is to be accepted, which 
some might detect in Cooper’s phrase o f ‘false starts’ in the sense that there 
are a series o f starts and then apparent stops, one should expect to see a well 
defined arc o f progress within set parameters. This would again lead without 
much deviation to the legal system as it existed circa 1250. While it is 
possible to posit these scenarios, and even reconstruct the evidence in such a 
way to support these models, there are difficulties. There are charters that do 
not fit the pattern, events that do not support either a smooth and continual 
advance or a cyclical evolution. Complexity theory is one way to 
accommodate the elements that do not ‘fit’.
With some sorts o f data it is possible to assign numerical values to particular 
types of items and then to place these items in a graph, depicting a variety of 
relationships between the items and demonstrating all three types of 
behaviour. There are problems with this approach, however, as there are with 
any approach to a large body of information. By necessity, there is a selection
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process. Although a database has been generated for the charters studied, the 
definitions of terms and types of charters are not easily quantifiable. At best, 
a database is a blunt tool circumscribed by the initial terms used to define 
particular aspects of the charters. Any graphs generated from this method of 
organising the material would be two-dimensional and lend an imagined 
uniformity and normality to the evidence which may lead to false 
impressions. Thus, organising the charters into graphs would in fact generate 
representations of the non-linear complex nature of the evidence, which may 
be as misleading as the other models.
It is in the nature of the process that the selection of material and the markers 
used to categorise the charters is subjective to some extent. There is also a 
great deal of overlap between charter types. An example is that the same 
charter might use the term ‘chirograph’ within the text, but also be a ‘quit­
claim’, a record of a donation and confirmation, and a record of a dispute 
settled after the intervention of a third party.®"' To label this single charter as 
one type of document or another may be acceptable within the strict limits of 
diplomatic, but in terms of its context as part of a quasi-legal process it is 
problematic and ultimately misleading. To include it in all or several different 
categories violates the integrity of the database and is equally misleading.
But see Agnes Juhasz-Ormsby, ‘Changing Legal Terminology in Dated Private Documents 
in England in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries: A Case Study-Quitclaims’, in Resourcing 
Sources, The Use o f  Computers in Developing Prosopographical Methodology, ed. K.S.B. 
Keats-Rohan (Oxford, 2002), 195-207. The author has been able to distinguish quitclaims 
from final Concordia  in the English material from 1170-1319. The Scottish charter material 
often combines quitclaims with other types o f documents, confirmations with original 
donations, and grants with settlements.
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The charter evidence as a group is not readily amenable to structured 
mapping. In addition to the problems of labelling a particular charter of one 
type or the other, there are the compounding problems of the limitations on 
source material resulting from any number of causes, not least of which are 
the archival practices of the time period and the accidents of survival. Both 
the initial selection of which charters to preserve and secondary selection of 
continued preservation of these charters has already been done. These initial 
selections were in most cases conducted with an agenda in mind, although 
that agenda may not be clear at a later date. A further selection has been 
conducted here. Not every charter can be discussed. It is not even possible to 
discuss every dispute, especially if one takes the view that there is at least a 
potential dispute behind every charter. The analysis here proceeds in a 
roughly thematic and chronological fashion through the twelfth century. The 
focus is on a few noteworthy cases, either a single record or a group of related 
records, as exemplars. Although this narrows the scope and has an admittedly 
subjective element, it allows for more in-depth discussion of these charters 
and what may be learnt from them about the decision-making process and 
approaches to disputes in medieval Scotland.
Another aspect where complexity may be discerned is reflected in the ‘charter 
development’ into more standardised forms. A good example of this is in the
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charters of both David I®® and Mael Coluim (Malcolm) IV concerning 
brieves of neyfty. At first glance, one may see a trend towards standard 
language with the use of precipio, iniuste and reference to a penalty in the 
phrases super meam defensionem, super meam forisfactum. Upon closer 
inspection, however, the charters demonstrate conformity to an idea rather 
than to strict formulaic phrases. There is an address in some of the charters to 
'omnibusprobis hominibus tocius terre sue'^^ which is from both David’s and 
Malcolm’s reigns, datable to 1141x1150 for David I and 1153x1162 for 
Malcolm IV, but the phrase might also appear as 'omnibus fidelibus suis 
tocius Scocie et Laudonie ’®® as seen in an early charter of David I datable to c. 
1128. In one of Malcolm’s later charters, the phrase is after the specific 
address to the various officials: 'Justiciis suis, Vicecomitibus, Prepositis, 
Ministris, Cunctisque Aliis probes hominibus totius terre sue. ’®^ Although 
there is an address, and it seems to conform to a particular format, it does not 
become more standardised over time. More striking still is the variation in the 
text of these charters. While the message remains constant, that is, they all 
are commands to return fugitive neyfs or serfs and prohibitions against 
keeping those that belong to another, the wording does not become more 
regularised. These texts represent more of a variation on a theme rather than
Barrow (ed). Charters o f  D avid 1, nos. 20, 142.
G.W.S. Barrow (ed), The Acts o f  Malcolm IV King o f Scots 1153-1165, (RRS, f) 
(Edinburgh, 1960), nos. 167, 188, 192.
Barrow (ed), D avid  I , no. 142, RRS, i, nos. 167, 188.
Barrow (ed), D avid  I, no. 20.
Barrow, RRS, i, no. 192.
26
standardised phrases. This sort of conformity to an idea rather than strictly to 
a format is evident in many royal charters of different types.
What follows is a discussion of the charter evidence, within the framework of 
complexity applied to decision-making in the prevention and resolution of 
disputes. Analysis of these decisions demonstrates that decision-making was 
in fact a complex and multi-faceted process, dependent upon several factors 
which changed depending on the circumstances and people involved. The 
Scottish evidence places Scotland within the European legal tradition, and 
demonstrates that the changes taking place throughout Europe during the 
twelfth and early thirteenth centuries were also affecting Scotland.
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CHAPTER II
DEFINING DISPUTES
Scholars from several disciplines have analysed disputes and the disputing 
process. Over the last century, perceptions and discussions of this topic have 
undergone several shifts and incorporated a variety of methodologies and 
influences from different disciplines. Broadly speaking, the approaches to the 
topic of disputes and the subsequent analysis may be divided into two groups.
First, there are those who have examined disputes and the disputing process 
within a broad context, such as the society or culture. These generally take a 
more ‘institutional’ approach. Another way of characterizing this is as a more 
‘external’ examination of the disputing process. Disputes are characterized as 
part of the framework of a system of administering justice within a set of rules 
or laws, which have been accepted by those involved and the group as a 
whole, whether an entire society, region or kingdom. This perspective makes 
basic assumptions concerning confrontations about injury or harm suffered by 
one and inflicted by another. There is a shared concept of wrong, and a 
shared acceptance of ways to redress the wrong. This external approach 
places the dispute rather than the law at the centre of the discussion within a 
given context.
The second group is composed of those who have examined the actual 
workings of the process itself. This approach focuses more on individual 
behaviour, on the application of the rule, norm or law to the particular facts in 
a particular instance, by a particular decision maker. This may be viewed as a 
more ‘internal’ perspective. Such an approach is more flexible, more 
adaptable and may focus on the ‘soft’ aspects of a society: the beliefs, values
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and attitudes of the individuals and groups within that society. Thus, there is 
room for variations in perceptions of what is just depending on an individual’s 
status or circumstances. While this may at first be considered the more 
legalistic approach, the emphasis is less on the rule of law than on the process 
itself. The external approach is actually more focused on the structure of the 
institutions, society, and the rule of law, all of which are external to the 
individual. Neither approach is mutually exclusive. Examining disputes and 
the disputing process using both approaches in fact yields a more complete 
picture of what is actually happening both internally, within the dispute itself, 
and externally, placing the dispute in the larger context of law and justice and 
society as a whole.
What follows is a brief overview of the literature on disputes, focusing on 
changes in perceptions of what constitutes a dispute, and on how disputes 
have been examined, and how this affects the analysis of decision making 
with regard to disputes in twelfth century Scotland.
The literature on disputes shows that over time, perceptions and attitudes 
change, and often the changes feed upon themselves in an evolutionary way. 
Thus, one change or shift begets another which could not have arisen in the 
same way without the earlier event. Part and parcel of this process is the way 
each group and each generation perceives and defines both the past and its 
own identity. Both perceptions of the past and notions of identity evolve 
dynamically. Historians and lawyers continue to re-examine the past, 
sometimes discovering new material, but more often re-interpreting what 
others have culled and talked through many times. This is especially true for 
legal decisions; their value lies in their ability to be re-interpreted and made
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relevant to present needs. The process of legal decision making is also one 
which has evolved, more in the way it has been presented than in the way it 
was done. Re-examining the written evidence of these decisions over time 
allows for conclusions concerning the underlying process, the mutability of 
perceptions with regard to it, and the factors which impact on both the 
underlying process and the evolution in perceptions of those involved. 
Changes occurred in the way disputes were prevented and resolved in twelfth 
century Scotland and in the way they were perceived, recorded and utilised.
Disputes are an inevitable part of life in any society. They occur as part of the 
interactions between individuals and may appear in any aspect of the life of a 
community. ‘Tensions and conflicts are facts o f civilization, and when 
exacerbated create harm and suffering which may be deeply felt. It is the 
business of the political authority to decide what is permitted and forbidden, 
to categorize the multiplicity of illegal acts; but it is for the individual or 
collective victim to demand justice, satisfaction and punishment.’' Because 
they are such an integral part of the communal landscape, studying disputes, 
and specifically the prevention and resolution of disputes, allows a deeper 
understanding of the values of a community, and the nature o f and approach 
to concepts of justice and law, and expressions of power. Although this study 
focuses primarily on Scotland during this era, the 12*'’ and early 13*'’ centuries 
were a period of change not just in Scotland but all over Europe. In a sense.
' N. Castan, ‘The Arbitration o f  Disputes under the "'Ancien Régime^'’\  in J. Bossy, Disputes 
and Settlements: Law and Human Relations in the West, ed. J. Bossy (Cambridge, 1983), 219.
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Scotland was a microcosm of what was taking place throughout Western 
Europe.
The shifts in concepts of law, justice and the impact they had on the 
prevention and resolution of disputes may be discerned in the monastic 
cartularies and royal charters of this period where the extant records of 
disputes may be found. When analysing them, however, one must be vigilant 
about the various influences that were brought to bear on the processes 
reflected in the texts. These influences include the perspective of those 
making the records, the people involved in the underlying action and not least 
in importance, why the record was made and to whom it was directed. Lastly, 
one of the most important aspects of all written evidence of disputes, or of 
steps taken to prevent disputes, is their value in portraying concepts of power 
and how it was exercised.
In the prevention and resolution of legal disputes, the decision-making 
process follows the same triangular fractal discussed above where the 
decision maker applies the law to the relevant facts, regardless o f when or 
even who is making the decision (at least in the Western world).® But because 
the charter evidence is not constructed as modern judicial decisions, where the
 ^Although women could make decisions and were part o f disputes in a fair number of 
charters, the vast majority o f  decision makers were men. Thus for simplicity and to avoid 
unnecessary verbiage, the masculine will be used in all general references. A detailed 
analysis o f  women in power including women’s roles as holders o f property with all that that 
entailed (including the issuing o f charters and the use o f seals) may be found in Susan M. 
Johns, Noblewomen, Aristocracy and Power in the Twelfth-century Anglo-Norman Realm 
(Manchester, 2003).
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reasoning is laid out in the ratio decidendi, the reasoning process taking place 
in medieval disputes must be discerned from a composite of information and 
within an inter-disciplinary context, especially in the early part of the period 
studied. An analysis o f the charter evidenee shows an uneven evolution 
towards conformity in the way decisions are expressed, and in the elements 
included in the texts, but this process is not linear, nor is it predictable. This 
shift may be seen to be part of the larger one in western intellectual thought, 
involving the changes not only in teaching methods, but in the emphasis 
towards Dialeetics and on rational persuasion occurring in the twelfth 
century.® Part and parcel of this shift is the increasing emphasis on the written 
word, and objeetification and expansion of rules beyond the local, to
 ^ Lynn H. Nelson, (trans.). Herman o f  Tournai, The Restoration o f  the M onastery o f  Saint 
Martin o f  Tournai, appendix 2, 138-139. Although placing the shift in description o f the 
dispute resolution process within the context o f this intellectual shift is valid, the topic is 
beyond the scope o f  this thesis and must be explored at a later date. For more general 
discussions o f law and reason within the intellectual framework of the medieval era, see G. R. 
Evans, Law and Theology in the Middle Ages, (London, 2002), and Philosophy and Theology 
in the Middle Ages, (London, 1993); Edward Grant, G od and Reason in the Middle Ages, 
(Cambridge, 2001), as w ell as older works on the subject, including those by Charles Homer 
Haskins, and Brian Tierney, While there will be some discussion o f  the Rational/Irrational 
debate, it will be limited. There simply is not enough evidence in the Scottish charters 
studied here to support a lack o f rationality in decision-making or problem solving. For 
further reading on this debate, see R.C. Van Caenegem, ‘Reflexions on Rational and 
Irrational Modes o f Proof in Medieval Europe’, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, vol. 58, 
1990, 263-280; ‘The Developed Procedure o f the Second Middle Ages, XII-XV Century’, in 
Encyclopaedia o f  Comparative Lau>, AT7 (Civil Procedure), Tübingen: Mohr, London: N.
.Toff (1984), 11-53; Paul Hyams, ‘Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common 
Law’, in M.S. Arnold, et al. (eds.). On the Laws and Customs o f  England: Essays in Honor o f  
S.E. Thorne, (Chapel Hill, N.C. ,1981), 90-126; S. Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities in 
Western Europe, 900-1300  (Oxford, 1997); M. Clanchy, ‘Medieval mentalities and primitive 
legal practice’, in Law, laity and solidarities. Essays in honour o f  Susan Reynolds, eds.
Pauline Stafford, Janet L. Nelson, Jane Martindale (Manchester, 2001), 83-94. These are just 
a few o f the writings on this subject. There are few, if  any, that directly address the question 
with regard to the Scottish material. This may be due to the fact that there are so few  
references to ‘non-rational’ modes of proof such as the trial by ordeal. This is not to say that 
there were no references, just that there are so few in the twelfth century material for Scotland 
that it would be difficult to draw useful comparisons between what may be termed rational 
modes o f proof and irrational modes o f proof.
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encompass an entire region or kingdom. This refocusing from emphasis on 
oral to written means of communication profoundly affected the way in which 
disputes were conceptualised and framed in the texts. This change in the way 
the evidence of disputes was recorded and preserved in turn affected the way 
historians and lawyers have approached them.
This problem is compounded by the differing perspectives and approaches of 
lawyers and historians to the evidence. As Milsom has pointed out, when 
discussing the approach of lawyers to medieval law-suits,
[T]o us a law-suit should first ascertain the facts and then apply 
the law. Relevant facts are therefore stated; and although we 
cannot know whether any particular party is telling the truth, we 
can be fairly sure that it would be lawful to act as he did if the 
facts were as he says. This last of course is always so; and to the 
extent that facts are stated at all in the earliest records the legal 
and social order is faithfully reflected."'
Both historians and lawyers however have been influenced by other 
disciplines in the analysis of disputes, and in the perceptions of customary law 
in the middle ages. The more recent view has been that customary law, by 
which these disputes were regulated, was more flexible and adaptable than
S.F.C. Milsom, The Legal Framework o f  English Feudalism  (Cambridge, 1976), 2. This 
approach is not limited to lawyers; see A.A.M. Duncan, Scotland: The Making o f  the 
Kingdom. I must acknowledge the influence on my own perspective o f  both legal and 
historical training.
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previously thought. It was also more rational in its approach to the prevention 
and resolution of disputes. ‘Despite the occasional use of ordeals and the 
belief in supernatural sanctions which they imply, it seems to give 
considerable scope for argument to evaluate degrees of wrong and to fit 
general principles to particular cases,’® But as Reynolds points out, 
‘[FJormalism is, on the face of it, more likely to characterize professional law 
than unprofessional customary law. Without written records, forms of words 
are unlikely to be fixed, and without some form of publication, definitions and 
decisions cannot become authoritative.’*^ Reynolds goes on to say that 
‘unwritten, customary law therefore cannot be rigid’ and assumes, 
understandably but too readily, that written records inhibit or even prevent 
mutation, and indeed, result in a more rigid formalism.® Analysing disputes in 
a society not recognised by either lawyers or historians for a perceived 
‘formalistic’ approach to decision making may prove instructive in what, if 
any, elements exist of Milsom’s description of the application o f laws to the 
facts o f a given case. It may also demonstrate how flexible the approaches 
may have been before the advent of the more structured and external legal 
system of the mid- thirteenth century.
‘Dispute settlement is a subject of crucial importance to both sociologists and 
historians of other societies. O f particular interest.,, is the fact that the study
Susan Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900-1300  (Oxford, 1997), 
14.
 ^ Ibid.
’ Ibid.
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of the settlement procedures which lay behind the records highlights the 
relationship between the charter’s form (and the history o f its form) and its 
social, political and cultural context. And without this understanding, legal 
history becomes another specialist taskmaster, written as it usually is, if not 
by lawyers, then with a legalist slant...’® While the disputing process can and 
should be studied by lawyers and legal historians, an interdisciplinary 
approach may yield deeper understanding o f the non-legal aspects involved in 
the disputing process. ‘When there is a formal dispute over property the 
recorded process of establishing ownership becomes far more complex and 
may reveal to us a vivid and detailed impression of contemporary activity.’^
Yet if one compares the approaches to disputes by the various disciplines, one 
needs to exercise caution. Each discipline has its own mentality, both in 
research and in writing about the subject. ‘History as usually written.. .is 
quite different from history as usually lived: the historian records the 
exceptional because it is interesting-because it is
exceptional...Anthropologists and historians use history differently because 
anthropologists are generally more concerned with uncovering, describing, 
and analysing the normal processes of social life and of change, rather than 
the exceptional processes. And legal history differs from both in its attempts
W. Davies and Paul Fouracre, The Settlement o f Disputes in Early M edieval Europe 
(Cambridge, 1986), 2.
Ibid, 23.
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to reconstruct the laws and legal systems of a particular period and their uses 
in society.’"'
In order to understand the factors impacting on the interpretation of the 
charter evidence a brief overview of the approaches to dispute prevention and 
resolution in law, legal anthropology and history may prove instructive. While 
the body of literature is vast and cannot be covered in detail here, there are 
some notable highlights. Numerous authors have dealt with the subject.' '
The variety and combinations of some of these approaches bring new 
perspectives to prior events and new lessons from old material. These 
approaches over the last century or so have ranged from that arising out of the 
legal anthropology field up through the 1960s, to the more variant approach of 
Frederic Cheyette'® in the 1970s and the studies of Stephen White in Northern 
and Western France in the 1970s and early 1980s.'® Patrick Geary has also 
written on this subject for France.'"' There have been studies of England 
during the Anglo-Saxon period, most notably by Patrick Wormald,'® and R.C.
J, Starr, ‘The “Invention” o f Early Legal Ideas: Sir Henry Maine and the Perpetual Tutelage 
o f Women’, in H istory and Power in the Study o f  Law, eds. J. Starr and J.F. Collier, 345-68, 
345-6.
' ' A good selection o f articles may be found in J.Bossy, Disputes and Settlement: Law and 
Human Relations in the West (Cambridge, 1983), and W. Davies and P. Fouracre, The 
Settlement o f  Disputes in Early Medieval Europe (Cambridge, 1986).
See for example, F. Cheyette, ‘Suum cuique tribuere’, French Historical Studies, Vol. 6, 
No. 3 (Spring, 1970), 287-299.
S. White, ‘ “Pactum... Legum Vincit et Amor Judicum”, The Settlement o f  Disputes by 
Compromise in Eleventh-Century Western France’, American Journal o f  Legal History, Vol. 
XXII, 282-30 (1978).
P. Geary, ‘Vivre en Conflit Dans Une France Sans État : Typologie Des Mécanismes de 
Règlement des Conflits (1050-1200)’, Annales ESC, septembre-octobre 1986, no. 5, pp. 
1107-1133.
P. Wormald has written extensively on this and related topies. See his Legal Culture in the 
Early M edieval West: Lcnv as Text, Image and Experience (London and Rio Grande 1999),
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Van Caenegem, Susan Reynolds, Paul Brand, Paul Hyams, David Bates and 
John Hudson among others, for the Anglo- Norman era.'^
For Scotland, there has also been a substantial body of literature, especially 
regarding the origins and development of the laws of Scotland. A logical 
starting point is the Stair Society’s publications. Volume 1, An Introductory 
Survey o f  the Sources and Literature o f  Scots Zmv/® discusses the various 
records and literature considered as sources of law. Slightly more than twenty 
years later, another volume of the Stair Society focused directly on the legal 
history of Scotland.'® Other writings include Lord Cooper’s Select Scottish 
Cases o f  the Thirteenth Century}'^ a legal history by David Walker,®" and 
various writings by G.W.S. Barrow, A.A.M. Duncan, and articles by David 
Sellar, Hector MacQueen, and Alan Watson, to name but a few who have 
contributed to the field. While many of these writings are general overviews, 
some specific works have been done which have influenced how lawyers and 
historians approach Scottish legal history.®' One of the most influential in this 
field, especially for the topic here, has been Hector MacQueen’s, Common
especially chapter 11; also, there are several disputes/lawsuits discussed in his The Making of 
English Law: King Alfred to the Twelfth Century (Oxford, 1999).
J. Hudson, The Formation o f  The English Common Law: Law and Society in Englandfrom  
the Norman Conquest to Magna Carta (London and N ew York, 1994). There are several 
articles as well, including Hudson, ‘Anglo-Norman land law and the origins o f  property’, in
G. Garnett and J. Hudson, (eds.) Law and Government in M edieval England and Normandy: 
Essays in Honour o f  Sir James Holt (Cambridge, 1994), 212.
An Introductory Smwey o f  the Sources and Literature o f  Scots Law, Stair Society, Vol. 1 
(Edinburgh, 1936).
An Introduction to Scottish Legal History, Stair Society, Vol. 20 (Edinburgh, 1958).
Cooper, Select Cases.
D, Walker, A Legal H istory o f  Scotland  (Edinburgh, 1988),
Especially o f  note are the works by T.B. Smith, British Justice: The Scottish ContribtUion 
(London, I9 6 l) \ and The Doctrines o f  Judicial Precedent in Scots Law (Edinburgh, 1952).
37
Law and Feudal Society in Medieval Scotland, focused primarily after the mid 
13**’ century/®
Many of these writers have dealt with the development of the law, and 
especially the common law,®® legal institutions or the interface between law 
and society.®"* While they often used case studies in their works, they do not 
focus on the decision-making process itself as a part of dispute management. 
Examining the decision-making process within this context places the aspects 
of both continuity and change, necessary in any dynamic system, in sharp 
relief. Limiting the focus to the period of circa 1115 to 1250 in Scotland 
demonstrates the universality of both the decision making process and the 
necessity of the twin concepts o f justice and law.
Simon Roberts has given a brief historical perspective on the anthropological 
studies done on disputes in various cultures over the last century or so. He 
noted a change in the approach; where initially the studies done had a 
‘straightforward, functionalist character’ relying explicitly on legal theory®®
H. MacQueen, Common Law and Feudal Society in M edieval Scotland  (Edinburgh, 1993).
P. Brand, The Making o f  the Common Law (London, 1992); R.C. Van Caenegem, The Birth 
o f  the English Common Lcrw (Cambridge, 1988); D. Bates, ‘The earliest Norman writs’, 
English Historical Review  (1985) 266-284, and ‘The Origins o f the Justiciarship’,
Proceedings o f  the Battle Conference (1981), 1-12; P. Wormald, The Making o f  English 
Law: King Alfred to the Twelfth Century, Vol. /, (Oxford, 1999), are just a few o f  the many 
who have dealt with this subject.
S. Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities (Oxford, 1997) (2d ed.); Ideas and Solidarities o f  
the M edieval Laity (Aldershot, 1995); Fiefs and Vassals: the M edieval evidence reinterpreted 
(Oxford, 1994); ‘Fiefs and Vassals in Scotland: A View From Outside’, SHR, (2003), 176-93.
S. Roberts, ‘The Study o f Dispute: Anthropological Perspectives’, in Disputes and 
Settlement: Law and Human Relations in the West, ed. J, Bossy, (Cambridge, 1983), 1-24, 3.
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which he described as ‘rule-centred’^ ,^ it soon gave way to research with a 
transactional flavour. This new influence was already evident in the 1920s. 
He also noted that these later studies owe very little to legal theory. They 
focused on small, isolated communities, with the researcher often visiting in 
the field, and staying for extended periods in order to observe first hand.
The basic arguments concerning dispute resolution have been set out since the 
1960s within the field of legal anthropology. An overview of this literature 
may be found in Francis G. Snyder’s ‘Anthropology, Dispute Processes and 
Law: A Critical Introduction’.^  ^ He noted that ‘[T]he main contributions of 
anthropologists have been to outline different forms of dispute processing, 
provide ethnographic data (usually from other countries) and propose limited 
generalisations. Though it is impossible to delimit these contributions 
precisely, one important strand clearly concerns the influences of social 
organisation on dispute processing, including informal alternatives to 
courts.
Snyder discussed the basic assumptions proposed by Laura Nader in 1965. 
These are, that: ‘1) there is a limited scope of disputes for any particular 
society...; 2) a limited number of formal procedures are used in human
Ibid, 4.
27 F. Snyder, ‘Anthropology, Dispute Processes and Law: A Critical Introduction’, British 
Journal o f  Lem Æ Society, Vol. 8, Number 2, (1981). This article, as well as a number of 
others on the subject, has been re-published in Law and Anthropology eds. Peter Sack and 
Jonathan Aleck, (Aldershot, 1992).
^^Ibid, 74.
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societies in the prevention of and /or settlement of d is p u te s . .3) there will 
be a choice in the number and modes of settlement.. While the terms 
‘formal procedures’ and even ‘dispute’ may generate disagreement as to exact 
meaning, here these terms will be confined to the generally accepted ones that 
a formal procedure would involve more than the disputants themselves, that 
is, some sort of public forum or involvement (formal), some recognisable 
rules by which the individuals operated within the context o f a dispute 
spectrum (procedure), and an actual or potential dispute over property rights.
This ‘processing’ or differentiating the modes of dispute has given way since 
the 1960s to a comparative approach. Roberts noted that legal anthropologists 
have moved on to consider the relationships between these groups and the 
state, or larger groups into which they have become incorporated. These have 
given rise to comparisons, which seemed to be where the research was at the 
time of Roberts’ publication. He did give some definitions though which may 
be useful for purposes of this analysis.
One of the key concerns is the definition of disputes. There are several 
approaches available. A modern, legalistic way of defining disputes is as ‘a 
specific disagreement relating to a question of rights or interests in which the
L. Nader, ‘The Anthropological Study o f  Law’ (1965) 67 (6) (2), in American 
Anthropologist, ed. L. Nader, (Special Publication on ‘The Ethnography o f  Law”), 3-32, at 
13.
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parties proceed by way o f claims, counter-claims, denials and so on.’^ ° One 
which seems to include a more interdisciplinary approach has been put forth 
by Roberts:
‘One possible approach is to identify as ‘disputes’ only those 
confrontations which follow from an actor’s perception that some 
harm he has suffered or anticipates flows from another’s departure 
from accepted criteria of association. The existence of any human 
group must imply some understanding among the members as to how 
the activities o f everyday life should be arranged, and as to what forms 
of conduct are to be acceptable or unacceptable in a given context.
How far these understandings are translated in explicit, articulate 
normative terms has been shown to vary considerably 
from one culture to another; but some shared idea of recognized 
interest, some conception of ‘wrong’, constitutes a necessary basis of 
association. From that position, we could treat as disputes those 
occasions where one feels he has suffered an injury, sees 
another as to blame and confronts him with responsibility.’^ ^
This definition necessarily assumes that there has been a departure from 
accepted behaviour. If there has been no such departure, then there should not
J. Collier and V. Lowe, The Settlement o f  Disputes in htternational Law: Institutions and  
Procedures (Oxford, 1999), 1.
S. Roberts, ‘The Study o f Dispute: Anthropological Perspectives’, in Disputes and  
Settlement: Law and Human Relations in the West ed. J. Bossy, (Cambridge, 1983), 1-24, 7.
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be a basis for holding another responsible for the injury. This, in turn, 
assumes à priori an adversarial element in all relations in a society. Thus, 
there would always be at least the potential of a dispute, a dispute ‘in embryo’ 
so to speak in any interaction. In addition, while the more legalistic definition 
appears more objective, viewing disputes according to external criteria and 
observable actions (procedural steps) taken by the actors, Roberts’ definition 
incorporates a more subjective, individualistic element, from the perspectives 
of the participants themselves.
According to Roberts, Henry Sumner Maine in his Ancient Law saw 
adjudication as the basic means o f dispute settlement from the outset of social 
life. In all levels of society, disputes were resolved by a third party decision­
maker. For Maine, it was a matter of judging, regardless of whether it was in 
the form of arbitration or adjudication.^^ Roberts also noted that the judging 
was done at different levels of civilization by different kinds of people, with 
different criteria underpinning their judgements. Underlying this approach, as 
well as underlying the approaches of Durkheim and M. Weber, is an 
assumption of a ‘necessary link between social order and some form of 
central control.’ Roberts pointed out that ‘[ojnce we are freed from the 
necessity o f the King and the Judge, though in the West still expecting to find
Roberts, ‘The Study o f  Dispute,’ 10. Roberts does not give a footnote reference for Maine. 
Ibid, and see footnote 14 on p. 10.
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them somewhere in the picture, it becomes possible to examine the range of 
dispute institutions in a far less restricted way.’^ "^
This opened the door to approaching disputes from the view of the parties, or 
from a perspective more universal than either the parties or the judge. If one 
considers the whole notion of disputes as a means of balancing rights, then the 
idea of justice as a pre-eminent motive becomes more acceptable. Likewise, 
if one is examining the whole range of dispute institutions, analysing the 
methods used to prevent disputes in the first place demonstrates the 
continuum of mechanisms available at almost every stage from negotiation 
through final conclusion.
While the actual role of disputes in the interactions of individuals within 
society has been shifted over time, the earlier (1960s-1970s) literature placed 
disputes at the centre of any discussion, rather than placing law at the centre. 
As Snyder noted, an analysis of the dispute process ‘denotes clearly that the 
outcome of disputes is not necessarily a firm resolution of the issues 
ostensibly at stake. Disputing displaces law as the subject of s t u d y . H e  
then built on Gulliver’s 1969 definition of a dispute as the public assertion, 
usually through some standard procedures, of an initially dyadic
Ibid, 11.
Snyder, ‘Anthropology, Dispute Processes and Law: A Critical Introduction, British 
Journal o f  Law & Society, Vol. 8, Number 2, Winter 1981, in Law and Anthropology ed. P. 
Sack, (Aldershot, 1992), 69.
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disagreement, noting that it has been widely accepted/^ Once it becomes a 
public concern, the attitudes, expectations and roles taken on by the 
community become a focus of attention as well.
‘Forms of dispute processing have been the subject of a great deal of 
research’,le a d in g  to an equally large amount of literature. Much of the 
theoretical work by anthropologists has been stimulated by sociological 
theories. These have ranged from the concept that political and judicial 
modes form two ideal, polar types of processes, to a distinction between law 
and warfare as two basic forms of conflict resolution.^^ ‘Any typology that 
distinguishes simply between judicial and political forms of processing is now 
widely deemed inadequate, as most scholars recognise that both norms and 
power are pervasive elements in all dispute processes every w h e r e . T h i s  
bipolarisation, either/or nature of situations may be seen in the sources as well 
as in the literature. One example is the discussions of judgement and 
settlement as if they were mutually exclusive,'^'^ when in fact, all too often
Ibid. ‘Dyadic’ meaning between two individuals or entities.
Ibid 72.
Ibid. This paragraph is a paraphrase. For a current discussion o f the relationship between 
law and polities, see, Martin Loughlin, Sword and Scales: An Examination o f  the 
Relationship between Law and Politics (Oxford, 2000).
Ibid.
M. Clanehy, ‘Law and Love in the Middle A ges’, in J. Bossy, Disputes and Settlements 
(Cambridge, 1983), 47. At 49, Clanehy also quotes Glattvill, ‘it is generally true that 
agreement prevails over law’ as support for the proposition. While that quote referred to 
contracting parties, not opponents in a court, the principle holds equally true for disputants. 
Glanvill discusses agreements (eoneords, chirographs) made in the king’s court in Book V lll.
G.D.G. Hall, The treatise on the Iom>s and customs o f  the realm o f  England commonly called  
Glanvill, {Glanvill) (London, 1965), 94-103.
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both extremes are to be f o u n d . T h u s ,  one may visualise the disputing 
process as a spectrum or a continuum rather than an either/or situation.
During the 1970s the focus shifted to Western societies, and specifically to 
alternative dispute processing. Much has been done in this field with regard 
to modern dispute resolution, chiefly with the court annexed and non-court 
alternatives to dispute processing. This focus has been evident since the late 
1970s among legal academics, and has borne fruit in the number o f alternative 
dispute mechanisms which have become available to litigants and potential 
litigants. These programmes have been in operation for a number of years in 
the United States and in Europe.
Since the early 1980s much work has been done in these fields with regard to 
dispute management in both so called ‘primitive’ cultures and latterly, in 
modern cultures. The effects of these studies include the reorganisation of 
some modern court systems in Europe and the United States, with alternative 
dispute resolution becoming a focus of attention, and more emphasis placed 
on non-confrontational means of resolving disputes."^  ^ With the greater
For discussions on ‘law and love’ and lovedays, see M. Clanehy, ‘Law and Love in the 
Middle A ges’, in D isputes and Settlements, ed. J. Bossy, (Cambridge, 1983), 47-67 and J. 
Bennett, ‘The Mediaeval Loveday’, Speculum, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1958) 351-370. In many of  
the Scottish disputes, this in fact seems to be the outcome. There are hearings, sometimes 
before both ecclesiastical and secular judges, and then a chirograph which indicates there was 
an amicable agreement between the parties.
There are courses being taught in law schools on Arbitration, Negotiation, Alternative 
Dispute Management, as well as government funding for ‘Court-Annexed Dispute 
Resolution’. There has been for a number of years the various Arbitration associations, and 
the International community has long used non-litigious means o f settling disputes, which
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interest in modern alternative dispute mechanisms the question of how earlier 
European societies went about preventing and resolving disputes has become
more pertinent."^^
Although studies have been done, as mentioned above concerning medieval 
society in general and for particular geographical areas, comparatively little 
has been done on this topic for Scotland prior to 1250. Exceptions to this 
include Lord Cooper’s Select Scottish Cases o f  the Thirteenth Centur)’^ ^^ 
which includes several cases before 1250, and discussions of the early laws 
and customs in E.W. Robertson’s Scotland under her Early K i n g s ,A.C, 
Lawrie, Early Scottish Charters Prior to A.D. 1153,^^ and references to early 
legal matters in Habakkuk Bisset’s Rolment o f  Courtis.^'’ And the most recent 
extensive discussion of disputes is, again. Hector MacQueen’s Common Law 
and Feudal Society in Medieval Scotland. In this comprehensive work, 
MacQueen discussed others who have approached the whole feudal question 
especially with regard to law. In discussing Milsom, he points out that 
Mi Isom’s feudal world ‘is an essentially legalistic one’ where ‘society seems
have been set forth in a number o f international treaties, including the Charter o f the United 
Nations.
This focus in the legal profession has in turn, influenced the literature on this subject. See 
Stephen D. White, ‘Feuding and peacemaking in the Touraine around the year 1000’, 
Traditio, 42 (1986), 195-263; Patrick J. Geary, ‘Living with conflicts in stateless France: a 
typology o f  conflict management mechanisms, 1050-1200’, in Living with the dead in the 
middle ages (lihüca,'H,Y., 1994), 125-160.
' '^'Cooper, Select Cases.
E. W. Robertson, Scotland Under her Early Kings: a History o f  the Kingdom to the Close 
o f  the Thirteenth Cew/i/rr (Edinburgh, 1862).
A.C. Lawrie, Early Scottish Charters Prior to A.D. 1153 (Glasgow, 1905).
Habakkuk Bisset's Rolment o f Courtis, ed. P.J. H am i 1 ton - G r i er son, Vols. l-Ill (Edinburgh 
and London, 1920).
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almost solely dependent upon fairly precisely-defined tenurial relationships to 
define the exercise of power and a u t h o r i t y T o  be fair, Milsom himself 
acknowledged that his approach was that of a lawyer/^ As Milsom’s 
conclusions are based on an investigation of legal sources generated in the 
time period ‘ immediately after that in which he says that they were most 
powerful’ they ‘tended to emphasise the court as taker of decisions on 
disputed m a t t e r s . B u t  MacQueen, quoting Paul Hyams, pointed out that 
one must be careful of what a source says about a prior age.^* MacQueen’s 
work assumed, as have other legal histories, a more centrist and ‘rules’ 
approach, focusing on the various brieves in use in Scotland, procedural 
requirements, and methods of obtaining relief.
One can divide the approaches to analysing disputes into two camps: 
institutional analysis, which has a more ‘external’ approach, and observation 
of behaviour, which is focused more on the ‘internal’ aspects o f the process.^^ 
The institutional approach seems to be favoured more by Western jurists, 
‘since it is suited to state societies and written forms of law, past or present, 
Western or non-Western.’^^  But Rouland points out that in oral societies, the 
institutional approach is insufficient, and the use of the observation of 
behaviour may actually be more valuable. Such an approach focuses on legal
H. MacQueen, Common Law and Feudal Society in Medieval Scotland  (Edinburgh, 1993), 
1 1 .
S.F.C, Milsom, The Legal Framework o f  English Feudalism  (Cambridge, 1976), 1.
H. MacQueen, Common Law, 11.
Ibid.
N. Rouland, Legal Anthropology,tmns, Philippe G. Planel, (London, 1994), 141.
Ibid.
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behaviour and the values and beliefs of the individuals and groups involved. 
Rouland points out that ‘the perception of just and unjust will vary according 
to the status of groups and individuals in the social hierarchy; hierarchies, 
values and authority must thus be clearly identified, without neglecting 
minority i n t e r e s t s . ‘The description of behaviour will permit a clearer 
interpretation of institutions.’^^  When taken together, descriptions of 
behaviour and analysis of institutions complement each other in the formation 
of a three dimensional reconstruction of the disputing process. The written 
texts themselves incorporate these two facets of a complex and ever-changing 
process.
There have been, likewise, two models used to define societies in the field of 
legal anthropology. The harmony model, where the society and means of 
preventing or resolving disputes were primarily concerned with maintaining 
harmony and cohesion in a community, and the adversarial model, where 
disputes were more often resolved contentiously, and with less regard for 
harmony. It has been observed that the ‘harmony model was being replaced 
by the adversary model as the new nation-states d e v e l o p e d . T h i s  shift 
could easily be argued as occurring in the 12th and early 13^ '^  century, where 
one finds an increase in centralisation and more and more evidence of 
individuals taking an adversarial approach rather than one designed to
Ibid, 142.
Ibid, 142.
Ibid, 142.
L. Nader,
and Power in the Study o f  Law, eds. J. Starr and J.F. Collier, (Ithaca, 1994), 320-344, 321.
56
 ‘The Crown, the Colonists, and the Course o f Zapotec Village Law’, in History
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maintain relationships. But such a stark delineation may result in obscuring 
rather than illuminating what was actually happening.
If one regards the process of dispute prevention and resolution as a spectrum, 
then harmonisation and adversity are two aspects of the process, and both 
approaches may be evident at the same time. Thus, in addition to the long 
adversarial process evident in some of the cases noted herein, there were 
attempts to work towards accord. The charter evidence discussed both 
settlements arrived at after l i t igat ion,and settlements arrived at through 
active co-operation of the parties.^^
Alternative mechanisms of resolving disputes have always been a part of the 
inter-power, inter-regnal and international legal arsenal. The mechanisms of 
‘good offices’, conciliation, negotiation, mediation, arbitration and only then 
formal litigation procedures, have demonstrated that the preventing, 
processing and resolution of disputes is a c on t i nuumas  well used by the
Melrose Liber, no. I l l ,  the charter concerning the settlement between Richard de 
Moreville and Melrose Abbey over the forest ealled Threepwood between the Gala and 
Leader Waters. See also, G.W.S. Barrow, The Acts o f William 1, no. 236 and comments. This 
is but one o f the settlements arrived at after what appears to have been a long running dispute.
This is arguably what was happening between the Bishop o f  St. Andrews and Arbroath in a 
series o f quit claims concerning several churches, all o f  which had been mentioned in a 
chirograph, which was then referenced in each o f  the quit claims. See Arbroath Liber, nos. 
153-171.
See generally, J. Merrills, Dispute Settletnent in International Law (Cambridge, 1996) and 
J. Collier and V. Lowe, The Settlement o f  Disputes in International Law  (Oxford, 1999) for 
an introduction into each o f  the areas o f dispute resolution in the international arena. These 
same areas may be perceived in the dispute process in the medieval context, although rarely 
are they so clearly distinguished in the charters. One reason for relying on International law 
sources is the pan-European legal tradition o f which Scotland was a part. Another is the 
‘international’ reach o f the papal curia and its influence. For distinctions between judging 
and arbitration, and rules governing them, see Lord Cooper, (trans and ed), Regiam
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ecclesiastical and royal powers called upon in particular disputes in the 
twelfth century as in the modern world. These mechanisms were valued as 
part o f the arsenal of approaches to dispute prevention and resolution not only 
by secular and religious leaders, but by lay individuals as well. All factions 
made use of these mechanisms for particular disputes.
In the modern world, this array o f options is incorporated not only into the 
United Nations Charter, but also in the Hague Conventions on public 
international law and more importantly, private international law, where it 
may arguably be more useful. A dispute may be avoided with good planning, 
as is the usual approach in the drafting of a contract, and mechanisms for 
handling any disputes that do arise may be provided within the terms of the 
contract itself. Just as in modern contracts, examples of the planning and 
attempts to prevent disputes may be seen in the language used in donation 
charters.^’ From the phrases, "in elemosinam ’ to the provisions for curses and 
then warrandice and maintenance, it is clear that the parties involved in the 
transactions reflected in the charters were thinking ahead from the time of the 
donation to when potential attacks or claims on the property donated might 
interfere with the original donors’ intentions.
Majesîatem and Qiioniam Attachiamenta (Edinburgh, 1947), specifically, Regiam  
Majestatem, Book II, chapters 1-10.
Donation charters were not, however, contracts in the modern sense, and should not be 
confused with them. See John H, Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (London, 
2002), chapter on Contracts and Conveyancing.
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When examining the dispute process in medieval society, however, there are 
limitations and elements which must be acknowledged. To begin with, there 
is the assumption that there was a strict hierarchy of class and social position 
which would have permeated all aspects of life. But in anthropological 
studies done in the last (twentieth) century, of the attempts to ‘delegalise’ the 
processing of disputes (the influence of which may be seen in Roberts’ 
approach), there were some interesting and thought provoking results.
Francis G. Snyder, in a discussion concerning various movements in legal 
anthropology, quotes Abel in a review of delegalising movements, who 
‘showed that delegalisation assumed rough equality between social actors, a 
high degree of normative consensus and the existence of adequate informal 
controls. He (Abel) concluded that in capitalist societies, where these 
assumptions did not hold, delegalisation tended to be detrimental to the 
already underprivileged and p o w e r l e s s . T h i s  supports the idea that a more 
‘law’ centred and externally enforced dispute resolution process may equalise 
or even out any disparity between the relative power of the parties. One could 
argue that there was a ‘delegalised’ approach evident in the charters in the 
early part of the twelfth century, and as centralisation increased, so too did the 
more ‘legalised’ approach. But the evidence of disputes and how they were 
resolved from this time period argues against any idea of a lack of 
enforcement mechanisms.
Snyder, ‘Anthropology, Dispute Processes and Law: A Critical Introduction’, in Lcnv and 
Anthropology, eds. Peter Sack and Jonathan Aleck, (Aldershot, 1992), 75, quoting from Abel, 
“Delegalization: A Critical Review of its Ideology, Manifestations, and Social 
Consequences”, m Alternative Rechtsformen und Alternativen ziim Recht, eds. Blankenberg, 
Klausa and Rottleuthner, (1979).
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For example, in the case of Kirkness and Robert, ancestor o f the family of 
Lochore,^^ one sees that in a pre- capitalistic society, where there is little if 
any centralised enforcement yet {circa 1128), there are mechanisms of 
enforcement which may be characterised as horizontal and communal rather 
than hierarchical and external.^'^ For all the equalising effect of the communal 
approach, social organisation and hierarchy were important in the handling of 
disputes in medieval Scotland not only with regard to the parties themselves, 
but with regard to the status and position of the witnesses and judges.
Conceptions of what was just, however, might vary. The Digest ‘defines 
justice as the constant and enduring will to give each what is proper to him.’ 
This approach also incorporates the sense that justice may be applied 
differently depending on the circumstances and the station in life of the 
parties to the dispute. While this particular case seems to have been decided 
not only by lay judges, but also by those deemed to be knowledgeable about 
justice, it seems safe to presume that the application of justice in this case was 
accepted by the participants and by the community as a whole.
In contrast to this, where there is primarily or even exclusively external, 
centralised enforcement there is less requirement for a shared concept of 
justice, or how it should be administered. There is then a complete
® G.W.S. Barrow, ‘The origins o f the family o f  Lochore’, SHR 77 (1998) 252-4. 
This case is discussed in more detail in the chapter on noticiae. p. 109-113.
G. Evans, Law and Theology in the Middle Ages (London, 2002), 8.
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subjugation to external means, which can be and often are forcefully imposed. 
One could see this solely as a mechanism of centralisation of the state, of 
accretion of power by a ruler, but that would only be half the equation. The 
other half is the acknowledgment and acceptance of that shift to a centralised 
power. For members of a society to give up local and individual autonomy, 
there has to be a reason. There is no charter evidence that there ever was, in 
Scotland, a complete autonomy for the individuals and local communities, 
since even the earliest charters show the king has authority over grants of 
property rights and some, if not all, disputes.^^ This is reflected in the fact 
that ‘[t]he huge majority of [charters] are in the king’s name and may reflect 
royal aspirations to some e x t e n t . T h e r e  is, however, evident in the charters 
of the twelfth century, a gradual shift to more centralisation and external, 
centrally administered and enforced decisions regarding disputes. This may 
be seen as early as the charters of David I where he uses the phrase, "super 
meum forisfactum "super meam plenariam forisfacturam  or "super
meant defensionem.
This shift seems to have had at least two results. The first and most 
influential was the increase in perceived importance of the written word.
No conclusions are drawn here for conditions prior to the written evidence.
D. Broun, ‘The Adoption o f  Brieves in Scotland’, in Charters and Charter Scholarship in 
Britain and Ireland, ed. Marie-Therese Flanagan and .Judith A. Green (London, 2005), 164- 
83, 165.
Barrow, The Charters o f  D avid  /, no. 172.
Ibid, no. 38.
™ Ibid, no. 188. These were not new sanctions. Rather, what was new was the focus on the 
king’s authority to punish transgressions in the written doeuments themselves.
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There was no mention of charters or writings of any kind in the Kirkness 
dispute. There appears to have been written evidence regarding the lands of 
the Cell Dé which arguably could have been used, but there is no reference to 
charters being used in the dispute with Robert of Burgundy.^ ^ Very early in 
David Ts reign the charter evidence reveals that documentation was important 
in proving property interests and rights.^^ The second was the apparent 
grafting of one way of accomplishing the resolution of rights disputes onto 
another, pre-existing one. This is perhaps most evident in the combining of 
different forms of evidence to achieve the same end.
Legal pluralism has been defined as a ‘situation in which two or more legal 
systems coexist in the same social f i e l d . T h e r e  is very little evidence of 
what kind of legal system existed before the early twelfth century in Scotland. 
But that there was a coexistence of distinct laws and customs in the twelfth 
century that differed, sometimes markedly, can scarcely be doubted. 
Considering the separate rules for the Galwegians, the Burgh laws, and the 
importation of Anglo-Norman rules and approaches to administration of 
government starting at least as early as David I, one could argue that there 
was legal pluralism in Scotland in the twelfth century.
It should be noted that the Kirkness case not only took place after the Horn dean dispute, but 
that it was in a different geographic location. Thus there may be local customs dictating the 
forms o f  evidence used. This is also an example o f  the unpredictability and nonlinear 
development.
See the Horndean case, discussed infra.
S. Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’, in Law and Anthropology, eds. Peter Sack and Jonathan Aleck, 
(Aldershot, 1992), I3 I-I58 , reprinted from an article which appeared in Law and Society 
Review, Volume 22, No. 5, 869-96 (1988).
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In approaching the problem as one of legal pluralism, some assumptions must 
be accepted. One of these is the definition of a legal system; it must 
necessarily be flexible enough to encompass the customary law and norms 
followed by the various groups co-existing in Scotland, even though these 
various systems may not have measured up to the same definition of a legal 
system envisioned today. ‘All local communities tended to develop their own 
laws and customs, which, even without charters, would with time acquire a 
certain validity which the community could try to maintain against its ruler.’ "^^ 
‘Early medieval law was customary law, unprofessional customary law. It 
had general underlying principles but they were taken for granted rather than 
stated: they were general norms rather than what we would call legal rules.
One way of viewing the litigation process between ecclesiastical and lay 
entities is as an evolution of power, and ‘civil conflict’. These disputes, of 
which there are documents from the twelfth century, are almost always won 
by the church. There was of course, the tension between secular jurisdiction 
and ecclesiastical. This was a power struggle, which arguably was played out 
in the processing of disputes. Bias of the parties, especially the victor, must 
be acknowledged, but also the fact that the records are almost exclusively 
ecclesiastical in one sense may be interpreted as evidence of the relative
S. Reynolds, ‘English Towns o f the eleventh-century in a European Context’ in S. 
Reynolds, Ideas and Solidarities o f  the Medieval Laity (Aldershot, 1995), VII, 7.
S. Reynolds, ‘The History o f the Idea of Incorporation or legal personality: a case of 
Fallacious teleology’, in Ideas and Solidarities o f  the M edieval Laity, ed. S. Reynolds, 
(Aldershot, 1995), VI, 3.
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positions of the parties. The victor not only wins the dispute, (presumably the 
res o f the dispute as well changes hands or is more secure), but also the future 
perceptions of these disputes are controlled by the victor, since it is the victor 
who has written the history. ‘This raises suspicions that the records 
bestowing property or privilege which are generically known to English- 
speaking historians as charters have been doctored or fabricated to the 
advantage of those who preserved them..’^^  Of course, not all charters are 
straightforward records of disputes. Therefore, even if there had been an 
actual dispute behind the charter, the record could very well be an edited or 
skewed version of the events. Thus, the writing of a record is a means of 
cementing the power garnered in the process of resolving the dispute. It is 
also a means of capitalising on the present gain for future needs of 
justification or rationalisation.^^
It has been suggested that ‘access to justice was a key concept if one took 
seriously the litigant’s perspective.. ..in evaluating or ascribing a meaning to 
this notion, one had necessarily to take account of people’s feelings and 
perceptions.’^^  This is not a new idea, and ample evidence can be found in 
the charters of individuals exercising their perceived rights to access the king,
W. Davies and Paul Fouracre, (eds.),7’/îe Settlement o f Disputes in Early M edieval Europe 
(Cambridge, 1986), 1
W. Brown, ‘Charters as Weapons. On the role played by early medieval dispute records in 
the disputes they record’ Journal o f  M edieval History, 28 (2002) 227-248. This article argues 
that charters concerning disputes were used by the monks for several purposes, including 
enhancing the images o f the churchmen and the institution involved, undermining or even 
destroying the image (record) o f their opponents, and promoting a particular agenda within 
the local and regional territories.
Ibid, quoting from Nader, “Forums for Justice: A Cross-Cultural Perspective”, 31 Journal 
o f  Social Issues (1975) 15 1-170 at 163
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the font o f justice, in resolving disputes. One of these, concerning the woman 
Leofgifu, was a brieve from King David I addressed to all responsible men in 
his land that her fugitive serfs were to be restored to her wherever they may 
be found. While this may seem minor compared to larger disputes between 
a magnate and a monastic house, it was not a minor matter to the woman 
herself, and demonstrates that individuals (including women) exercised their 
rights to access the king in pursuit of justice.
The following discussion focuses on the disputes primarily during the reigns 
of David I, Malcolm IV and William I of Scotland. The approach taken will 
be to analyse the records of disputes, and where possible, further analyse the 
decision making process itself. This includes the way such records were used 
both in the prevention of disputes and in the use o f records to prove or dismiss 
a claim. The whole notion of jurisdiction as not only a property right, but as a 
decisive factor in the resolution of a dispute becomes more prominent by the 
end o f the twelfth century. Much o f the methodology used to dissect the 
framework of facts, law/rule and decision maker is based on complexity 
theory, but the application is limited by the inability to quantify words or 
ideas. Even with these constraints, viewing the decision-making process 
within this context allows for a greater understanding of the immediacy and 
mutability of the process.
Barrow, The Charters o f  D avid I, no. 142, p. 121.
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The bifurcated analysis of these records demonstrates that there were two 
important shifts during that period. The first is the way such information was 
recorded, and the second was the way in which the first changes affected the 
decision making process and perceptions of those for and by whom such 
records were made. Lastly, each generation perceives the past in light of the 
present. These perceptions then feed into that generation’s myths regarding 
identity, however defined.
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CHAPTER III
JUDGES
The generally accepted wisdom regarding the institutions of justice in 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries may be best summed up by a quote 
from Lord Cooper: ‘until the later years of the 13^ *^  century important 
civil controversies, when not settled by agreement or arbitration, were 
usually left to the decision of the skilled and ubiquitous ecclesiastical 
lawyers, who in Scotland found ample scope for their activities owing 
to the absence of a fully organized judicial system and a legal 
profession to work if  J This conclusion has been challenged by 
others, including Hector MacQueen, who has discussed the 
development of the institutions of justice in his Common Law and 
Feudal Society, and in various articles." His conclusions show that 
there were systematic approaches to administering justice in the courts 
of lay lords, but that they were subject to ‘royal correction and
 ^ Lord Cooper o f  Culross (Cooper), Select Scottish Cases o f  the Thirteenth Century 
(Edinburgh, 1944), xxvi.
 ^MacQueen, Common Law and Feudal Society, especially chapter 2; see also ‘Scots 
Law’ and ‘Expectations o f  the Law in 12'*' and 13'*’ Century Scotland’, Tijdschrift 
voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, 70 (2002), 279-290. Barrow has also challenged this 
assumption, see his The Kingdom o f  the Scots, Government, Church and Society from  
the eleventh to the fourteenth century, (2d ed) (Edinburgh, 2003), 68-111. See also. 
The Scottish Legal Tradition, eds. Michael C. Meston, W.D.H. Sellar, The Rt. Hon. 
Lord Cooper, (Edinburgh, 1991), 29-64.
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control’.^  These corrections would have been made by royal officials, 
either sheriffs or justiciars, or by the king himself. MacQueen focused 
his study on the thirteenth century rather than the twelfth. As he noted, 
‘[F]rom the thirteenth century on, the evidence for the 
courts...becomes much more extensive.’"^ Although it is most 
probably correct that the evidence becomes more extensive because 
there are more cases and more activity in the thirteenth century, as 
MacQueen noted, ‘[Mjost of what then becomes visible was probably 
also present in the twelfth century.’  ^ This view of the twelfth century 
extends to the administration of justice, to the judges and others who 
performed a decision-making role. Their roles become clearer with 
time and greater detail in the records, but a close examination of the 
records for what they do say as well as what they omit allows for a 
picture to emerge, not perfectly clear, but better defined than most 
historians have accepted thus far.
The rough outlines of what would become the structures of legal 
administration can be seen in David Ts reign, but become more 
defined under Malcolm IV and especially under William I. If the 
approach to the topic is from an institutional basis, an examination of
MacQueen, Common Law, 66.
Ibid, 37. This is in keeping with Susan Reynolds comment about legal historians 
focusing on the thirteenth century at least in part because o f  the more plentiful 
sources. See S. Reynolds, ‘The Emergence o f Professional Law in the Long Twelfth 
century’, 21 Law & Hist. /?ev,348 (Summer, 2003).
 ^ Ibid, 37.
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the records for evidence of sheriff courts,^ justiciar courts/ courts 
baron and procedural brieves/ would lead one to conclude that there is 
a steady rise in the bureaucracy of the Scottish kingdom, and an 
increasing structure to the administration of law and justice. Most 
historians have indeed taken this linear, progressive approach.^ One 
could even conclude that the legal transplanting and borrowing 
acknowledged in the Regiam Majestatem was intentional and part of an 
overall plan.’^
 ^Eg., The Sheriffs o f  Scotland, eds. Norman H. Reid and G.W.S Barrow (St. 
Andrews, 2002) xili-xvii; William Croft Dickinson, Sheriff Court Book o f  Fife 
(Edinburgh, 1928), ‘Introduction’, xi-cv; Isabel A. Milne, ‘The Sheriff Court: Before 
the Sixteenth Century’, in An Introduction to Scottish Legal H istory (Edinburgh, 
1958), 350-355; Barrow, The Kingdom o f the Scots (Edinburgh, 2003), 1-68; 
Habakkuk Bisset's Rolment o f  Courtis ed. Philip .1. Hamilton-Grierson, (Edinburgh, 
1926), Vol. Ill, 29-36. Because I have found no evidence for courts or legal decision 
making by mairs, although they did perform administrative duties, I do not discuss 
them here.
 ^Barrow, Kingdom o f the Scot, (Edinburgh, 2003), 68-111; see literature cited in 
previous footnote. For all courts and procedures, see APS, I, 317-325 (David I), 363- 
365 (Malcolm IV), 371-392, (William I).
® These are thoroughly discussed in Hector L. MacQueen, ‘Pleadable Brieves, 
Pleading and the Development o f Scots Law’ 4 Law and History Review  (1986) 403- 
22, and Common Law and Feudal Society in M edieval Scotland, See also Hector 
Me Kechnie, Judicial Process upon Brieves, 1219-1532  (David Murray Lecture) 
(Glasgow, 1956).
 ^ See for example, W.C. Dickinson, The Sheriff Court Book o f  Fife (Edinburgh,
1928), ‘Introduction’;. Walker, The Scottish Legal System  (Edinburgh, 1992); I. 
Willock, The Origins and Development o f  the Juiy in Scotland  (Edinburgh, 1966); 
Habakkuk B isset’s Rolment o f  Courtis, Vol. Ill, ed. Philip J. Hamilton-Grierson 
(Edinburgh and London, 1926), ‘Introduction’; as well as the first three chapters In 
Barrow, Kingdom o f  the Scots.
Cooper, ‘Introduction’, Regiam Majestatem  (Edinburgh, 1947), 9. He stated that 
‘We borrowed at an early date several o f the most notable and suggestive remedies- 
the writ o f right, mortancestor, and novel disseisin for example- and though each of 
these received in course o f  time individual Scottish characteristics, there need be no 
doubt whose was the master patent for these fruitful and ingenious inventions. We 
even picked up many useful ideas on such technical matters as citation, essonzies, 
procedure in absence, advocation, the assise o f  error, and registration for execution.’ 
See also Alan Harding, M edieval Law and the Foundation o f  the State (Oxford, 
2002), 199, concludes that the ‘compilation o f the Regiam Majestatem  may possibly 
have stemmed’ from a reaction to English legal imperialism early in the fourteenth 
century.
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While there is no intention here to negate or disagree with the validity 
of this linear development perspeetive per se, an examination of some 
of the charters during the reigns of David I, Malcolm IV and William I 
allows for further conclusions about not only the structure of these 
administrative units, but of procedures followed, and then current 
perceptions about the administration of justice and the roles of the 
various officials. The process was at once more complex and much 
simpler than current historiography would suggest. There is more 
complexity in the decision-making and procedural norms discernable 
in the documents individually, and more simplicity as well, because of 
the ad hoc nature of supplying or fashioning solutions to immediate 
problems. There was a direct shift in the position of the king with 
regard to dispute resolution, from a mediator or arbitrator to a central 
figure making decisions about evidence (in a graphic sense, a shift 
from a more horizontal structure to more vertical), procedure and final 
outcomes; a similar shift is not seen for justiciars and sheriffs for the 
simple reason that these offices were imported during the twelfth 
century, and they, derivatively as the king’s agents, were more central 
figures from the beginning. Their position in the shift to verticality, as 
it were, did not really change. As to the judex, it has been argued that 
their roles became more peripheral with greater centralisation but they 
were vital and integral parts of the disputing process well beyond the
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end of the twelfth century. They did, however, move to a lower 
position in this more vertical orientation of the disputing process.
Any discussion of the secular institutions of justice has been focused 
on the office involved, whether of the sheriff or the justieiar, and to a 
limited extent, the judex}^ This may be due in part, perhaps, because 
the first two were imported and more easily delineated than the latter. 
The fact that for some of the early cases involving a judex, the record 
is actually more explicit than the concurrent records involving the 
activities of a sheriff or justiciar may be a reflection of contemporary 
perceptions and record-making practices rather than a lack of activity 
on the part of these latter officers. In other words, the relative absence 
o f detailed records of judicial process or decision-making by these 
imported offices early on may indicate that they and their activities 
were taken for granted more than the judices, at least by those making 
the records. These scribes, mostly clerics, would have been recent 
transplants and thus arguably more familiar with the workings o f a 
sheriff or justice as seen elsewhere. In addition, the very structure of 
the records reflecting disputes changed, becoming less a narrative, 
descriptive history and more a record of acts and procedures that were
' * Barrow, Kingdom o f  the Scots, chapter 3, ‘The Judex'.
John Baniierman, ‘M acDuff o f  Fife’, in M edieval Scotland: Crown, Lordship and  
Community: Essays presented to G. W.S. BarroM’, eds. A. Grant and K.J. Stringer 
(Edinburgh, 1993), 23.
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increasingly perceived to be within a more formalistic, legal 
structure.
Both Barrow and MacQueen have noted problems with Cooper’s 
summary dismissal of any judicial system before the end of the 
thirteenth c e n t u r y . T h i s  approach has coloured the perceptions of 
most twentieth century historians when examining the record evidence 
for signs of a judicial system.*^ Part of the problem lies in attempting 
to approach the problem from an external perspective. Barrow and 
others have started with a discussion of Scottish government, and the 
mechanisms of enforcement.'^ While both of these factors are 
important in their own right and impact on any understanding of the 
administration of justice, an understanding of how disputes were 
prevented and resolved should also include an examination of the 
individuals (and perceptions about them) who actually made 
judgements, and to the extent possible, the decision-making process 
itself. Including this approach may help to circumvent the limitations
This is discussed in more detail in the chapters on Noticiae and Charters, infra 
Barrow, Kingdom o f  the Scots, 2"'' ed. (2003), especially chapters 1-3; MacQueen, 
‘Scots Law under Alexander III’, in Norman H. Reid, (ed), Scotland in the Reign o f  
/4/exa/7£/er/ / / (Edinburgh, 1990), 74-102.
This approach, while most succinctly stated by Cooper, pervades earlier writings as 
well. The summaries o f the administration o f  Justice by Dickinson, Hamilton- 
Grierson, and others emphasise the offices and structure o f government rather than 
the cases, decisions and decision-makers. While this is understandable given the 
structure o f the records themselves, it leads to the perception that the structure o f  
decision making may have been fundamentally different from that o f later 
judgements. It should be noted that Cooper, in Selected Scottish Case o f  the 13'’’ 
Century (Edinburgh, 1944), does attempt to approach the material on a case study 
basis, which in effect, places the material in a format similar to modern case 
decisions.
Barrow, Acts o f  Malcolm  /K, 35.
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imposed by the records themselves, although it presents its own 
problems of analysis.
THE KING
Although there are a few records from the reigns of kings of Scots 
from 1094 to 1124, they provide only hints for the details o f the means 
and mechanisms of preventing and resolving disputes. One may, 
however, discern in the reigns of these earlier kings the outlines of the 
framework of justice and the role of the king as the font of justice.'^ 
The record evidence from Scotland demonstrates that the position of 
the king shifted injudicial matters from that of mediator or arbitrator, 
to a more active, central role as decision-maker. As Pennington has 
noted, the king or prince was ‘not at the center of a trial before the 
thirteenth century. Rather, the community gathered around him in 
court, dictating the course of a trial and determining its outcome’.'^
Issues o f  constitutionality, detailed discussion o f  government and the nature of 
kingship are beyond the scope o f this thesis. Scotland was well within the common 
European experience during the twelfth century, and its kings were operating in 
essentially the same cultural milieu as other monarchs during that period. See 
A. A.M. Duncan, The Kingship o f  the Scots, 842-1292, Succession and Independence 
(Edinburgh, 2002); James C. Holt, Magna Carta (Cambridge, 1992), especially 
Chapter 4, ‘Custom and Law’, 75-122; R.C. Van Caenegem, Legal History: A 
European Perspective (London, 1991), 71; and generally, O.F Robinson, T.D.
Fergus, W.M. Gordon, European Legal History, Sources and Institutions (London, 
1994).
Kenneth Pennington, ‘Due Process, Community, and the Prince in the Evolution o f  
the Ordo iudicarius\
http://www.maxwell.svr.edu/maxpages/classes/his381/procedure.htm. 1-24, at 1; also 
published in Revista internazionale di diritto commune 9 (1998), 9-47.
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The extant early Scottish charters from Duncan II (1), Edgar (8) and 
Alexander 1(10) showed similar uses for charters as found elsewhere 
in Europe, but there are not enough of them to draw firm eonclusions 
regarding the details of the administration of justiee.'^ There are hints, 
however, that even then, the king’s role was shifting. Alexander I’s 
eharter telling the prior not to do anything with regard to the settlement 
of a dispute eoncerning Swinton is one of the earliest pieces of 
evidence that the king had an active role in the resolution of dispiites.^^ 
It seems that, at the least, Alexander intended to be present when any 
decision regarding Swinton was made and may have intended to 
preside over the proceedings himself.^'
The evidence for the role of the king with regard to the settlement of 
disputes becomes more explicit during the reign of David I. This 
cannot be attributed solely to the increase in records, but to some 
degree of course, it is the result of the establishment of administrative 
procedures during his reign. David I had been involved in the 
resolution of disputes well before becoming king of the S c o t s , a n d
A. C. Lawrie, Early Scottish Charters Prior to A.D. 1153 (Glasgow, 1905), 1-44.
Ibid, 22. This case is discussed in more detail infra. The charters o f King Edgar 
also show adherence to the pattern o f use regarding certain phrases in grant charters.
This may also have been a contested issue o f  jurisdiction between the lord o f  
Lothian, David brother o f  the king, and King Alexander himself. See Duncan, The 
Kingship o f  the Scots, 62.
J. A. Green, ‘David I and Henry E, Scottish Historical Review, 75 (1996) 1-19, at 
11, where she pointed out that David had been a royal justiciar in England under 
Henry I.
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had fairly extensive experience while at the court of Henry After 
his marriage to Maud de Senlis, he was involved in the settlement of 
disputes by virtue of holding the Honour o f Huntingdon. He acted as 
mediator ,presiding j u d g e , a n d  even as the one before whom an 
appeal was brought in a matter previously decided."^ All of these roles 
were repeated after he became king. The breadth of roles, which 
David filled both before and after his inauguration, shows that the shift 
to more central authority was gradual, fluctuating and inconsistent. 
While David I may indeed have had a plan to import administrative 
practices, it would have been based on his own experiences as Earl of 
Huntingdon, and his experience at the court of Henry I. There are no 
records where his intentions are stated, thus it is possible that this 
importation was simply a practical ad hoc means to achieve just results 
rather than an overt intention to impose a structural framework over 
the existing practices.
When David I first became king, he appeared to have been willing to 
allow the established means of doing justice to continue, and only 
gradually to integrate the offices of sheriff and justiciar with the local
Habakkuk B isset’s Rolment o f  Courtis, Vol. Ill ed. Philip Hamilton-Grlerson 
(Edinburgh, 1926), 7; E.W. Robertson, Scotland Under Her Early Kings (Edinburgh, 
1862), I, 235; A.C. Lawrie, Early Scottish Charters Prior to A.D. 1153 (Glasgow, 
1905), 262, 265.
See Peverel case, infra.
See criminal case -can ’t remember the name, in addition to cases such as the 
inquest o f Glasgow.
See the Horndean case, infra. While a formal appellate process cannot be 
concluded from the evidence, aggrieved parties could, and did seek redress from Earl 
David.
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thanes and judices}^ This may be concluded from the apparent refusal 
to render summary justice himself upon the request of the Cell Dé in 
the Kirkness dispute. Instead, David convened a hearing to be 
conducted in the traditional manner. There was no wholesale 
imposition or attempt to eradicate existing customs and laws, as seems 
to have been feared much later in Scottish history, during the reign of 
Edward I of England.^^ David made use of existing practices and 
officers, supplementing where needed. His importation of 
administrative procedures seems to have been largely limited to the 
land south of the Forth, along with his grants to newly arrived land 
s e e k e r s . T h i s  would mirror the extent of immigrant implantation 
during his reign, supporting the idea that this was a gradual integration 
rather than an imposition of foreign ways.
This pragmatic approach to the administration of justice did not appear 
materially to change the rules or norms under which David I operated 
as an individual. Grants made in the king’s name seem to have been 
bound by the same rules as other grants, and the language in charters 
reflected duties that accompanied all such grants. There is a notable
Michael C. Meston, W.D.H. Seliar, Rt. Hon. Lord Cooper, The Scottish Legal 
Tradition (Edinburgh, 1991), 34, 35. Sellar notes that the Celtic law was ‘gradually 
integrated until at length virtually unrecognisable’ as was the breithheamh ovjvdex. 
He further notes that the ‘Anglo- Norman law ... was adopted or received by the 
kings o f  Scots themselves rather than imposed from without by conquest.’ 
MacQueen, ‘Scots Law’, 84.
A.A.M.Duncan, Kingship o f  the Scots, 842-1292, Succession and Independence 
(Edinburgh, 2002), 79.
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one datable to 1145x1153, where David grants lands to Walter of 
Rye dale in Roxburghshire.^'^ The charter explicitly states a remedy to 
be provided by the king, in the case of failure of the king’s warrandice: 
et si ego aut heredes met Waltero vel heredibus suis predictas terras 
propter iustam alicuius calumpniam varantizare non poterimus, ego et 
heredes mei ei et heredibus suis excambiam ad valenciam ad suum 
racionabile grahant dabimus?^ The rules or norms o f inheritance and 
grants appear to have applied no matter who the parties were. The 
language supports the conclusion that, with regard to measures found 
within the grant charters to secure the transfer of rights, even the king 
was bound by rules that protected the grantee from future elaims. The 
only requirement seems to have been that the donor be a free man.^^
The role of the king apparent in David I’s charters with regard to 
disputes continued to be more clearly defined under Malcolm IV and 
William I, with more examples of royal acts of justice, and increasing 
detail eoneerning the king’s actions as a judicial decision-maker. 
Although ‘there are very few references to Malcolm IV exercising his
Barrow, Charters o f  D avid I, no. 177.
Ibid. Barrow compared the warrandice language in this matter to the warrandice 
language given by T. Madox, Fonnulare Anglicanum: Et si contigerit quod non ei 
possitn warantizare illam, dabo ei excambium alibi ad  suum grantum, et ad  
valitudinem illius predicte terre (in the time o f  Robert II earl o f Leicester, d. 1168). 
Barrow also noted that this record survives as a judicial transumpt in the justiciar’s 
court held in 1506.
Glanvill, VI, 18: ‘Every free man who has land can give a certain part o f his 
land...’
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judicial functions’^  ^ there are numerous references to his agents acting 
in their judicial capacities.^"' There are numerous charters reflecting 
disputes or complaints brought by monks directly to the king, and 
relief was granted.^^ Horndean^^ is unique in that it is clear the king is 
making decisions regarding procedure, but there is at least one case 
where Malcolm IV required proof of a quitclaim from the prior heirs of 
the fee in question before a subsequent grant was to be confirmed.^'^ 
Although there are no details beyond Malcolm IV’s charter, judicial 
action is implied, and the king’s role as the one requiring certain kinds 
of proof is explicit. There is no way to determine for this case whether 
the proof required was a charter or simply witnesses. There are other 
charters where it is clear that there was a hierarchy of officials before 
whom complaints could be brought, and procedures to be followed in 
the case o f failure to procure justice.^^
The picture of Malcolm IV generally has been an oscillation between a 
weak, ineffective king who did not keep the peace, and a vainglorious,
Barrow, RRS, i. 49.
Ibid, 35-52. Nos. 144, 145 (steward and men o f the Honour o f Huntingdon ordered 
to maintain justly the monks o f  St. Andrew’s Priory), 153 (order to steward to 
enquire into a will), 198, 199 (perambulation)
Ibid, nos. 126, 151,154 (confirmed a prior grant and gave the monks the right to 
deal with the land as if  it were their own in case o f failure to pay the render, in 
essence forfeiture on failure o f payment), 167, 170 (blanket order to repay debts 
owed to brethren o f Hospital o f  St. Andrews), 173 (confirms chirograph), 177,179, 
181,211 (order to Elstow convent to give possession o f certain property to Nostell 
Priory or the king’s sheriff will do so), 220,233,242, 245 (grant o f all teinds o f  all 
pleas), 247 (one o f the few references to trial by battle or ordeal). These are some of  
the charters o f  Malcolm IV that rellect judicial actions by the king or his officers.
The case is discussed infra.
”  RRS, /, no. 206.
Ibid, no. 253.
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ambitious military leader .Al though Barrow himself notes that there 
are few charters that show him rendering judicial decisions, Malcolm 
IV is described by his contemporaries as ‘having a concern for 
equitable justice, he dealt fair judgement between man and man, and 
bringing the inflexible penalty of the law to bear upon thieves, robbers 
and traitors. When comparing the charters of David I and his 
grandson Malcolm, and indeed, with the charters of William I, it would 
be easy to conclude that both David I and William I were more active, 
more proactive in the prevention and resolution of disputes than 
Malcolm IV seems to have been, a perception fed by the greater 
number and more explicit detail of David Fs charters dealing with 
overt disputes and the sheer number of William Fs charters. The 
evidence, however, when read for what it does not say as well as what 
it does, points to a king following in his grandfather’s footsteps, 
building on the administrative and judicial practices already in place, 
and delegating judicial authority to officials whose duties seem to have 
been well understood, even if they are not explicit in the charters.
Under William I the role of the king is portrayed in more detail in the 
records. While William I continued to perform the same types of 
functions regarding the administration of justice as his brother and 
grandfather, he also was more active in asserting royal jurisdiction, and
Barrow, RRS, i, 25. 
Ibid, 26.
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was called upon, as were David and Malcolm before him, to mediate 
disputes as well as resolve them directly/' With regard to disputes or 
potential disputes, a similar situation held: where the king was one of 
the parties, the same rules appear to have been applied as with other 
contesting parties. Perambulations were conducted before witnesses."'^ 
The king walked the disputed lands along with his men, or delegated 
the marching of boundaries to his responsible men. Generally, there is 
more written evidence that William I was involved personally in the 
resolution o f disputes than his brother. This does not mean that 
Malcolm IV did not act in the same capacity, just that the charters are 
more explicit under William I as to his presence."'^
The procedural hierarchy reflected in the charters of all three kings 
becomes more explicit. The move to a more central role that the 
documents show had begun early in the twelfth century continued. But
Cases involving David I as mediator, discussed infra', for Malcolm IV, there are 
inferences, especially in the Calendar o f  Act o f Malcolm IV, nos. 312, and 313. 
William Ts role as mediator and arbitrator shows that the process was not a 
continuum, and would not fit a linear model.
Barrow, RRS, H, no. 130. This is a grant to Dunfermline Abbey and the chapel of  
Stirling certain land in exchange for the land that King William I took as part o f the 
King’s Park. The perambulation was conducted by Richard de Moreville, constable, 
Robert Avenel, Justiciar, Ralph the sheriff, and Peter o f Stirling.
Barrow, RRS, ii, nos. 35 (Balchrystie); 84 (Hardingstone) and comments. Barrow 
notes that this charter may reflect a dispute between William de Vieuxpont and 
Delapre. There are other charters where it is clear that the dispute was resolved in 
the presence o f the king, including nos. 105, (Edrom); 165 (which supports the 
conclusion that William was not literate), 236 (de Moreville), 249 (East Kilbride), 
252 (Moorfoot), 364 (Alan son o f Walter vs. Melrose Abbey), 430 (Muckcroft), 483 
(Dunbar vs. Melrose), 491 (Leuchars), 496 (Bangour). A number o f William’s 
charters also reflect disputes that were probably settled in his presence, or at least 
finalised, but the texts do not always announce that these matters were resolved 
before the king himself.
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the hierarchy of administration was set in place during David’s reign, 
and does become more explicit in the charter evidence from Malcolm 
IV and William L There are charters setting out the procedural steps 
and duties o f the officials from King Malcolm IV and William I which 
may be based on earlier charters of David l/"' Behind these charters are 
individuals whose complaints were being addressed by the king in a 
variety of ways. Most involve property rights of course, but there are 
also issues concerning jurisdiction, procedure, and evidence."'^ The 
most telling charters setting out the procedural steps to be followed are 
those involving the enforcement of collection of teinds in various 
parishes throughout the kingdom. The fact that these charters 
reference prior acts from earlier rulers, and repeat the same hierarchy 
indicates that these procedures were well known and accepted. It does 
not appear, however, that they were always followed by the officials 
involved.
The parishioners o f various churches seem to have had a problem 
paying their teinds during the reigns of both Malcolm IV and William 
I. One of Malcolm IV’s charters, datable to 1153x1165, concerned
There Is no single extant prototype charter o f David I on this, but there are 
references to the practice set out in the charter to those o f King David I. In fact, 
William Ts writs refer to the ‘assise o f King David’ as authority for his own 
commands to his officers to enforce tiends. See Barrow, RRS, ii, no. 132; see also 
Duncan’s comments on this, in Kingship o f  the Scots, 114.
These topics are covered in greater detail, infra.
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teinds payable to Glasgow/^ There is a detailed ordering of officials, 
and list of what can be paid in teinds. It is addressed to "Justiciariis, 
baronibus, vicecomitibus, ministries, Francis et Anglicis, Scottis, 
Walensibus, Gauelensibus, et omnibus ecclesie Sancti Kentigerni de 
Glasgu et eiusdem episcopiparrochianis ' which implies that there may 
have been at least one justiciar living within the bishopric o f Glasgow 
during Malcolm’s reign, although, as in other charters of Malcolm IV, 
there are no names given for the justiciar. Malcolm IV ordered that the 
sheriff take the forfeiture from anyone withholding teinds, and should 
the sheriff fail or ‘eonnive’ at the withholding, then the king’s justice is 
to take a forfeiture from the sheriff, ‘lest a complaint should reach the 
king through default of justice’."'^  Since this was the second order to 
his sheriffs and mairs within the diocese of Glasgow regarding the 
revenues due the church, it would seem that Glasgow was having a 
more severe problem than other places, although they were not alone."'^
A similar problem occurred during William I’s reign in a different 
region. In a charter addressed to all his responsible and faithful men of 
Moray, King William I commands them all to pay teinds to their 
churches, parsons and offieers of those churches, all ecclesiastical dues
Barrow, RRS, i, no. 258. This is also one o f the very few charters to use the word 
’■lex' rather than d u s \
Ibid.
Barrow, RRS, i, 242 (Glasgow); 233 (St. Andrews Priory).
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and ail teinds/^ If anyone withholds his teind, then he is to be 
compelled to pay it by the sheriff in whose jurisdiction he lives, along 
with the same forfeiture taken in the diocese of St. Andrews.
There is a subsequent charter that seems to be on the same topic. The 
people of Moray appear to have been recalcitrant in paying their teinds, 
and perhaps the officials were at least slack in enforcing the first 
charter. The second charter^'' is even more detailed. It commands all 
the responsible men of Moray to pay their teinds, listing all the kinds 
o f teinds due, including any annual increase. If anyone withholds his 
teinds, he will be compelled to pay it and a forfeiture, ‘according to the 
assize of King David V and as was the custom in his day and still is in 
the diocese of St. Andrews. Then the charter lays out the levels of 
recourse and enforcement from the lowest to the highest. If the neyf 
refuses, the thane in whose jurisdiction he lives or his lord shall 
compel him and take the forfeiture. If the thane himself or the lord 
will not compel the neyf or withholds his own teind, then the sheriff 
shall compel the detainer to pay both the teinds and the forfeiture to the 
king. And if the sheriff is negligent in executing this command or 
withholding his own teind, the king’s justiciar shall compel the 
detainer to pay the teind and pay a forfeiture of 8 cows to the king.
Barrow, RRS, ii, no. 132; Moray Registrwn, no. 1. Barrow dates this charter to 23 
January x April 1172, fairly early in William’s reign.
RRS, ii, no. 281, datable to 1185x1189, probably 1187x1189.
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The ordering of the payment of teinds found in William’s charters 
addressed to the men of Moray is similar to the order in a charter of 
David I, in favour of the church of the Holy Trinity of Urquhart/'
This charter is dated towards the end of David’s reign, 1145x1153, 
perhaps as late as 1152x1153. Although David I had exercised at least 
nominal control over Moray since 1130,^ "^  there are few charters 
surviving from his reign directed to any ehurch entities in that region. 
Lawrie noted that ‘[I]n the second great charter to the Abbey of 
Dunfermline, King David granted the half of his tithe of Ergaithel and 
of Kentir.’ He further noted that this was ‘the only mention of a grant 
of the tithe of the ean of M o r a y A l t h o u g h  there were bishops of 
Moray, of course, there do not seem to be any other extant charters 
from David’s reign specifically addressed to them. This charter 
granting inter alia, a tenth of the king’s cain of Argyll and of the 
king’s pleas and all revenues from that province, may be the basis for 
William’s later order to pay up, although the language in William’s 
charter seems to refer to the customs of St. Andrews. While there are 
numerous eharters from David’s reign concerning Dunfermline, there 
do not seem to be specific charters relating to Moray in the St. Andrews 
Liber, and no specific charters concerning St. Andrews delineating the
Barrow, Charters o f  D avid I, no. 185; ESC, no. 255; Dunfermline Register, no. 33; 
Moray Register, 254. Although they are different types o f  teinds, the hierarchy of  
payments and who would be responsible for enforcement is notable,
 ^Barrow, RRS, i, 43. Barrow states that it came ‘directly under royal control on the 
death o f  its last mormaer, Angus, in 1130.’
Lawrie, ESC, 442.
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hierarchy o f offices and remedies as found in these charters. This 
eharter concerning Urquhart is found in both the Moray Register and 
the Dunfermline Register!’'^
There are three possible options as the basis for William Ts charter. 
Either there was such a charter more specifically related to the matter 
discussed in King William’s charter and it is now lost, the eharter to 
the Holy Trinity in Moray is the basis, or William I is essentially 
saying that these customs have been in force since King David’s time 
in one diocese, and they should be followed in Moray as well.^^ It is 
not clear whether the ‘assize of King David’ applied to Moray 
specifically, to St. Andrews, or generally to the whole realm. Since 
there are numerous charters from King David that address the 
enforcement of teinds, it is diffieult to assign just one of them, absent 
the naming of Moray, as the definitive preeursor to William’s charter. 
But the idea is there that this was not new, either substantively or 
procedurally. These practices had been in force since David I’s reign, 
and William I expected them to continue during his reign. In fact, 
there are several later charters issued by William 1 relating to the 
payment of tiends, indicating that while there were enforcement 
procedures in place, and the expectation of compliance, they were not 
always pursued to the satisfaction of the complainants.
M oray Registrum, no. 254; Dunfermline Registrum, no. 33.
This is not the only time William commanded the payment o f teind 
been rendered in the past. See RRS, ii, no. 189, referring to Glasgow.
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The hierarchy set out is not just for enforcement of payment of teinds, 
but details the steps the church needed to take before reaching the king 
in pursuit o f these payments. The first step is the neyf who owes. If 
there is default o f payment recourse goes up the chain to the thane, or 
lord, then the sheriff, then the justiciar. This sets out very clearly and 
methodically the levels of officials and their jurisdiction. The sheriff 
presumably would want to ensure that the thane or lord had at least 
attempted to enforce the payment, or had been asked to pay his teinds 
before being petitioned to do something about it. There is not just a 
methodical, procedural approach to remedies for this complaint, but 
there is the citation of authority. Not only does William’s charter refer 
to the assize of David I, but to the customs, past and present, of the 
diocese of St. Andrews. The charter makes distinction between custom 
and what may well be a written order from King David.
While it may be stretehing the argument a bit to call this a reference to 
‘precedent’, it is an example of the ‘self-referencing’ and reversion 
discussed above. By referring to earlier and current customs and the 
assize of David I, William is bolstering the authority and justification 
for his command. Technically, as king, he does not need to do this. In 
earlier charters, specifically David’s, there are few references to earlier 
commands, or to earlier royal orders. There are few, if any references
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to the laws of Malcolm III, or to Alexander I or to Edgar, when issuing 
orders or enforcing them. David does refer to grants and charters of 
these earlier kings, but not to their government, their assises or 
procedures followed during their reign.
Another faetor which may be gleaned from these charters is the 
implied realization of dereliction of duty on the part of officials at the 
least, and overt eorruption at worst. The provisions for enforcing the 
collection of teinds and forfeitures from the officials who may have 
been lax in performing the duties of their office indicate royal 
awareness of such problems.
Under William I the role of the king is portrayed in more detail in the 
records. As indicated, this does not mean that William I actually acted 
any differently than his predecessors; it does mean that the records are 
becoming more detailed, and the use of writing as a means of 
bolstering the authority and presence of the king is more widespread.
JUDEX
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The term judex  is found in Scotland, England and indeed, throughout 
Europe in various forms during the Middle Ages/^ The office of judex 
seems to have been common in England as well as Seotland/^ English 
documents reflect several officials whose duties are discrete from one 
another. The records from Scotland however show that the judex 
seems to have been a composite of the roles set out in similar charters 
of disputes in England. The judex  In Scotland declared the law, but 
also swore the witnesses. This does not seem to have been the case in 
England. Several other historians have discussed the nature o f the 
judex. Barrow has concluded that not only was the judex  a ‘tenacious 
survival of an ancient judicial c a s t e , b u t  that they were attached to a 
geographic region, and were important in the administration of law and 
j u s t i c e . T h e  judex  might be called upon to perform a number of 
duties that were discrete, separate roles in England. A judex  seems to 
have served as actual judge, expert witness, repository of knowledge 
about local customs, laws and norms, juror, and what may be termed
This section does not directly address the origins o f the jury, although the jury and 
the office o f judex  are certainly related. See, Ian Willock, The Origins o f  the Jury, 
Stair Society. See also, Mike MacNair, ‘Vicinage and the Antecedents o f the Jury’, 
in Law and History Review, Volume 17, Issue 3, 1-36, 
http://www.historycooperative.org.
David Bates, Regesta Regum Anglo-Normanorum, The Acta o f  William the 
Conqueror, (1066-1087) (New York, 1998). There are numerous references to the 
judex.
Barrow, Kingdom o f  the Scots (2003), 57.
Ibid, 58. Barrow’s is the most comprehensive study o f  the office o f ju dex  thus far, 
although the older literature should not be Ignored.
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bailiff, court official or macer in the modern sense/'' The duties of 
bail i f f  court official/macer would include swearing witnesses and 
jurors, keeping order in the proceedings, and essentially guarding the 
conduct of the proceedings/' A more negative reading of this
W.C. Dickinson, The Sheriff Court Book o f  Fife, 1515-1522, (Edinburgh, 1928), 
Ixvi-lxvil. Dickenson attributed the decay o f this office to ‘the development o f  
feudalism, the growth o f national law and, with it, written court record’ at Ixvii.
The Scottish Courts Website, duties o f  court official/macer. 
http://www.scotcouits.gov.uk/indexl ■asp?path=yo2Fsherif[%2Fhistorv.htm.
Compare the role o f  the judex or ju d ices  to the Carol ingian scabini, which Susan 
Reynolds terms ‘collective assessors or judgement-finders.’ S. Reynolds, Kingdoms 
and Communities, (1997), 23, and the role o f  the Sacrabar, detailed by D.M.Stenton, 
English Justice Between the Norman Conquest and the Great Charter, 1066-1215, 
(London, 1965), 55-56, as a court official or public prosecutor. The definition given 
in R.E. Latham (preparer), Revised M edieval Latin Word-List from  British and Irish 
Sources, (London, 1999), 415, is ‘public prosecutor in local court (Norse sakar- 
àberi); -barrum, (?) action instituted by the same.’ J.M. Kaye, ‘The Sacrabar’, EITR 
83, 1968, 744, argues that contrary to D.M. Stenton’s views in English Justice, the 
sacrabar was not a public prosecutor. Rather the meaning o f  the root word from Old 
Scandinavian, o f  ‘bearer o f  a suit’ seems to be the one intended. The references in 
the English charters point to this as a right; the reference in Thomas Mackay Cooper, 
Regiam Majestatem and Qouniam Attachiamenta, (Edinburgh, 1947), 311,312 which 
is also contained In T, David Fergus, (ed), Quoniam Attatchiamenta, (Edinburgh, 
1996) Ch. 1, 117, refers to “Attachments in cases o f ‘wrang and unlaw and other 
actions which are pursued by sickerborg’”, that is, civil wrongs such as delicts. 
Cooper’s determination that the word sickerborg means ‘sure caution’ seems to have 
been founded on Sir John Skene’s definition o f ‘sacreborgh’ as equivalent to "securus 
plegius Fergus refers back to Skene De Verborum Signifieatione, Habakkuk Bisset, 
The Sheriff Court Book o f  Fife and Cooper in support o f this same interpretation.
This interpretation may also find support in what Balfour has written on the subject; 
see P. G. B. MacNeill, (ed). The Practicks o f  Sir James Balfour o f  Pit tendre ich, Vols. 
1, II, (Edinburgh, 1962), 210, 214, 505. It seems however, that this may actually be a 
variant o f  sacrabar, especially since the variants include the spelling ‘sacreborgh’.
See Habakkuk B isset‘s Rolment o f  Courtis, Vol. Ill, ed. Philip J, Hamilton-Grierson 
(Edinburgh and London, 1926), 54. See also Woodbine, Bracton De Legibus et 
Consuetudinibus Angliae, Vol. 11, trans. and ed. Samuel E.Thorne, (Cambridge,
Mass. 1968), 425. If indeed the root o f both may be interpreted as the ‘bearer o f  
suit’, there may be a relationship between the sacrabar or siekerborgh and the jurors 
or suitors. If so, it would be another instance o f legal borrowing from pre-Norman, 
Anglo-Saxon England. Another aspect must not be ignored, although proving it is 
difficult. The terms sac et soc are jurisdictional, and include the right to hear pleas of 
one’s tenants. See also D.M. Hadley, The Northern Danelaw, (London, 2000), 168, 
where she notes that ^sac ' meant cause or dispute in the legal sense. There seems to 
be not only a procedural aspect to the term sacrabar but a jurisdictional one as well. 
See Lawrie, Early Scottish Charters, (Glasgow, 1905), 48, 306. Pollock and 
Maitland, in The H istory o f  the Common Law before the time o f  Edw ard 1, Vol. 1 
(Cambridge, 1968), 579, states that team  ‘ought to mean the right to hold a court into 
which outsiders may be vouched as warrantors, or, to use a more technical term, the 
right to enforce a ‘foreign voucher.’ They go on to state that ‘The word sac (or, as
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combination o f roles would be that given by Cooper when he 
concluded that, ‘[I]t is hardly possible during the period under review 
to disentangle the functions of a member o f an assise as a judge of fact 
from his functions as himself a witness to fact, the latter functions long 
predominating.’*^^
John Bannerman has a slightly different approach to the references to 
the judex. He stated that the judex  might have been a term used for
‘justiciar’. H e  based this on the fact that the record of the Kirkness 
dispute had been translated into Latin from Gaelic. If the phrase 
referring to Earl Constantine, who was called fnagmis judex in Scotia" 
had been translated from Gaelic, it might have first been 'brithem môr 
i nAlbain", This would have been the Gaelic equivalent o f ‘justiciar in 
Scotia’, which Constantine, as Earl of Fife, may have been. 
MacQueen’s interpretation of this case is in keeping with this version. 
MacQueen states, ‘[T]he dispute was resolved in the court o f Fife and
we had better spell it, sake), the Anglo-Saxon sacn, the modern German Sache, 
means thing, cause, matter...in legal language it means a cause, a matter, an 
action...a grant then o f  sake should be a grant-by a very general term- o f  
jurisdiction.’ Perhaps there was, in Skene’s Scotland, a conflation o f the meanings o f  
team  and sake.
Cooper, ‘From David I to Bruce, 1124-1329’, in An Introduction to Scottish Legal 
History, (Edinburgh, 1958), 11.
John Bannerman, ‘M acDuff o f  Fife’, in M edieval Scotland: Crown, Lordship and  
Community, eds. Alexander Grant and Keith J. Stringer (Edinburgh, 1998), 23. He 
refers to Barrow on this point, in support o f this interpretation; Barrow, The Acts o f  
Malcolm IV, 50, has stated ‘[W]e cannot trace any organic link between the office o f  
Justice on the one hand, an obviously Anglo-Norman innovation, and the office o f  
judex {brithem) on the other, an ancient institution o f  Celtic Scotia and Cumbria.’
See also, R. Andrew MacDonald, The Kingdom o f  the Isles, Scotland's Western 
Seaboard, c. 1100-c. 1336 (East Lothian, 1998), 59-60, where MacDonald discusses 
the translation o f  Gaelic titles into Latin equivalents.
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Fothrif, presided over by the earl of Fife, “great judge in Scotia”, and 
two judices, who ordered the restoration of the célidé. ’ He then goes 
on to state that ‘this was clearly the earl’s court in action, (and) the 
office of earl had a predominantly public character at this period, and 
the proceedings were commanded by the king’/"'
The precise nature of the role and duties of the judex  is uncertain. One 
position that has been accepted is that the Scottish office was inherited 
from the Irish, which would mean that these men were in a sense, 
professional lawmen.^^ The Scottish charter evidence, however, 
shows that the men called judices served a number of functions. This 
would be in keeping with much of the rest of continental Europe in the 
early Middle Ages, where ‘the legal expert.. .was often no more than a 
man who happened to be knowledgeable in the law. His expertise was 
a source of social and political influence but not of his daily livelihood 
nor was it acquired by a formal educa t i on . Al t hough  Lawrie states 
these men are ‘practically witnesses in the modern sense’, a n d  it is 
tempting to limit their role to witnesses and fact finders, they are more 
than either of those roles. In one case, they had been described as
H. MacQueen, Common Law and Feudal Society, 43. This interpretation would 
indicate that David Ts administrative importations had penetrated northward early in 
his reign.
Meston, et al. The Scottish Legal Tradition, 34.
Lawyers and Laymen, eds. T.M. Charles-Edwards, Morfydd E. Owen and D.B. 
Walters (Cardiff, 1986), 5. Ireland and Wales are the notable exceptions to this, but a 
detailed discussion o f Irish and Welsh law or their judicial castes is outwith the scope 
o f  this thesis.
Lawrie, ESC, 304.
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senior and wise men in all Cumbria, called specifically to help with the 
inquest/^ This would support Bellomo’s view, that these “judges” 
‘were simply “those who judge”; people who, in real life and at a 
specific moment and a particular time in their lives or their daily 
activities, found themselves in a position of having to adjudicate.’ He 
states that these men were not ‘professionally engaged in that activity’ 
and the role could have been filled by an individual or a group of men 
called upon to act as judges.^^ While this has some similarity to the 
duties that may be discerned from the Scottish charters, the Scottish 
judex  does not appear to have been such a happenstance role.
These men were considered to be repositories of knowledge about the 
properties themselves, and rights in the properties. In the Inquest of 
Glasgow, at least two of these men were called judices?^ From later 
documents, it appears that the judex  had specific duties with regard to 
hearings where what might be termed ‘legal’ decisions were made.^' 
They often appeared in charters concerning proceedings where there is
Barrow, Charters o f  D avid  /, no. 15.
M.Bellomo, The Common Legal Past o f  Europe, 1000-1800, 45.
Lawrie, ESC, 304. Lawrie points out that Dr. Prescott holds the view that the four 
men whose names appear before the term Judices, while Lawrie would attribute that 
term to only the last two, Leysing and Oggo. Although the arguments o f  both have 
merit, since there is one individual, Hal den son o f  Eadulf, named after the term 
judices, Lawrie’s position seems more likely. The usual seems to have been one or 
two, although there is the possibility o f more, noted by Barrow concerning the Letter 
o f  Brice, the judex, in Barrow’s article, judex', and in the Kirkness dispute.
See e.g., Dunfermline Register, no. 15, where King David ordered his ju d ices  to 
attend the abbey courts '‘ut placita  et justicie juste tractentur'.
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also a sheriff and/or justiciars, and appear to have had set duties/^ 
Barrow notes that in the letter from Brice, of the king, dated 11 
November 1221, one of these duties was to swear the jurors on a 
scrinarium, or relic/^ There were occasions where they were called 
upon to testify about their collective memories concerning property 
rights/"' or convened together by the king to determine property rights, 
including the rights of a king/^ They have duties that go beyond mere 
‘judging’.
Whether these men could be deemed ‘professional lawmen’ at the 
beginning of the twelfth century and throughout the period may never 
be fully understood; the charter records show however, that It would be 
wrong to say, as Bellomo has, that these fudices" had little 
acquaintance with the customs of the place in which they lived, or that 
they did not ‘interpret’ a norm or law.^^ The Scottish evidence 
demonstrates that at least some of these judices were seen to be expert
See, e.g., RRS, ii, nos. 452, 399, (grant to Coupar Angus with perambulation by 
inter alia  Earl Duncan, MacBeth, judex o f Cowrie, and others, and witnessed by 
Duncan the justiciar). See also, Dickinson, Sheriff Court Book o f  Fife, Ixvi-lxviii, the 
section on the dempster. Dickinson notes that the ju dex  performed many o f  the 
functions o f the sheriff prior to the institution o f that office.’
Barrow, Vî/t/cA'’, 19, 26.
Innes, Glasgow Register, no. 1
A gathering o f  ju dices  was in fact, held during William’s reign, ca. 1187 at Lanark, 
to ‘adjudge the king’s right to collect his cain in Galloway.’ See APS, 1, 378, c. 
XXllI; Duncan, Scotland, The Making o f  the Kingdom, 186.
Bellomo, The Common Legal Past o f  Europe, 45.
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in the laws and customs of the region, in addition to being elders of the 
community/''
Barrow noted that in Scotia proper, the judex continued to appear until 
at least the end of the thirteenth century/^ The use of the term judex 
did not last so long in the south, disappearing from the charter 
evidence by the mid-thirteenth century/^ It is interesting to note that
St. Andrews Liber, 114-117. The Kirkness dispute is a prime example not only 
because there is reference to three judges, but that the ‘great judex’, Constantine, Earl 
o f Fife defers to Dubgall because he is thought to be more experienced and 
knowledgeable in the law.
The jn dex  was preserved in the office o f  dempster, whieh survived into the modern 
era. One o f the clearest examples o f the transition o f terms, may be seen in the 
charters concerning Fergus, called jndex  in the original charter datable to 1295, to a 
reference to ‘Fergnsiiis dictus D em ster’ in 1310, and finally a reference to the same 
Fergus in 1431, as Fergusins Dempstare. See C. Innes, The Book o f  the Thanes o f  
Cawdor, A series o f  papers selectedfrom  the Charter Room at Cawdor, 1236-1742 
(Edinburgh, 1859); Dickinson, Sheriff Court Book o f  Fife, Ixvii, note,l. See also 
Barrow, Kingdom o f  the Scots, 61-65, especially his notes on the connections o f  
YjdïdXà, ju dex  with Careston, Angus, and the Dempsters o f Careston.
Barrow, ju d ex ', 23-24; Atlas o f  Scottish History to 1707, eds. P. G.B. McNeill and 
Hector L. MacQueen (Edinburgh, 1996), 189. The maps show that ju dices  were 
found in the charters in Strathnith, Galloway, Car rick and Cumbria. The only 
reference to a ju dex  in Cumbria is during David’s reign, and Barrow notes that 
references to them in the other regions had disappeared by the mid-thirteenth century. 
The ju d ices  that are named in the Inquest o f Glasgow, Lessig and Oggu, are also 
witnesses in the Holyrood foundation charter, (1141x1147), Charters o f  D a v id l, no. 
147, but the term ju dex  is not used for either. This may be due to the composite 
nature o f the charter, which Barrow, (notes to 147) and Lawrie (pp. 257, 386), or it 
may be that they were not acting in any official capacity; Barrow states that no. 147 
is based on an original foundation charter which no doubt did have these two listed as 
witnesses. The maps also show that by 1193x1195, there was at least one reference 
to sheriffs in Carriek and in Galloway, and McNeill and MacQueen noted that ‘it is 
possible that there was a sheriff o f Dumfries by this period.’ But the ju dex  was 
preserved in the office o f  dempster, which survived into the modern era. One o f the 
clearest examples o f  the transition o f  terms, may be seen in the eharters concerning 
Fergus, called judex  in the original charter datable to 1295, to a reference to 
'Fergusius dictus Dem ster' in 1310, and finally a reference to the same Fergus in 
1431, as Fetgusius Dempstare. See C. Innes, The Book o f  the Thanes o f  Cawdor. A 
series o fpapers selected from  the Charter Room at Cawdor, 1236-1742 (Edinburgh,
1859); Dickinson, Sheriff Court Book o f  Fife, Ixvii, note,l. Although the connections 
between the shift in terminology from judex  to dempster in Scots legal history have a 
parallel in Roman law in the judex  and recuperatores or assessors, scabini, and then 
the dempsters or doomsmen, tracing the chronology and nature o f  these linguistic
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while there is some overlap, chiefly in the area just north of the Forth, 
the map showing the distribution of the judicial officer known in the 
charters as judex" reflects an absence of such an office or official in 
the centre of the area below the Firth of Forth, which is where many of 
the sheriffdoms are found before 1165/'' During William Fs reign, 
sheriffdoms spread north of Forfar, along the east coast, and to the 
south and west, into Lennox and Galloway. By the end of the twelfth 
century, there were sheriffdoms in several areas where judices had 
been f o u n d . T h e  offices of sheriff and judex seem to have co-existed 
for some time in certain areas and often both sheriffs and judices 
appeared as witnesses in the same cha r t e r s . T h i s  would fit with the 
initially administrative roles of the sheriffs and judicial roles of the 
judices slowly fusing into a single role. This supports the notion that 
the procedures being followed were evolving, and the process of 
integration was not forced. While the perception of the role of these 
judicial men must remain unclear, what is evident is that they were, for 
several centuries after the advent of the Anglo-Normans, an integral
influences is beyond the scope o f this thesis. See O.F Robinson, T.D. Fergus and 
W.M. Gordon, European Legal History (London, 1994), 33; The Institutes o f  Gaius, 
trans. W.M. Gordon and O.F. Robinson (London, 1988), 545.
Barrow, The Acts o f  Malcolm IV, King o f  Scots 1153-1165  (Edinburgh, 1960), 40. 
Barrow notes that there were already sheriffs o f Stirling during the reign o f  David I.
McNeill, et.aL, Atlas, 189, 192, 193. There is some overlap, as there is no direct 
correlation between the appearance o f the sheriff and the disappearance o f  the judex. 
And it is noteworthy that the early shreiffdoms established before William’s reign are 
in areas where there is little evidence o f judices, such as Lothian, where there was a 
Gospatric, sheriff son o f Uhtred, probably by 1120-23x1124. See Barrow, Charters 
o f  D avid 1, no. 14.
® Arbroath Liber, nos. 35,126,149.
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part o f the resolution of disputes, and in some cases, they were the 
decision makers rather than simply advisors.
JUSTICIAR
Barrow has previously noted that ‘when we examine the office of 
Justice (Justicid) between 1153 and 1165, we see, first that it was 
accorded a high importance, and secondly that we can discover very 
little else about it.’^^  Later in his career, he has noted that the evidence 
in the records before the end of the thirteenth century as well as 
beyond that date did not entirely support the Cooper analysis. He 
concluded that a study of the office o f justiciar ‘ought at least put us on 
our guard against hasty condemnation of the native secular legal 
machinery. It is not self-evident that the institutions at the disposal of 
the Scottish state for administering justice during the period from 
David I to John Balliol were inadequate for the purposes for which 
they were designed.’ "^'
There do not seem to be any clearly notated examples of cases brought 
before the justiciar during this p e r i o d . W h i l e  there are records which 
include the names of men who were justiciars as witnesses, none of
Barrow, RRS. i, 49.
Barrow, Kingdom  (2003) 109.
Except for the Kirkness case, if  one accepts that the Earl o f Fife was in fact a 
justiciar.
these records allows for certainty in concluding that such matters were 
heard by and decided before a particular justiciar acting in his official 
capacity. There are references to such hearings during David’s reign, 
and inferences that may be drawn from royal charters throughout this 
period.^^ As Barrow alludes, however, it would be dangerous to 
conclude that there were no such cases, or no such courts. The 
numerous references to justiciis in the royal charters, and commands to 
them regarding legal proceedings, indicate that there were such 
officials acting in a judicial capacity most probably in David f  s reign, 
and certainly in Malcolm IV’s and William Ts reigns. The earliest 
non-criminal case, however, where it is clear that the matter was 
decided in the court of the justiciar is in 1235 regarding a dispute 
between Maldoven, Earl of Lennox and Gilbert, son of Samuel. It was 
decided before Walter son of Alan, justiciar of Scotia, and others.^^
The justiciar, Walter son of Alan, William abbot of Paisley and the 
Earl of Lennox all appended their seals to the agreement.
It is to Barrow and Professor Nicholas Vincent that Scottish historians 
owe an additional debt. They have now documented an unpublished 
brieve of Malcolm IV, which sheds some light on the role o f the
See Barrow, Charters o f  David I, no. 176, where the king states that Baldwin the 
Lorimer should not have to answer any lawsuit except before the king or his justiciar, 
Registnim M onasterii de Passelet, cartas privilégia conventiones aiiaque 
munimenta complectens {Edinbmgh, 1832), 170-171.
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justiciar in the mid-twelfth century. The text o f this brieve is
significant for a number of reasons, two of which concern the topic at 
hand. First, it refers to a justicia of Lothian, and another o f Teviotdale, 
which offices do not appear elsewhere in the extant records from 
Malcolm IV’s reign. From the wording of this document, it appears 
that either there was no justiciar north of the Forth, or if one existed, he 
was unable to act as required by the brieve. Second, it gives clear 
information about the duties of the sheriff and the justiciar. From the 
charter, the sheriffs duties included apprehending those holding stolen 
property and bringing the offender before the justiciar of Lothian or 
Teviotdale so that full justice may be done to them in his (the 
justiciar’s) presence.^^ This is one of the earliest and clearest 
expressions of the duties of the justiciar regarding the hearing of pleas 
(in this case, criminal) and the rendering of justice, ft does not actually 
describe the process to be carried out when in front of the justiciar, 
however.
SHERIFF
The extent to which a judicial (as opposed to an administrative,) 
function for the sheriff in Scotland can be substantiated in the twelfth
G.W.S. Barrow, ‘An Unpublished Brieve o f Malcolm IV’, SHR LXXXIV (2005), 
85-87.
Bodleian Library, MS Top. Yorks e .l2 , fo. 76 ^^(a manuscript o f John Burton, 
editor o f  Monasticon Eboracem e  (1758)); Barrow transcript o f charter.
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century charters is debatable. The records do indicate that there were 
sheriffs operating as judges in England at this time as noted above, and 
Earl David’s charter to the monks of La Charité listed Hugh the sheriff 
as the first witness. It is clear that one of the early roles of the sheriff 
was as an administrator for the king. The sheriffs duties would have 
included ensuring the collection and distribution o f revenue^^ and 
enforcing the decisions regarding disputes.^' Because he addresses 
'omnibus vicecomitibus suis cunctibus baronibus Francis et Anglicis ’, 
in a recording of a grant to his miles Ernulf, it seems reasonable to 
presume that the role of sheriff in Northumberland was, at the very 
least, similar to the role of sheriff in the rest of David I’s k i n g d o m I t  
has been noted that ‘[I]t cannot be doubted that Scottish Northumbria 
and the southern areas of Scotland-Teviotdale, Tweedale, Lothian and 
probably also Clydesdale and the south-western areas outside 
Galloway- shared an administrative history closely related to more 
southerly parts of the island.
Although 'it is clear that by the mid twelfth century the system of local 
administration, depending on the sheriff as the king’s primary 
intermediary official for judicial, administrative and fiscal affairs, was
Barrow, The Charters o f  D avid  1, no. 49.
Ibid, no. 75. While it is not entirely clear that the dispute was decided by David I, 
he is clearly instructing his sheriffs to see that the sequestration is carried out. 
Barrow, The Charters o f  D avid I, no. 53. The date o f this charter is 1140 x l 141. 
The Sheriffs o f  Scotland, An Interim List to c. 1306, eds. N.H. Reid and G.W.S. 
Barrow, (St. Andrews, 2002), xiii.
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well advanced,’^ '* the precise nature of their judicial functions is more 
difficult to describe. Barrow and Reid have noted, however, that the 
sheriffs ‘regular presence in, for example, perambulations of marches 
to resolve tenurial disputes, demonstrates that they were expected to 
wield at least eivil p o w e r . T h e y  had fiscal responsibilities as borne 
out by the records in the Exchequer R o l l s , a n d  duties to enforce the 
king’s brieves and ensure the receipt of grants.^^ While these may not 
be viewed as judicial activities, strictly speaking, they were part of the 
enforcement procedures called into play after a variety of royal 
decisions including grants and gifts or writs of protection. These would 
include orders to refrain from collecting revenues, and orders to 
sequestrate lands until the king’s arrival.
This is supported again by King David’s charters, in the addresses to 
'Comitibus, Baronibus, lusticiis, Vicecomitibus, Ministris...
Although one could argue that this address was to the sheriffs as the 
king’s local administrators, David has also addressed it to the Justices, 
indicating that he wanted all those in positions of power, before whom
Ibid, xiv.
Ibid, XV.
The Exchequer Rolls o f  Scotland, Vol. I, A.D. 1264-1359, eds. .Tohn Stuart and 
George Burnett, prefaces, and pp. 1-34. Although these records begin in 1264 and 
are therefore beyond the scope o f this thesis, they illustrate the types o f  activities o f 
the sheriffs especially with regard to the collection and dispersal o f  revenues.
Barrow, The Charters o f  D avid I, nos. 45, 49, 51, 67 are just some o f  the types o f  
royal brieves directed to sheriffs.
Ibid, no. 45.
Ibid, no. 75.
Barrow, The Charters o f  D avid I, no. 97.
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any dispute could be heard and by whom any decision could be 
enforced, to be on notice of the proceedings in the subsequent text. By 
at least 1135, the king was issuing brieves addressed to 'baronibus, 
vicecomitibus, ministris et omnibusprobis hominibus ’ specifically 
forbidding the taking of poinds on church l a n d s . T h i s  implies that 
sheriffs would have been one of the officials who would be called upon 
to enforce a judicial decision. A questionably more enlightening 
charter is the one issued by Henry, earl of Northumberland to William 
Cumin the chancellor and Osbert the sheriff of Durham, forbidding 
them to implead the monks or their men except before the earl himself 
or his justice.’ "^ It seems to imply that William Cumin and/or Osbert 
the sheriff had so impleaded someone; it also implies that Earl Henry 
was putting a stop to this practice. From this charter alone there is no 
way to draw a firm conclusion. Were the sheriffs actually hearing the 
pleas and was Earl Henry objecting to this practice? Or were the 
sheriffs performing their duties, but there were irregularities causing 
Henry to halt the practice until the matter could be dealt with by 
himself or his justice? While none of these charters are explicit in 
detailing what might be termed the judicial duties of the sheriff, it does 
appear that the sheriffs duties encompassed at least a quasi-judicial 
component as early as David’s reign. In England during Henry I’s 
reign, it is clear that there were shire courts, and sheriffs did hold
Barrow, The Charters o f  D avid  I, no. 100. 
Ibid, no. 103. This charter is dated 1I4I.
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judicial h e a r i n g s . A l t h o ug h  there is no direct proof, it seems more 
likely than not, that there were sheriff courts during David’s reign, 
conducting the same sorts of procedures.
Stenton relates a case also from Henry I where, by the King’s 
command, the sheriff was to hear the plea  made by the monks of St. 
Stephen of Caen regarding the ‘encroachment made by [the King’s] 
men of Bridport on the manor of Burton Bradstock. In this matter, 
there were sixteen jurors.’*^"* In both of these cases, which are 
exceptional in their detail, the sheriff’s judicial role is more clearly 
defined. He was instructed to hear a plea, and he is described as 
having the role of a judge. It seems that even if it was not routinely part 
of his duties, he did occasionally take on judicial duties in England 
during the first part of the twelfth century.
There is another case which could just as easily be covered under 
another heading, but is important here because it was brought before 
and heard by the sheriff at Huntingdon while David I held that Honour. 
The case brought by the Abbey of Thorney against Robert of Yaxley is 
instructive not only procedurally, but substantively, with regard to the 
requirements of assent and consent. This series of charters makes
D.M. Stenton, English Justice Between the Norman Conquest and the Great 
Charter, 1066-1215 {honùon, 1965), 140-147.
Ibid, 21.
Ibid, Appendix. This topic is covered in more detail, infra.
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clear that the original transaction had not been approved by the 
chapter, so Robert did not have clear title. He also did not have the 
confirmation of the king. These were considered fatal defects. The 
case was heard before Fulk, the sheriff at Huntingdon, where there was 
a full shire court. Fulk the sheriff not only held the court and presided 
over the matter, he also apparently gave advice to Robert of Yaxley 
when it appeared that Abbot Robert had proved his case. The sheriff is 
seen to be not only acting as an administrative officer, but as a judge 
before whom pleas are made and witnesses called to testify. While 
there are clear parallels between the charter evidence in England and 
the far less numerous charter evidence in Scotland, and it is tempting 
to draw a straight line between the two, this is not entirely possible. 
There are discrepancies, most notably in the role of the judex, and 
possibly, but not conclusively, the role of the sheriff.
The various roles of those who decided the fate of disputants in the 
twelfth century were in flux. From being a communal effort, where 
many in the community had a voice, dispute resolution was well on the 
way to becoming, by the end of that century, one which was regulated 
and controlled by a few. The role of the king shifted to a more central, 
authoritative position, where issues of jurisdiction, procedure and 
evidence were decided by him, as well as the outcome of the matter. 
This shift had a cascading effect on those who derived their authority
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directly from the king, specifically the justiciar and sheriff. Their 
positions became more clearly delineated in the documentary evidence, 
but as imported offices, we do not witness the same shift directly, only 
derivatively. They begin with a more central role as officials of the 
king, and evidence concerning them becomes more frequent and 
detailed over time.
Not only were the processes of dispute prevention and resolution and 
certain roles o f decision-makers evolving during the twelfth century, 
but the records reflecting these disputes and the measures taken to 
prevent them were also changing. Indeed, a key factor driving the 
changes in procedure was the impact o f changing attitudes towards, 
and used of the written word. With that in mind an examination of the 
types of documentation used to record disputes, actual and potential is 
in order.
96
CHAPTER IV 
NOTICIAE
While the majority o f records concerning the prevention and resolution of 
disputes were charters, usually writ-charters, there are several texts in the form 
of a noticia} Lawrie describes noticiae as documents that record the process 
of how certain properties came into the recorder’s possession; the documents 
discussed here deal specifically with either frank disputes or some sort of 
judicial proceeding involving property rights. There are only a handful of 
these types of records. Several are datable to the 1120s, although these types 
of documents do not have an end date and some may be found throughout the 
twelfth century.^ Some indeed, do not fit nicely into the definition of a notice 
or notification so much as they are informative narratives relating information
Lawrie, ESC, 220, defined noticiae as ‘writings made after an event or grant, recording how 
lands had been acquired.’ Many o f the documents that reflect the resolution o f a dispute, and 
certainly the prevention o f  a dispute are writ-charters which themselves could be called 
noticiae. The address is general, the action is described in the past tense, and there may or 
may not be any command or prohibition addressed to the recipient. A detailed discussion of  
the different and more precise definitions o f  these types o f documents may be found in 
Richard Sharpe, The use o f writs in the eleventh century', Anglo-Saxon England 32 (2003) 
247-91. The author defines the writ-charter as ‘addressed by the king to the officers and 
suitors o f  the shire court,’ at 3. The function, according to this author, was as a grant or 
confirmation o f  rights in property. That meant that the form o f  the writ charter was often as a 
notification, although there were clauses o f prohibition and injunction included in the writ.
The chief distinctions between a notice type document as discussed here and a writ-charter, o f  
whatever form or purpose, are the authentication by seal o f the writ-charter, where the notice 
was not so authenticated, and the use o f the writ-charter in the proving o f  a claim. Noticiae do 
not seem to have been used in this fashion.
 ^Barrow, RRS, i. Introduction’, 75-76, in his discussion o f notifications; RRS, ii 
‘Introduction’, 78, and as an example, no. 287, relating that the loan from the Cistercians 
should not act as precedent.
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about a dispute or process. And some of them would be virtually 
incomprehensible if not read in conjunction with other records, including 
grants and confirmations.
Most historians do not analyse noticiae as separate types of documents; they 
are usually included in notifications of all types,^ certificates or letters."* In a 
broad sense, the records discussed here are narrative stories, but unlike 
chronicles or histories, these are single documents, usually included in 
monastic or diocesan cartularies. Because they memorialise certain events 
with regard to a dispute or judicial hearing concerning property rights, they 
should be viewed as ‘legal’ records. As a particular type of legal writing or 
legal discourse, they have become the focus of scholarly research.
Narratives, narrative testimony and the impact of language and literacy on law 
are some of the subjects that have been examined by scholars in a variety of 
fields, especially in the last fifty years.^ While no one method or approach is
 ^ Barrow, RRS, ii, 78. Strictly speaking, noticiae are notifications. But they can include 
letters, such as Simon the Cantor’s letter regarding Moorfoot, infra.
M.T. Clanchy, From M emory to Written Record  (Oxford, 1993), generally, chapter 3, 
especially 89-92. Clanchy, at 88, defines certificates as ‘public statements by 
individuals...issued in the form o f recognizances, testimonials, notifications, wills, sealed 
memoranda and similar records.’ He indicates at 90, that ‘letters’ in their earliest forms were 
not correspondence but rather ‘writs’ or brieves.
 ^These fields have included law, linguistics, sociology and Anthropology, literature and 
language and linguistics. See B.S. Jackson, Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence (Merseyside, 
1988); Jackson, ‘Towards and Interdisciplinary Model o f Legal Communication’, 97-110; 
David Nelken, ‘Rules and Stories: A Comment on Jackson’ 111-118, both in Legal Semiotics 
and the Sociology o f  Law, ed. B.S. Jackson (Onati, 1994); Peter Brooks, Law's Stories, 
Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law ((New Haven, 1996); John Gibbons, Forensic Linguistics, 
An Introduction to Language in the Justice System  (Oxford, 2003); Jack Goody, The Logic o f  
Writing and the Organization o f  Society (Cambridge, 1986); Brenda Danet and Bryan 
Bogoch, ‘From Oral Law to Literate Law: Orality, Literacy and Formulaicity in Anglo-Saxon
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adopted here, examining these records in light of the recent interdisciplinary 
scholarship may increase understanding of the shift in mentality evident in the 
twelfth and thirteenth century. This shift is evident in the greater importance 
given to records in the disputing process.^ Even more fundamentally than the 
changes evident in the use of records however, is the evolution in the 
perceptions of the authors about the disputing process and their expectations 
of justice and law.
This change in mentality encompasses the shift from orality to literacy noted 
by Clanchy, Ong, Goody and others;^ it also highlights cultural constructs  ^
and cultural self- reflection.^ Essentially, these records were simply 
memoranda, created to preserve information for the future with regard to
W ills’, in Legal Semiotics and the Sociology o f  Law, ed. B.S. Jackson (Onati, 1994), 227-292. 
David Mellinkoff, The Language o f  the Law (Boston, 1963) is useful as a background to the 
diverse linguistic influences on Anglo-American law, but does not deal specifically with 
narrative, or the linguistic dissection o f legal discourse.
 ^Clanchy, Memory to Written Record, generally and chapters 1, 5, introduction to Part II, 7 
and 8.
’ Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Tecnologizing o f  the Word (London, 1982); and Ong, 
‘Oral Residue in Tudor Prose Style’, PMLA, LXXX (1965), 145-154, 146, where he notes that 
‘Generally speaking, literature becomes itself slowly, and the closer in time a literature is to an 
antecedent oral culture, the less literary or “lettered” and the more oral-aural it will be’; Jack 
Goody, author o f  several manuscripts on the impact o f literacy, including Logic o f  Writing, 
cited above, and The Power o f  the Written Tradition (London, 2000), and Clanchy, cited 
above. Others are cited above, n. 5. See also, Henrietta Leyser, ‘Texts and languages, old and 
new’, in The Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, ed. Barbara Harvey (Oxford, 2001), 167-199, 
at 169, who notes that the shift from memory to record was European in scope, but the lack of 
documentation had a more regional effect for the conquerors. It was both a curse and a boon 
to the Normans- they could not find written evidence of the activities and properties o f their 
predecessors, but they also could ‘rewrite’ unwritten histories.
K. Heidecker, ‘Introduction’, in Charters and the Use o f  the Written Word in Medieval 
Society (Turnhout, 2000), 11.
 ^Robert Weisberg, ‘Proclaiming Trials as Narratives: Premises and Pretenses’, in L aw ’s 
Stories, Narratives and Rhetoric in the Law, eds. Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz (New Haven, 
1996), 61-83, 63, where he notes that ‘Certain ethical, political, and legal values manifest 
themselves or operate only in the medium o f narratives by which a culture or nation defines 
itself.’
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particular property claims.'** Aspects of the records which shed light on these 
various elements include language, particularly the address, verb tenses used 
and ‘voice’ of the account, the person or authority in whose name it was 
drafted, and finally, who actually created the document and why.
Although negative criteria may not be considered the best way to define or 
discuss a class of document, it can be a useful way o f distinguishing noticiae 
from other types of records. Thus, these documents do not have any 
authentication, are not usually sealed, and have few formulaic phrases. The 
format is inconsistent, with some being cast in the form of a history or an 
account, some in the form of a letter, and some truly fit the very limited 
definition of strict notification of actions taken. One of the most important 
characteristics of noticiae, however, is that they do not seem to have been 
drafted with an eye to their future use, so much as records or accounts of 
transactions or events."
There are certain formulaic phrases that are found in noticiae. These may 
include, (but are not limited to) words such as sciatis or notum sit. Formulaic 
language has been described both as ‘oral residue’ and as indication of the
Clanchy, Memory, 146.
" In contrast to charters, which, as legal documents were drafted in anticipation o f using them 
in the proof o f  rights in property. See also, Herwig WeigI, ‘ What to Write in Court; Literacy 
and Lawsuits in Late Medieval Austria’, in Charters and the Use o f  the Written Word, ed.
Karl Heidecker, 63-80, 66, where the author notes that court books, “'Stadtbiicher, were kept 
by town-councils. ..to keep all this in memory after the participants had died, in order to avoid 
renewed trouble. The entries into the book were therefore considered to have the same 
validity as sealed charters.’ Future use was not limited to charters where disputes were 
concerned.
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move towards ‘communicative practiees specific to writing."” Narrative 
analysts have argued that ‘every historieal rendering of events is an aesthetic 
project, as well as an empirical one, and that eveiy aesthetic strategy has 
ethical premises and effects.’"  They are in a very real sense, stories of past 
events that were placed in a record the existence of which may not yet have 
been perceived to be legally necessary." It would be misleading, however, to 
assume the accounts were unbiased records. ‘...Narrative discourse is never 
innocent, but always presentational, a way of working on story events that is 
also a way of working on the listener or reader.’"  All o f the noticiae were 
written for a partieular purpose, whether stated or not. Each of the extant 
records discussed below is preserved in the cartularies of one o f the interested 
parties.
Records memorialising the cases diseussed below may only have survived as 
one-sided noticiae, but they are important nonetheless. These narrative
Danet and Bogoch, ‘From Oral Law to Literate Law: Orality, Literacy and Formulaicity in 
Anglo-Saxon W ills’, 227-292, 230. A fundamental assumption in the authors’ work is that 
medieval texts are transitional not only because o f their dating, but because they were 
produced ‘in an era where primary orality was being eroded and in which beliefs and practices 
associated with literate culture were in the process o f formation.’ Thus, they seek to examine 
‘how written legal acts emerged from oral ones in the Middle A ges.’ See also, Ong, ‘Oral 
Residue in Tudor Prose Style’, in Publications o f  the Modern Language Association o f  
America LXXX (1965) 145-154, 146, where he defines oral residue as ‘ ...habits o f thought 
and expression tracing back to pre-literate situations or practice, or deriving from the 
dominance o f  the oral as a medium in a given culture, or indicating a reluctance or inability to 
dissociate the written medium from the spoken.’
Robert Weisberg, ‘Proclaiming Trials as Narratives: Premises and Pretenses’, in Law's 
Stories, Narratives and Rhetoric in the Law, eds. Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz (New Haven, 
1996), 61-83, 63.
There are instances where noticiae were used in the presentation o f  a claim concerning 
property rights, such as those set out in the Gospel Book o f Deer; see Barrow, Charters o f  
D avid I, no. 136.
Peter Brooks, ‘The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric’ in. Law's Stories, Narratives and  
Rhetoric in the Law, eds. Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz (New Haven, 1996), 14-22, 17.
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accounts provide a window on the author’s perspective of what is important in 
the resolution of disputes. Their value is in detailing the perceptions of what 
they thought the source of law was and how those perceptions changed during 
the course of the twelfth century.
The case studies that follow range from before Earl David became king to the 
1180s, and include disputes between religious and laity as well as those where 
both parties are religious. While there are some common elements, such as 
the lack of authentication, there is no over-arching pattern to which all seem to 
conform. As with other case studies here, there is no inevitable progression 
towards a more refined state, no clearly marked path to a more perfect record 
type. There is, however, a clear change in approach towards the disputing 
process and the recording of information about them over time. It is an 
uneven, inconsistent evolution, and the accounts set out in these noticiae are 
examples of an earlier stage compared to the more precise, ‘future use’ 
focused writ charters.
Peverel
One of these disputes, datable to the ten-year period before David’s 
inauguration as king, concerned land in which both William Peverel and
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Thorney Abbey claimed interests." William Peverel of Dover was connected 
to David through the Honour of Huntingdon, which David inherited on his 
marriage to Maud de Senlis." As one of David’s men, William Peverel would 
have been able to look to the Earl in resolving any disputes. Although this 
particular dispute occurred in England, it demonstrated, first that David I had 
partaken in the resolution of disputes well before becoming king of the 
Scots," and second, that the mechanisms for resolving disputes were similar 
whether in England or in Scotland, and indeed as will be shown later, in 
northern France. Finally, the noticia, authored most probably by a monk of 
Thorney Abbey, sets out what that monk thought was important about the 
procedures used to settle the dispute and the details worth mentioning.
In this case, David as Earl of Huntingdon, met with William Peverel and 
Robert, abbot o f Thorney at Keyston, in the presenee of many barons," 
regarding a dispute between the two. Earl David persuaded William to 
abandon his claim to the parish church of Bolnhurst against Thorney Abbey, 
for the good of William’s soul and for his ancestors. Although the dispute was 
resolved, there are few details about the exact facts or indeed the procedures 
followed. What is notable, however, is how inclusive both the procedure and 
the record of it seem to be. Earl David met with the disputants before a large
Barrow, The Charters o f  D avid  /, no. 5; Thorney Abbey cartulary, MS. Add.3021, f. 417', 
Cambridge University Library.
Barrow, The Charters o f  D avid  /, 20.
J. A. Green, ‘David 1 and Henry \\S H R , LXXV, 1 (1996) 1-19, 11, where she pointed out 
that David had been a royal justiciar in England under Henry 1.
Barrow translates this as ‘Earl David, in the presence o f a concourse o f barons assembled at 
Keyston’.
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number of barons, and it was in the presence of these men that the dispute was 
brought to an end?** David was instrumental in resolving the dispute, but 
appears to have been perceived as more of a mediator rather than a decision­
making judge?* While the term ‘judge’ can be misleading, it is clear that 
David’s role was closer to the modern concept of the role of a mediator than 
the role of a judex, or even of a president, which can be determined from the 
cases involving the judices~^ Also, Earl David’s persuasion of William 
Peverel is key in labelling this a mediation rather than an adjudication. David 
was not deciding who was right or wrong, but facilitating an agreement that 
satisfied both parties. William Peverel gave up his claim for the benefit of the 
prayers of the monks, and for his soul; the Abbot and the Abbey got the rights 
to the church and undertook the obligation to pray for William and his familia. 
Neither left empty-handed.^^
The language of the document is also important. The record of this dispute is 
of the process, rather than a judgement. It is informative, declarative rather 
than commanding.^'* From the universal address to the close listing the 
witnesses on behalf of the parties, it is in the voice o f an anonymous third
This fits well with the general description set forth by Susan Reynolds.
See White, ‘Inheritances’ at 65, where the definition o f  a mediator and o f mediation has 
been described as ‘involving third parties who did not act as judges, but could Instead serve as 
effective go-betweens because o f their pre-existing relationships with the disputants.’ For the 
definition in a modern context, see J. Collier and V. Lowe, The Settlement o f  Disputes in 
International La\v, Institutions and Procedures (Oxford, 1999), 27-29.
The cases im oW m gjudices  are discussed below in more detail.
Frederic L. Cheyette, 'Suum Cuique Tribuere', French Historical Studies, VI (1970), 287- 
99, at 291.
Barrow, Charter o f  King D avid  I, 54. The document begins ''Notum s i t \  and was probably 
fairly contemporaneous with the internal action.
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person. It is a narrative relating how the controversy between the abbot and 
William Peverel came to be resolved. Procedurally, the details are slim, but 
show elements of ritual in David kissing the hand of the Abbot. Witnesses 
were present on behalf of each of the parties. Whether these witnesses 
actually testified or merely witnessed the proceedings is not clear, but their 
partisanship was important enough to be noted. Also, although it was ‘in 
respect of the parish church o f Bolnhurst’, the precise nature of the dispute 
remains obscure.
The record did not reflect everything that was going on between those 
involved. It is only a record of what the author perceived to be important. 
Thus, there is the reference to the kissing of the Abbot’s hand by Earl David, 
but no details about why William Peverel was willing to enter into a 
settlement that seems from the record, to be all to the advantage of the Abbey. 
He probably got something of value in return and there is some evidence to 
suggest that David did give William Peverel land in Bedfordshire in 
approximately 1124.^^ Because it appears that the Abbey generated this 
record as an account of how certain properties came into its possession, it 
would not necessarily have tried to make an objective or even complete 
account. While the inherent bias means that much is omitted, it is also useful 
to determine what the author thought was notable.
^^Barrow, The Charters o f  D avid  /, no. 5, no.264 (lost act). Although Barrow dates the 
settlement between Peverel to 1114x1124, and the lost act to c. 1124, one cannot help but 
think the two may be related.
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The other factor which must be taken into account Is that this is a record of a 
concluded matter. There is no way to determine how much of the record was 
based on anecdotal information, other records, or personal knowledge of the 
scribe. The focus for its use would have been on the prevention of future 
disputes, hence the address, rather than fully explaining the current one, 
although the detail o f the transfer would have been useful in any future 
disagreement to show that there had been an actual transfer. There are few 
other such references to physical transfers in the charters recording land 
transfers in the remainder of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.
Inquest of Glasgow
Earl David as princeps of Cumbria held an Inquest concerning the see of 
Glasgow some time before he became king. The inquest was made"^ and was 
carried out in order to ‘define the possessions of the see of Glasgow.’”^  But 
although he held the inquest, and probably presided over it, Earl David was 
again not the decision maker regarding the merits of the inquest.”  ^ The
E S C , 301. Lawrie states that David ‘probably issued a brieve; the names o f those to whom 
it was addressed have not been recorded.’
N.F. Shead, ‘Benefaetions to the Medieval Cathedral and See o f  Glasgow’ The Innes 
Review, Vol. XXI, 1 (Glasgow, 1970), 3-16, 3. It might well be that the extent o f the 
possessions o f Glasgow was the same for the prince o f Cumbria, and therefore, David had a 
direct interest in determining what belonged to the see o f  Glasgow.
C. Innes (ed), Registnim Episcopatiis Glasgiiensis (GlasgOM> Register), I (Edinburgh, 1843), 
xviii-xix. In the preface to the printed register, Cosmo Innes points out that this is a memoir, 
or notitia, lending support to the analogy to a sort o f record o f proceedings. He notes that the 
investigation is ‘directed by David, while Prince o f  Cumbria’. ‘The narrative, at its 
commencement, does not claim the same authority with the subsequent verdict o f the five 
juratores,-sem ore homines et sapieniiores totiiis Cnmbriae. ' This inquest is also discussed in
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language used in the record is c l e a r T h e s e  senior and wise men from 
Cumbria were the decision-makers.
According to Lawrie^** and Innes?* these men were jurors, although precisely 
what that meant is not certain. It is not clear from this record who swore them 
in, nor if as in oX\\qy ju d e x  cases, they swore on relics. But they were the ones 
who made the decisions regarding the properties under investigation in this 
matter. Lawrie had also assigned the role of witness to these men, but the 
records for this case and others involving the ju d e x  show their roles were more 
complex.^^ Barrow points out that there were only five jurors, most of whom 
would not be in the best position to know about the extent of the lands 
belonging to Glasgow, although several of the witnesses would have been in a 
position to have such knowledge. Barrow concludes that, ‘[Tjheir role must 
have consisted in supervising the findings of more numerous local jurors."^ 
These local men were repositories of knowledge about the properties 
themselves, and the rights in the properties. More importantly, perhaps, those 
involved seem to have conducted the proceedings along well-established and 
accepted lines, which were not fully described in the account. While it is 
difficult to determine the exact facts to which these ‘witnesses’ testified or 
judged, it is clear that they gave information about their collective memories
The Victoria History o f  the County o f  Cumberland, Vol. II ed. James Wilson (London, 1905), 
3.
Barrow, The Charters o f  D avid  /, no. 15.
ESC, 304.
Innes, Glasgow Register, xix.
ESC, 304. See also the discussion o f  the role o f the judex, infra.
Barrow, The Charters o f  D avid I, no. 15, and eoinment.
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of which parcels of land belonged to Glasgow?'* As with the other noticiae, it 
records the perceptions of the author about the inquest and what was 
important, not necessarily eveiything that historians or lawyers would consider 
vital to a record of such a case.
As with the previous case, this record is of past actions in both narrative and 
confirmatory terms. It runs in David’s name, but is in the third person as 
well.^^ It does not lead with an address; the beginning of the record is a 
narrative account, and the end contains, in non-standard language, a 
concession by Earl David’s wife, Matilda. The list of witnesses to Matilda’s 
portion is more detailed than the list of five sworn ‘jurors’.
There is again the blend of orality, memory and the recording of a proceeding. 
While this is a judicial proceeding, the document does not read like a 
judgment, nor even a standard confirmation. But neither the previous record 
nor this document were authenticated by Earl David. They are differences 
between the two, though. The record of the inquest is more formal than the 
account in Peverel in appearance and language without rising to the formality 
implicit in a sealed writ-charter. It is a combination of two types of records: 
the narrative, based on a recollection of what happened and who was involved, 
and the latter part, which could almost be read on its own as a confirmation by 
Matilda, although there is no indication that the end portion, starting with
Innes, G lasgow Register, No. 1, 3-5 at 4, 5.
The opening is ‘Earl D avid...to his friends’ and then later, it switches to first person, with 
the account in terms o f  what he has done.
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Huius rei testes sunt ut audientes et videntes was ever in a separate 
document?'^ In addition, Peverel seems to have been drafted shortly after the 
events it records. The Inquest document may have been drafted any time up to 
the m id- twelfth century because of its placement adjacent to a document of 
that date.^ *^
There are some questions about this proceeding and about the record that 
remain unanswered. Lawrie had dismissed the record as ‘interesting’ but 
concluded that too much had been made of this document. He noted, ‘there 
was no grant made nor act done by the Earl which witnesses could attest.
And Barrow noted puzzling details, such as the ‘absence of persons from the 
northern part of the diocese’ and that of the five jurors, ‘two at least and 
possibly three, seem to have been men of Tynedale and north-east 
C u mb e r l a n d . T h e r e  is an explanation for these anomalies, although it is and 
may remain complete speculation.
If the approach to the document starts from what the author perceived to be 
important, some things become less puzzling. First, although it is an inquest 
and there is no mention of adverse parties, Glasgow was maintaining the
See Barrow, Charters o f  D avid I, no. 15, comments. Since the entire document is preserved 
in the GlasgoM> Register, with no separate originals, it is difficult to know precisely what the 
original appearance was.
ESC, 299, where he notes that the document is found immediately preceding a charter 
datable to 1152, and in a volume which appears to have been compiled in the m id-13“’ 
century, well after the events.
ESC, 299.
Barrow, Charters o f  D avid  /, no. 15, comments, p. 61.
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position that it had right to certain lands. But as prince of Cumbria, David 
may have had claims to some of the same lands. Thus, even if this was a 
‘friendly’ dispute, it was a situation where the two parties, the see of Glasgow 
and the principality of Cumbria had opposing interests. As Barrow noted, 
David I was embarking on a programme of infeftment in southern Scotland 
and would not have wanted to encroach on church lands.'*** Any grant David 
made of lands to Glasgow, or a confirmation of grants previously made would 
have been important enough to be noted in this record.
There is also the concession by Matilda, who was not only the wife of Earl 
David, but also the descendant of Waltheof, Earl of Northumberland. As his 
heir, she may have had rights in certain lands in the area in question.'** 
Barrow’s explanation, that Matilda may have been given a dower that included 
certain lands in Cumbria to which Glasgow had a claim does not take into 
account that there is no record of a grant by David, to which she would have 
been conceding.'*" Concessions had legal effect and would not have been 
given gratuitously. Her concession might have been a necessity if lands in 
which she had an interest were being confirmed to Glasgow. This is more 
likely to have been in the north-eastern portion of Cumbria rather than the 
areas nearer to Glasgow proper, precisely where the majority of the jurors
Barrow, Charters o f  D avid 1, no. 15, comments. 
Ibid.
Barrow, Charters o f  D avid  /, no. 15, comments.
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seem to have originated?^ All this remains speculation, however. There is no 
firm evidence to prove any of these suppositions, but they do provide an 
interesting scenario for the puzzling aspects of this noticia.
Kirkness
‘The most often quoted lawsuit of twelfth-century Scotland, the dispute 
between the monks of Loch Leven and Robert, the ancestor o f the family of 
Lohore over the marches of Kirkness near Loch Leven, c.\ 128, was 
determined at King David’s command’'*'* by three judices. The record of this 
dispute, again in the form of a noticia, is not a charter, nor is it supported by 
other, fairly common elements of an ‘official’ record such as being issued in 
the name of the king or royal official, or authenticated by a seal. It is a record 
drafted by one of the disputants, the clerics of Loch Leven who could not be 
described as objective. But precisely because it is not an objective account it 
describes in explicit terms what was expected from the procedures used to 
resolve the dispute, and the perceptions of the author about the process and the 
outcome.
In this dispute, David again was not the ‘judge’ and was not the decision 
maker regarding the merits of the dispute. He sent his sergeants and called
Ibid. See also, McNeill and MacQueen, Atlas o f  Scottish History to 1707 (Edinburgh, 
1996), 79.
Barrow, RRS, i, (Edinburgh, 1960), 50; For the Robert involved here, sometimes referred to 
as ‘the Burgundian’, see G.W.S. Barrow, ‘The origins o f the family o f Lochore’, SHR 77 
(1998) 252-4.
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together the men of the area, including the judices. These men were the ones 
who were expected to make any decisions regarding the merits of the case; of 
the three named, two of the judices deferred to Dufgal son of Mocche ‘because 
of his seniority and skill in the law’?^ They were the ones who knew the 
customs and laws of the area and were respected by the local community.
There is less adherenee to a hierarchy as well. Constantine, Earl of Fife is 
termed magniis judex, yet he defers to an older, more experienced judex, as 
discussed by MacQueen.'**  ^ The overall impression is of a more horizontal 
structure to the proceedings. Both the king and the earl were very much a part 
o f the proceedings, and MacQueen notes that David ‘commanded’ them, but 
neither one of them seem to have been in control as would a modern judge.
Certain elements are clear in the record.'*'  ^ The information is presented more 
in a (rather colourful) narrative form rather than a formal description of a 
process or judgement. While certain faets are explicit, such as Robert having 
encroached on the land of the religious and an outraged response, there is no 
detailed report of the facts or what exactly was proven. As in the other 
narrative accounts, there are no overt references to rules or to prior records or 
acts concerning the donation of the lands to the Cell Dé. It is essentially a 
summary of events with no indication of when in relation to the hearing the
Ibid, 50-51.
MacQueen, Common Law and Feudal Society, 43. See previous discussion at p. 82,
T. Thomson, Liber Cartarum Prioratus Sancti Andree in Scotia (Edinburgh, 1841), 114- 
118.
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record was made. While modern legal writers may find fault with this record 
for its lack of transparency and detail, it is in accord with the other similar 
types of records of the time and place, and indeed, with the notion of law 
itself. Every case has a story, and every story has a narrative. It is the normal 
way for people to relate information and especially with regard to the 
expression of legal information; ‘...narratives are essential to the notion of the 
law in a customary society."^
The less than formal narrative and colourful details show that this was not the 
type of record routinely kept. As with other narrative accounts, it is more a 
story or history than ‘evidence’ o f rights in property. There is no implicit 
intent to use it at a later date to prove such rights, as seen with writ charters. 
There is no authentication, and no apparent attempt to present this as anything 
other than perhaps an eyewitness account by one of the interested members of 
the religious community. Some care was taken however in the noting of 
details about who was present, testified and who passed judgement.'*^ This 
provides not only valuable information about the people involved and the 
procedures, but about the awareness of the importance of these factors
Mary Jane Schenck, ‘The Role o f Narration in Philippe de Beaumanoir’s Coutumes de 
Beauvaisis’, in Essays on the Poetic and Legal Writings o f Philippe de Remy and Llis Son 
Philippe de Beaumanoir o f  Thirteenth-Century France, eds. Sarah-Grace Heller and Michelle 
Reichert (Lampeter, 2001), 205-220, 207. With regard to modern cases, a recitation o f  the 
facts is simply a bare bones narrative. Schenck at 208-209, quoting Plunknett, also pointed 
out that early on, lawyers were known as narrators. See also, Clanchy, Memory, 274; the 
description o f  what the narrator did was essentially acting as advocate, and the pleading he did 
on behalf o f the litigant was called a ‘tale’ or conte.
While it is clear that the king ordered the proceeding, it is not clear whether he was actually 
present. He sent nuncios and summoned all to meet in one place, but he is not named as 
present; the Earl o f Fife is.
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included in the telling of the tale. The satisfaction evident in the concluding 
remark that their adversary had been publicly conquered also points to a 
record drafted more for internal consumption rather than explicitly something 
specially to be used as proof at a later date.
As with the other documents, the most useful information provided by this 
account is about the perceptions and expectations of the author. Speaking for 
the Céli Dei, the author concentrated on the details he perceived to be 
important. His comment about why the monks went to King David in the first 
place, ‘for justice and a just judgement’ says more about their expectations 
than any of the other noticiae, before Simon the Cantor’s letter.^^ They sought 
justice from the king; and while the procedures described were public, there is 
a lack of concentration on the precise nature o f the process, or on whether the 
procedures conformed to a customary practice. This was not a record to be 
used in later proceedings, nor was it to be used to prove ownership. There was 
no information about the actual settlement included, as if such details would 
be already known to the audience. In contrast, the following dispute over 
Eccles produced a Concordia that gives the impression of a record made late 
and with less attention to detail than the other noticiae, but also of one drafted 
specifically to recount in summaiy form the details of a transaction deemed to 
be significant.
Newbaftle Register, no. 3. It is a document datable to 1184, discussed in greater detail, infra.
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Eccles
There are some disputes for which classification of document type is not easy. 
These records appear in the monastic cartularies, clearly reflect a dispute, or 
the resolution of one, but to call them noticiae may be inadequate, or may not 
be entirely in accord with the words of the record itself. Yet these types of 
records are not in the form of traditional charters, may not have an address, but 
still record a dispute and its resolution. One such case, occurring late in David 
Fs reign, is that of the contested matter between Robert, Bishop of St.
Andrews and Geoffrey, Abbot of Dunfermline.^’ The dispute concerned the 
church of Eccles and the chapel of Stirling, the teinds of which had been given 
to Dunfermline by King Alexander I, No charter of donation remains for 
Alexander’s gift, if there had ever been one.
The matter was resolved in the presence of David I, Earl Henry and their 
barons at Edinburgh. There are several witnesses listed within the document. 
The record, which states it is a concordia, does not reflect the positions of both 
o f the parties so much as Dunfermline’s record of the memories o f the barons 
about the terms of the agreement. All the barons are said to have been in 
agreement as to their recollection of the terms of the Concordia. It is a 
narrative, but like both Peverel and Glasgow, it is in the third person. The 
tone is more objective than Kirkness, but since there is no way to determine
Dunfermline Register, no, 4.
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precisely when either of these records was made, it is difficult to draw any 
conclusions about the evolution of the do c ume n t s . The  Eccles record cannot 
have been drafted too long after the events it recorded because of the dating of 
the witnesses and the death of Earl H e n r y . T h e  record is not entirely clear 
but the ‘decision’ in this case does not seem to have been made by David 1, 
contrary to Cooper’s conclusion.^'’ David appears to have acted again, more as 
an arbitrator rather than a decision maker, in keeping with the noticiae 
accounts of other disputes resolved in his presence. As with other such 
documents, there is no authentication and apparently no confirmation charter 
by the king or Earl Henry. Since Dunfermline is one of the most complete 
cartularies for royal acts, if a royal charter had been issued, it is strange that no 
copy of it was preserved in the Dunfermline register.^^ The record seems to 
have been based upon the recollections of several barons, but there is no 
evidence that either the king or his son validated it.
Newbattle-Mastertoii
There are some matters that have been preserved in a combination of both 
noticiae and charters. The evidence concerning the lands o f Masterton and
The dispute itself In Kirkness is datable to ca. 1128; Eccles is probably 1147x1151.
The ecclesiastical witnesses place the charter between 1147x1151. There are discrepancies: 
Osbert, prior o f  Holyrood did not assume office until 1151, and H. prior o f  Coldingham held 
office from 1147x1150. There is no reason to doubt that these individuals were there, but it is 
probable that the events occurred while H was still prior o f Coldingham, and the record 
generated after Osbert became prior o f Holyrood.
Cooper, Selected Scottish Cases, xlvii.
Dauvit Broun, ‘The Adoption o f Brieves in Scotland’, in Charters and Charter Scholarship 
in Britain and Ireland, eds. Marie-Therese Flanagan and Judith A. Green (London, 2005), 
164-83.
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Moorfoot is one such case. The factors discussed above may also be seen in 
these records where an explicit dispute was never discussed but when 
examining the entire series of records, both charters and noticiae, involving 
related plots of land, rights and individuals, it becomes clear that, in all 
likelihood, there had been a dispute and there were certain procedures 
followed in order to resolve it. This series of records spanned three reigns 
during the twelfth century, and may indeed reflect controversy over the lands 
in question for the same length of time. The charters of donation and 
confirmation describe the land itself and the perambulations that occurred 
during King David’s reign and King William’s. There are confirmations from 
three twelfth-century kings, David I and his two grandsons. For our purposes 
here though, the most important document in this series is the noticia or letter 
of Simon the Cantor preserved in the Newbattle Register. I t  describes a 
perambulation in the presence of the king as an ordo judiciarius. Barrow has 
dated this to Malcolm IV’s r e i g n , b u t  because of the witnesses and the details 
in the charters of William I, this noticia must be dated to 1184.
King David I donated certain lands in Newbattle and Moorfoot to Newbattle 
Abbey;^^ and granted Masterton (in Newbattle) to a layman, Robert the 
ironsmith, referenced in the donations to Newbattle, but for which no separate
Newbattle Register, no. 3.
Barrow, RRS, /, 49.
^^Barrow, Charters o f  D avid  /, no. 96 (1 Nov. 1140), (Newbattle); no. 97 (1140x1141), 
(Moorfoot).
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charters exist.^^ Robert the ironsmith also made donations to Newbattle. Both 
this donation and the donation of the lands o f ‘Ruchalech’ and ‘Blankeland’ 
are reflected in the same charter, for which no separate donation or 
confirmation charters exist.^’’ There are two charters from David I regarding 
Moorfoot, one of which describes the lands being given,^’ while the second 
charter reflected the grant of lands of Newbattle and of Moorfoot and included 
language that David I and some of his responsible men had traversed the 
boundaries of these lands and o f ‘Ruchalech’ and ‘Blankelande’, and the land 
he had given to Robert the ironsmith as well.^^ Even with these two charters, 
there appears to have been a dispute over the boundaries as there was another 
perambulation over forty years later at the order of King William I.
There are also two charters which Barrow has dated somewhat later, which 
must be taken into account; the date spread could indicate that they were 
closer in time to the charters discussed above, and may be directly tied to 
them. The first is a grant to Newbattle of ‘Ruchale’, a place which Barrow
Ibid. The exact phrase is: ‘exceptis duabus Carucatis terre quas Roberto Ferrario pro  
setwitio suo dedi
Ibid, no. 98 (1140x1152), Barrow dates this charter to 1140x1152, presumably because 
Earl Henry is a witness. Because there was still land from Robert the ironsmith to be 
transferred to Ralph Freebern, it does not appear that the ironsmith gave the entirety o f the two 
caiTucates to Newbattle.
Ibid, no. 97.
Ibid, no. 98. The passage could be interpreted to mean that David and his men traversed 
only Moorfoot, and he is granting and conceding the other lands mentioned, but this makes 
less sense than David traversing all the lands and granting the pannage and timber. It is clear 
that Robert had granted some of his land to Newbattle, and David could be simply confirming 
the gift, but that is not clear from the language. According to Barrow, Charters o f  D avid  /, 
no.96, the location o f the land and meaning o f the name known as ‘Ruchalech’ is now Most’. 
Barrow also notes that in the contemporary table o f contents, this charter is listed as 
‘confirmacio ejusdem  '.
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describes as lost,^^ The second of these charters is the one following, showing 
a grant to Holyrood Abbey o f certain parts of Dalkeith in exchange for 
‘Ruchale’, which the king gave to Newbattle.^'’ The only subsequent reference 
to these parcels of land is in a confirmation of William I, of the property and 
privileges o f Newbattle, where the only property with a name similar to these 
two (and both were granted to Newbattle), is ‘Ruchalc’. There is only one 
such name.^^ It may be that ‘Ruchalech’ and ‘Ruchale’ or Rhuchale’ are the 
same parcel of land.
There were subsequent activities regarding these lands. Malcolm IV’s charter 
granting land to Robert Freebern is datable to the last few years of his reign. 
This charter indicated that the land originally granted to Robert the ironsmith 
was being regranted by King Malcolm IV to Robert Freebern, along with the 
lands of Rosyth and Dunduff.^^ This grant was subsequently confirmed by 
William I, with a reference to the terms of Malcolm IV’s charter.^^ One may 
presume that Robert the ironsmith had probably died without heirs before 
1162, although it is possible but less likely that Robert the ironsmith and 
Robert Freebern were related. Since the terms of Malcolm’s charter indicated 
that the king was granting the land to Robert Freebern, and there was no
Ibid, no. 124.
Ibid, no. 125. It seems that these two lost parcels may have actually been the same piece o f  
land. If so, the charter order and dating would be as follows: no. 96, 97, 124, 125, and finally, 
no. 98.
Barrow, RRS, ii, no. 61.
Barrow, RRS, i, no. 256.
Barrow, RRS, ii, no. 9. The confirmation o f Malcolm’s grant to Robert Freebern by 
William I is datable to 1166x1171.
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language of a confirmation of a transfer, it does not seem likely that there was 
any sort of transaction regarding the land between Robert the ironsmith and 
Robert Freebern.
The next two charters at first may seem problematic, but on closer inspection 
the dating of the documents and the actuality of a dispute become apparent. 
One is the memorandum from Simon the Chanter o f the church of Glasgow, 
which Barrow has called the ‘best recorded activity of sheriffs and justices in 
twelfth century r e c o r d . T h e  other was a charter of William I himself, 
detailing a perambulation that he ordered of the boundaries of Moorfoot.
When read in conjunction with the other charters previously discussed, these 
records demonstrate what appears to be a long running contest concerning the 
boundaries of these lands between Newbattle and a succession of lay 
landholders.
Simon’s noticia indicated that there was a perambulation in the presence of 
John, bishop of Glasgow and Sheriff Alexander.*"^ Bishop John was listed as a
Ibid, 49.
69 The reference to John, bishop o f Glasgow may have been a mistake. John was bishop until 
1147, well before the gift to Robert Freebern by Malcolm IV. If it had been a mistake for 
Jocelyn, the dates would be 1174x1199, which is more likely with a reference to Sheriff 
Alexander and during William’s reign. See Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae Medii Aevi A d Annum 
1638, eds. D.E.R. Watt and A.L, Murray (Edinburgh, 2003), 188. The reference to Sheriff 
Alexander may be to Alexander Saint Martin, who was sheriff o f  Edinburgh in the 1180’s; the 
only certain reference seems to be 1184, (this case). See N.H. Reid and G.W.S. Barrow, The 
Sheriffs o f  Scotland, An Interim List to c. 1306 (St. Andrews, 2002), 13. There are no records 
o f any other sheriff with the name Alexander for this period. If in fact, the reference to 
Bishop John were to be taken as correct, then the sheriff o f that area, variously designated as 
Edinburgh, Fladdington, Linlithgow or Lothian, would have been Thor, who can be dated to 
1140x1150, but appears only once, as do the other sheriffs o f  the area, Robert, 1153x1162;
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witness to the donation of King David of the land of Newbattle, with the 
exception of two carrucates of land to Robert the ironsmith/^ Simon related 
that the lands held by Newbattle were confirmed to that establishment except 
for the two carrucates that had been given to Robert Freebern by Malcolm IV. 
He also indicated that he had been present during the transaction where the 
King had ordered a perambulation, along with the said Bishop John and 
Sheriff Alexander. Although this presents problems since Bishop John was 
long since dead, it could easily be a transcript error, mistaking John for 
Jocelin.
The royal charter from William I is tracked a little more easily. It was dated 
within the text to 1184, and made it clear that William had ordered the 
marches of Moorfoot between the monks of Newbattle and David Uviet to be 
perambulated and sworn to by responsible men, in short, a sworn jury.
Those conducting the perambulation included Alexander sheriff of 
Haddington, Simon son of Malbet, sheriff of Traquair and other honourable 
men. This charter specifically referred to the charter of King David, and the 
descriptions o f the boundaries perambulated in William’s charter track almost 
word for word the description of the perambulation in David’s charter.^" Yet 
William’s charter did not mention the grant to Robert Freebern, nor the land
Geoffrey Melville, 1162; Uhtred, 1162, 1159x1163; Hervey, 1170x1 INov. While there are 
other sheriffs in other places and at other times named Alexander, none coincide with the 
lace and time besides Alexander Saint Martin.?° Newbattle Reg, no. 2.
Newbattle Reg, no. 20; RRS, ii, no. 252. 
Barrow, Charters o f  D avid I, no. 97.
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granted to Robert the ironsmith; it did, however, refer to David Uviet/^ This 
is the first indication that David Uviet has an interest in this land. This is in 
contrast to Simon’s noticia, which, considering the witnesses and the periods 
of office for both witnesses and Simon, must refer to the same perambulation 
as William Ts charter. Yet Simon’s noticia contained a reservation of the two 
carrucates of land granted to Robert Freebern by Malcolm, but did not 
mention David Uviet.
Interpretations of these charters could take several routes. The route that 
makes most sense is that the monks were concerned about the boundaries of 
their lands from the vei-y beginning, and King David perambulated the lands 
of Newbattle and Moorfoot to ensure the boundaries of both the grant to 
Newbattle and to Robert the ironsmith. Newbattle continued to be concerned, 
quite possibly because of disputes between Newbattle and both Roberts, right 
through William’s reign. In 1184, William put an end to disputes concerning 
the boundaries of Moorfoot with the perambulation he ordered. There remains 
the problem of Robert Freebern and David Uviet. Considering Simon’s letter 
in conjunction with William’s charter, it seems plausible that both David Uviet 
and Robert Freebern were holding lands bordering Newbattle and Moorfoot,
It is not clear when David Uviet would have been granted the land. See, Barrow, Charters 
o f D avid  7, 21: although Barrow discusses the Uviet ‘the white’ who was lord o f Duddingston, 
it is not clear that this David Uviet is related, since it appears that David Uviet had been 
granted his land, and there is no record o f the land o f the lord o f Duddingston being granted to 
him. David’s no. 177 listed David Uviet as a witness to King David I sometime between 
1145x1153, probably 1150x1153, and he appears in Malcolm IV’s reign as a witness; see 
Barrow, RRS, i, nos. 120, 197, 265. The sworn body o f men ordered to perambulate the 
boundaries has similarities to the jury o f  recognition as well.
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or perhaps parcels within the boundaries of the land held by Newbattle, and 
disputes had arisen between the monks and these lay landholders about the 
boundaries on more than one occasion. Simon’s noticia could be interpreted 
as a note of reassurance, or simply a report to H(ugh) the dean and Helias the 
cleric regarding the outcome of the proceedings concerning the boundaries of 
Newbattle’s lands.
Discussion
A key factor to understanding the importance of noticiae is their subjective 
nature. What was written about a dispute tells us what the author thought was 
important. These records also document how perceptions changed throughout 
the twelfth century. In turn, these narrative accounts detail expectations of law 
and justice through the language used to describe the various proceedings.
Each of these cases demonstrates the central role of the ‘story’ of a dispute. 
Each presents in greater or lesser detail, a narrative of the basics of the ‘who, 
what when and sometimes, why’ of a particular controversy. This manner of 
relating the facts of a dispute is as important a part of the legal process now as 
it was in the 12^  ^and 13’'^  centuries.^'’ The records can be analysed for details 
that those who wrote it and their audience perceived as important, especially 
with regard to facts, the law, rule or norm applicable to the matter, and who
Peter Brooks, ‘The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric’, L a w ’s Stories, eds. Brooks and Gewirtz 
(New Haven, 1996), 14-22, 20.
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the decision-makers were/^ The same story can be analysed at a later date 
and re-interpreted to determine its relevance to that time and place. This is, in 
a basic sense, why reading history, literature and legal cases remains 
important.^^ Each generation re-interprets the past in light of its present.
In cases where the narrative form is the only record that survives to indicate 
that there was a judicial process or a dispute, a lack of other records is in a 
sense, an advantage. There is nothing to compare it to, to ‘fill in the gaps’ so 
to speak. There is only the narrative to indicate what was deemed important 
enough to be included in the tale, or indeed, what the desired effect of telling 
the tale was to have been."^  ^ Where there are other records, such as chronicle 
entries or charters, the one even less official than the narrative, the other not 
only more official but specifically drafted with a legal purpose in mind, the 
immediate perceptions of those involved may become obscured.
Language is key in narrative accounts in determining the perceptions of those 
involved of the events themselves, and the law or rules applicable. Choice of
These factors have all been discussed in the chapter on Complexity, infra. It must be 
remembered that these facts were not ‘all the facts’ even in noticiae. There was a decision­
making process going on with the scribe, who decided what to include based upon his 
determination o f what was ‘relevant’.
Martha Minow, ‘Stories in Law’, in L aw 's Stories, Narratives and Rhetoric in the Law 
(New Haven, 1996), 24-36, 25: ‘At the most basic level, then, I suggest that storytelling offers 
real continuities with common-law reasoning; it dwells on particulars while eliciting a point 
that itself may be moulded or recast in light o f the story’s particulars reviewed in a different 
time.’ This is another example o f the ‘perversion o f the past’ necessary to lawyers, but 
rejected by historians.
Paul Hyams, Rancor and Reconciliation in Medieval England (Ithaca, 2003), ix. ‘ .. .the 
way the story is told-by whom, starting and ending at which points-all these matters 
determine the kind o f  thrust and impact the tale will have.’
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words, tone and ‘voice’ of the record communicate more than the basic 
information of what happened. But where there is choice, that is, a lack of 
formulaic terminology and flexibility in word usage, there may be problems 
with distortion. The narratives may be (and often are in these cases) 
incomplete, inaccurate and biased.^^ Yet those very qualities that may offend a 
more structured legal approach with pretensions to objectivity are useful in 
gauging the subjective component implicit in narrative accounts. It is from the 
narrative discourse that the outrage of the Céli Dé over how they have been 
treated by Robert, the ancestor of the family of Lochore, becomes clear. It is 
also within the narrative structure of the record that what they sought, justice 
according to the procedures with which they were familiar, is expressed.
While storytelling may lack the logic and formal analysis necessary in the 
application of legal rules, it is from the story of a dispute that the question of 
justice can be best understood.'^^
The tale in the narrative is descriptive, not primarily prescriptive, as writ- 
charters and brieves are. There are few, if any, commands per se, in these
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, ‘Legal Storytelling and Constitutional Law; The 
Medium and the M essage’, in Lqm>' s  Stories, eds. Brooks & Gewirtz (New Haven, 1996), 37- 
53, 37-38. The modern debate is precisely that narrative can distort legal debate. There is 
tension between the two forms: the modern formalistic structure o f legal discourse is 
incompatible with the storytelling format. Yet both are necessary in the presentation o f a 
lawsuit and in the writing o f legal opinions.
Hyams, Rancor and Reconciliation, ‘Introduction’, ix. Hyams notes that people cannot say 
what justice is, but they are very well able to relate stories o f injustices done to them. See also 
Farber & Sherry, ‘Legal Storytelling’, 39-42, in their discussion o f  the impact o f critical legal 
studies and the indeterminacy thesis. Essentially, the argument is that formal legal reasoning 
does not in fact ‘provide concrete, real answers to particular legal or social problems...’.’ The 
judicial decision is based on social and political judgement incorporating numerous factors. 
This again goes back to the concept o f ‘justice’ as the basis o f judicial reasoning and judicial 
action. See chapter on ‘Complexity’.
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accounts. In Peverel, there is a recounting of how the dispute came to be 
resolved, and what role Earl David played in bringing about a resolution.
There is no 'mando, precipio’ or even ‘vo/o’ in the document. In the Inquest 
o f Glasgow, while there is no command language, there is an indication of 
Earl David’s power to do so in the phrase rogatu et imperio supradicti 
principis. Even so, the judgement made by the juratores did not result in an 
order from the earl, at least none that the scribe thought important enough to 
r e c o r d . B u t  certain facts were considered relevant and important enough to 
note, such as who called for the inquest and why, the names of who 
determined the extent of Glasgow’s properties, and that Matilda had conceded 
something of value, but full details of that concession were not included.^’
The lack of command language in these early narratives supports the more 
horizontal structure o f the process generally. This horizontal structure 
changes towards the end of the twelfth century and is evident in the language 
used in royal charters to describe the role of the king. While not strictly a 
narrative account, these phrases are a narrative element in the more formal 
charters issued in the king’s name. They are a piece of the ‘story’ that actually 
illuminates the changing role of the king and the perceptions of the importance 
of noting these changes/^ While there is a certain amount of discretion on the
Barrow, Charters o f  D avid I, no. 15.
These would probably all make their way into a modern legal report as well.
See Barrow, RRS, ii, nos. 105, 236, 249, 252, 253 (spurious, but using the first person 
similar to other charters). The most common phrase is that the dispute was settled ‘in my 
presence’ and ‘in my court’. Some, such as in the de Moreville case, indicate that peace was 
made by the king (sciatis me fecisse pacem).
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part of the scribe in the wording of a charter, since the description of the role 
o f the king is consistently more detailed in the later charters, this change had 
to reflect at least acquiescence on the part of the king.
In Kirkness, the same discretion is evident in what was included in the 
narrative, and what was not. There is a vivid description of Robert, the 
ancestor of the family of Lochore’s behaviour, self-serving comments about 
the monks wanting peace and a just judgement as their reason for petitioning 
the king, and details about procedure and who actually made the judgement. 
There is no indication in the record itself that a perambulation actually took 
p lace ,a lthough  that is in the rubric.^'’ To the viros Religiosos, it was more 
important that the record clearly show that Robert had violently injured them 
and that he was justly punished (conquered) before a multitude for trying to 
take their property. The description of public humiliation and vindication of 
the injured party’s position was a well understood part o f the process of 
seeking and obtaining justice. As a sort of balance to the public humiliation, 
the transgressor might well have expected an equally public p a r d o n . Wh i l e  
this is not explicit in the text of the Kirkness account, there is language to 
suggest that something of the sort took place.^^ But considering the subjective 
nature of the account, it cannot be assumed that the events occurred as
St. Andrews Liber, 117-118. There is a reference in the record to an oath o f  some o f the 
Céli Dé took regarding the boundaries o f  Kirkness, but it does not say the boundaries were 
perambulated.
St. Andrews Liber, 117-118.
Hyams, Rancor and Reconciliation, 200-201.
St. Andrews Liber, 117-118. The specific terms in the text include,/w/V compromissiun,
127
recorded. Whether the actual events played out as described by the Céli Dé, 
however, is not as important as the perceptions of the author and his intended 
audience. The record describes the author’s own interpretation of the events 
and the significance o f the outcome to the parties.
Both Eccles and Newbattle present narrative accounts that differ yet again in 
their portrayal o f what was important. Eccles is a record that, to all 
appearances was made to act as a substitute for a charter that would have 
contained the terms of the agreement. Although there are both ecclesiastical 
and lay witnesses listed, it is unclear if they were present when the matter 
came before the king, or if they were witnesses to the drafting of this record.
Simon the Cantor’s letter does not give a lot of detail about the procedure, 
which is actually described more fully in the royal charter. But there is a 
description: he calls what he witnessed an ordo judiciarius^^ In a way, this 
short phrase says more about the perceptions and the expectations of Simon 
than the more detailed passages from the other texts. It shows at least a 
limited understanding and expectation of Romano-canonical law and judicial 
process that is distinct from the pursuit of justice evident in the other 
narratives. The language itself is critical. While the religious men sought a 
‘just judgement’ from King David in the Kirkness dispute, Simon saw the 
boundaries of Newbattle’s lands determined by a judicial process, for which
Newbattle Register, no. 3.
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he had a formal and technical, procedural name. Although ‘there is evidence 
that pre-Gratian canon law materials were known in Scotland, and there 
cannot be much doubt that the Decretum was also in circulation t h e r e , t h i s  is 
the first reference to the Romano-canonical procedure in a non-papal charter. 
The term does appear a few years earlier in a papal bull from Alexander III to 
the Bishops of Glasgow and Whithorn regarding Holmcultram, so the term 
and what it represented were known to the ecclesiastics in Scotland at least by
1181T
Kenneth Pennington has argued that the transition from the Romano-canonical 
procedure of the ordo judiciarius to the secular courts is not well understood 
since so many of the secular court proceedings were oral, leaving no records.^’’ 
If the use of this phrase by Simon the Cantor is accepted as an accurate 
reflection of the technical meaning of the term with regard to ecclesiastical 
legal procedure, and the description set out in the royal charter is accurate 
(which should be a fairly safe presumption), the combination of these records 
shows a rare glimpse of a case where the two overlapped. Since the 
procedures outlined in the royal charter do not differ greatly, if at all from the
MacQueen, ‘Canon Law, Custom and Legislation’, 229.
R. Somerville, Scotia Pontificia, no. 98. The exact phrase in Alexander Ill’s letter is 
‘hidiciario ord in e\ There is no way to tell if  the phrase that Simon used truly described a 
Romano-canonical procedure that was any different from the procedure described in William 
Ts charter concerning the perambulation conducted in 1184 over these lands. See Barrow, 
RRS, ii, no. 252. William’s charter clearly states in the first person that the procedure was at 
his command and in his presence. Since the king also is confirming the perambulation that 
occurred during his grandfather’s reign, it seems logical that the procedure William followed 
was similar to the earlier one. The descriptions o f  what was done are similar.
Kenneth Pennington, ‘Due Process, Community and the Prince in the Evolution o f the Ordo 
judiciarius', http://classes.maxwcll.svr.edU/his381/procedure.htin#N 14 .
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earlier procedures in David Fs charters, it is arguable that the secular 
procedures followed in David’s reign as early as the 1140s and continued 
under William I, were adopted as acceptable Romano-canonical procedure (or 
at least not markedly different from it). It is also possible, that the ordo 
judiciarius described by Simon was actually known in Scotland from the time 
of David’s reign.^' Either way, they are evidence of the legal transplantation 
discussed by Watson.^^ Watson points out that complete adoption is not 
necessary, and the rules adopted will in any case be modified over time within 
the new context.
Other elements found in Simon’s record are important as well. The use of the 
phrase ordine judiciario places this record in an altogether different category 
from other records within this group or within the twelfth century as a whole. 
Although Barrow described this as a ‘somewhat obscure letter’, and it 
certainly is that, it is the first time that a formal, technical name was applied to 
a legal proceeding.^'’ The significance of this phrase in terms of legal 
development or the existence of a legal system is critical. Coupled with the
Evidence supporting the conclusion that perambulations were regularised under King David 
I is found in Arbroath Register, nos. 228,229. These two charters refer to a perambulation 
according Ho the assise o f  King David’ between Arbroath and the Barony o f Kynblathmund 
and Achinglas in 1219, and the subsequent Recognition o f the perambulation in 1227 In the 
full court o f the king. Examination o f the procedures described in the charters concerning the 
Masterton-Moorfoot lands show that the initial marking o f the boundaries was described in 
no. 97. Subsequently, no. 98 was issued which refers to the lands being traversed, and the 
terms o f the charter are more formalistic rather than descriptive. This suggests that the assise 
concerning the procedure for perambulations may have taken place during the 1140s, 
specifically the early part o f  it, between the time when David 1 gave the lands to Newbattle, 
and then perambulated the bounds in a more formal manner.
Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: an Approach to Comparative Law, 2d ed. (Athens, Ga., 
1993), 21.
Ibid, 7.
Barrow, The Acts o f  Malcolm IV, 49.
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description of the proceedings conducted by William I set out in the royal 
charter, it shows the existence of rules recognised by both individuals and the 
officials conducting the proceedings.^^ The phrase as it is used also 
demonstrates a ‘self awareness’ within the text of a distinction between 
procedures and process. If the distinction between legal rules and their 
application is a marker of a legal system’s autonomy,us ing the terminology 
that characterises a particular series of actions as a specific judicial process 
demonstrates an abstraction and conceptualisation of process from practice 
and procedure.
This issue of abstraction and conceptualisation is especially important for any 
discussion of a full fledged legal system if in fact, there were regularised 
procedures compatible with Roman law during David Ts reign. Adoption of 
procedures does not necessarily mean an internalisation of the abstract notions 
that went with it. Nor does following a procedure from another legal system 
imply complete adoption of all the ‘baggage’ that went with it. There is no 
firm evidence of such abstraction or conceptualisation that can be firmly dated
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept o f  Law, (Oxford, 1993), at 113 states that there are ‘two 
minimum conditions necessaiy and sufficient for the existence o f a legal system.’ First, there 
must be rules o f  behaviour, valid according to that system’s ‘ultimate criteria o f validity’ 
which must be generally obeyed, and second, the rules o f recognition and rules o f change and 
adjudication must be ‘effectively accepted as common public standards o f official behaviour 
by its officials.’
Andrew Lewis, ‘The Autonomy o f  Roman Law’, in The M oral World o f  the Law, ed. Peter 
Coss, (Cambridge, 2000), 39-40. Lewis was discussing the comment by Cicero which 
demonstrated the distinction between argument and legal doctrine. Lewis argues, that ‘this 
distinction, which lies at the heart o f the autonomy o f  a legal system’s rules, was already 
developed in the middle o f the last century BC when many o f  the classical rules were as yet 
unformulated. It is the capacity to separate the discussion o f legal rules from their possible 
application in actual circumstances that characterises autonomy.’ This will be discussed in 
more detail, infra.
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to David Fs reign. But such evidence is present by the 1180’s with Simon’s 
letter. One letter is not conclusive proof that the Romano-canonical rules of 
procedure had been adopted en masse, but when placed in context with the 
other elements such as the change from justicia mea to justiciarius meus 
discussed a b o v e , i t  is further evidence of the maturation and growing 
complexity of the legal system in the twelfth century.
The Moorfoot charters are another example of the process. When examined 
separately, the impression is of formulaic phrases used in donation and 
confirmation charters with little sense of outside factors impacting on the 
language used and actions described. But when the charters are pooled and 
dissected as a group, a different picture emerges. The story behind this series 
and many other similar series throughout all the chartularies is a continuum of 
interactions on many layers, not least of which is what can only be described 
as the ongoing legal relationships between the neighbours regarding the 
properties over which they claimed interests. This series starts out as a 
standard grant and confirmation, and culminates in the determination of the 
boundaries of the lands granted by a recognised, formal judicial proceeding.
All of these cases use the narrative to relay information about the underlying 
events. The subjective tone of these records communicates the perceptions 
and expectations of the authors and their audience about justice, law and the
See chapter on Judges, specifically, the section on the Justiciar, infra.
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resolution of disputes. Each of the cases discussed provides more evidence of 
the maturing legal system and increasingly formalised procedures used to 
settle disputes regarding property.
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CHAPTER V
CHARTERS
Although noticiae seem to have functioned more as records of concluded 
disputes or events, charters were the primary text format used both in the 
prevention and the resolution of disputes. Charters have been defined as 
‘.. .written declarations meant to serve as evidence of actions of a legal 
kind, recorded in specific forms, which are, however, changing according 
to the various persons, times, places and topics concerned.’’ This 
necessarily assumes that these records will be authenticated, preserved and 
produced in the case of a dispute. These assumptions do not apply to 
other, less formal records such as discussed earlier. Noticiae were not 
sealed, and as seen in the previous chapter, could be a private letter or 
memorandum. Sealed writ-charters, however, were different. Originally, 
‘the sealed charter had hitherto been in essence a letter informing the 
recipient of a transaction already passed. It was in fact an undated post 
factum  record of a verbal transaction, carefully recording the names of the
' Charters and the Use o f  the Written Word in M edieval Society, ed, K. Heidecker 
(Turnhout, 2000), 2.
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witnesses who had seen the transaction and heard the covenanting words. 
The taint o f ‘unreliability is most obvious in the witnesses listed on 
charters. The presence of witnesses cannot be presumed simply because 
their names appear on the charter’/  but their inclusion in the list of 
witnesses does say something about the perceived status of the witnesses 
and their desirability as such.
Charters ‘are not only written texts but also material things. Their texts 
are written down, preserved, copied... and used in many ways by many 
different people.’'’ As Susan Reynolds has noted, ‘the most obvious 
innovation in twelfth-century landholding was that grants of land were 
more and more often recorded in charters.’  ^ Most charters of this period 
reflected human acts and human intentions regarding property rights of 
some sort. ‘..[T]he motive force behind the production, transmission and 
preservation of all kinds of charters was the conservation of property, and 
it is the establishment or description of the property ownership in the
 ^V.H. Galbraith, ‘The Literacy o f  the Medieval English Kings’, in Kings and Chroniclers 
(London, 1982), I, 102. Hudson discusses the distinction between writ-charters, used to 
record grants, and writs, used to convey orders. There were several ‘mixed-style 
documents’ found in his study o f the charters o f  the Earls o f  Chester. John Hudson, 
‘Diplomatic and Legal Aspects o f the Charters’, in The Earldom o f  Chester and its 
Charters, ed. A.T, Thacker (Chester, 1991), 153-177, 154. There are several such mixed 
documents among the early charters of David 1.
 ^ David Bates, ‘The Prosopographical Study o f  Anglo-Norman Royal Charters’, in 
Family Ties and the Roots o f  Politics: The Prosopography o f  Britain and France from  the 
Tenth to the Twelfth Century ed. K.S.B. Keats-Rohan (Woodbridge, 1997), 92.
 ^K. Heidecker, ‘Introduction’, in Charters and the Use o f  the Written Word, (Turnhout,
2000), 4.
 ^ Susan Reynolds, ‘Fiefs and Vassals in Scotland; A View From Outside’, SHR, LXXXII, 
(2003), 176-93, 182.
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charter which illuminates the underlying human activity.’  ^ As the 
existence of a charter took on greater significance in the course of the 
twelfth century, the perception of its value with regard to proof of 
ownership changed. Charters were used in the settlement of disputes,^ but 
the lack of a charter was no bar to claiming possession, nor was it deemed 
necessary to prove rights, early in the twelfth century.^ By the thirteenth 
century, however, the production of a charter was adequate proof, and the 
lack of a charter could be a problem in protecting one’s property rights.^ 
As the use of charters became more prevalent, a lord could demand that 
his tenant produce his charters to show what he held and under what terms 
he held from the lord.”’ Not only were charters used more and more 
regularly, they began to be perceived as necessary to prove one’s rights. 
This perception could and did lead to falsification of charters, sometimes 
well after the supposed grant occurred.
 ^Paul Fouracre, ‘ “Placita” and the settlement o f disputes in later Merovingian Francia’, 
in The Settlement o f  Disputes in Early M edieval Europe , eds. W. Davies and Paul 
Fouracre, 23.
 ^Barrow, Charters o f D avid I, nos. 9, 10, 11.
® Ibid, no. 11, where either the charter or testimony o f witnesses was deemed acceptable. 
This is discussed in more detail, infra.
 ^ Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus AngTiae, trans. Samuel E. Thorne, Vol. II 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 62: ‘If a charter is made the gift will be more secure, for a gift 
may be proved more easily and more effectively by a writing and instruments than by 
witnesses or suit.’ See also Hyams, 'Warranty and good lordship in twelfth century 
England', Law and H istory Review 5 (1987), 437-503.
MacQueen, Common Law and Feudal Society, 120-121. This was called ‘showing the 
holding’, a means for the lord to determine the terms on which his tenants held o f him, 
and ‘ensure the preservation o f  their written titles. It was an administrative and 
disciplinary procedure which ‘was probably, perhaps even certainly, older than the brieve 
rule’. As Macqueen points out, initially charters were probably not absolutely necessary, 
as long as the terms o f  the grant and sasine were remembered In the lord’s court.
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Not only were charters evidence of rights in property, they were also 
tangible representations of power and identity. These were expressed in 
different ways, the most consistent of which were when and by whom the 
record was created, the type of charter, and the specific words used in it. A 
subsequently created charter demonstrated the increasing perceived 
importance of records, especially with regard to a disputed property. 
Equally important were the type of charter used to resolve a particular 
dispute, and the preeise wording of the charter text. The following cases 
demonstrate the importance of these factors in the prevention and 
resolution of disputes. As with all case studies, there is some overlap; 
some cases could easily be discussed under different headings. But the 
specific points being made seem best illustrated by the particular charters 
for each topic.
A veil el
Confirmations played a vital role in the transfer of property rights. While 
there is little firm evidence that a confirmation charter was legally 
necessary at the beginning of the twelfth century, it was common practice 
to have at least one confirmation, preferably royal. The Avenel charters 
are noteworthy because there are numerous confirmations as well as a 
chirograph. The purpose of so many charters seems to have been to erase 
any doubt of the validity and royal approval of the transfer, and negate any
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possibility of future claims by Robert Avenel’s family. The series of 
charters record the history of the grants concerning the land of Eskdale. 
Where charters have not been preserved, information about earlier 
transfers was preserved in the later confirmation charters.
King David had granted the land of Eskdale to Robert Avenel, for his 
service, sometime before 1153. No grant charter from David I to Robert 
Avenel remains for this transfer. Robert Avenel then gave this land to 
Melrose during the reign of King Malcolm IV. There is no extant charter 
reflecting this gift, but it is recorded in the confirmation charter of William 
I early in his reign.” Although it appears from the witness list that there 
were other family members, including sons, they are not noted in the body 
of the text.’  ^ His son and heir, Gervaise, is named in the body of the first 
donation charter, as granting and assenting to his father’s gift. Although 
there is no original of this grant, there is a charter of Bishop Herbert 
during the reign of Malcolm IV which supports a donation of the tithes of 
the land which the monks held of Robert.’  ^ Robert’s renewal of the gift, 
reflected in William I’s confirmation may be seen as a means of 
reinforcing the effectiveness of the charter itself, and indicates in no 
uncertain terms that the royal confirmation was deemed to be for
" NLS, Adv. 34.4.11, to. xxxv''-xxxvi  ^ - xxxvi Melrose Liber, no. 39.
’ ‘^Glai, nephew o f Robert Avenel, Robert the clerk, son o f the same Robert’. In the 
confirmation charter o f Robert’s son and heir, the witnesses are ‘Gervaise, nephew of  
Robert Avenel, Glai, nephew o f  the same, Robert son o f Robert AveneT.
The charter from Bishop Herbert o f Glasgow described the gift o f  tithes given by 
Robert Avenel from Eskdale. NLS, Adv. MS 34.4.11, to. xliif; Melrose Liber, no. 5.
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enforcement, irrespective of whether the king was involved in or had given 
up any rights to the subject property. The chirograph between Robert, his 
son Gervaise and Melrose included reference to the four merks which 
apparently served as rent or render in addition to the terms of the 
agreement regarding the other grants.''^ The internal text and the 
witnesses allow it to be dated to on or shortly before 8 March 1185, the 
day Robert Avenel died.^^ The third charter in this series is the 
confirmation from Gervaise of his father’s gift.^^
There is a second confirmation from William 1, which Barrow dates 
roughly twenty years later. ' ^  The earlier one has already been discussed; 
Barrow comments regarding the second, that ‘[t]he probability seems to be 
that the Avenels’ charters and King William’s confirmation of them were 
issued in 1185, the former shortly before Robert’s death, the latter shortly 
afterwards.’ The timing could explain why the monks were so 
meticulous about the language in the charters and the confirmations. 
Deathbed gifts were suspect, and were one of the few donations that could 
successfully be challenged.'^ The overt references concerning why Robert
NLS, Adv. MS 34.4.11, fo. xxxviii'; Melrose Liber, no. 40.
Chronica de Mailros, ed. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh, 1835), 93.
NLS, Adv. MS 34.4.11, fo.xxxvi''; Melrose Liber, no. 41.
Barrow, RRS, ii, no. 104, dated to 1165x1171; no. 264, dated to 1180x1193.
RRS, ii, no. 264, comments.
The Treatise o f  the Lcnvs and Customs o f the Realm o f  England commonly called  
Glanvill, trans and ed. G.D.G Hall (Oxford, 1993), 70.
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wanted the royal confirmations and the stated purpose of making the 
charter ‘more firm and stable’ support this/'^
There is a second series of charters concerning this land during the reign 
of Alexander II. In this second series, there is an almost verbatim 
duplicate of Gervaise’s confirmation. The only significant difference is 
that the new confirmation from Gervaise contained a reference to his own 
son, Gervaise.^' There is yet another confirmation of this gift, from Roger 
Avenel, grandson of Robert and son of Gervaise, which reiterates the 
language of the confirmation charters from Gervaise, and records the 
history o f these transactions."^ Immediately following this confirmation 
by Roger Avenel o f the gifts of his father Gervaise and grandfather 
Robert, is an agreement regarding Eskdale.^^ This is a charter of 
Alexander II dated within the text to 1235, regarding an amicable 
agreement between Roger Avenel and the Abbot and monks of Melrose, 
over the contentious matters between them. King Alexander’s charter 
refers to Roger’s charter; either they are contemporaneous or Roger’s 
charter predates Alexander l l ’s, but, of course, after 1214. It also includes 
Roger’s brother as one of the witnesses.
Melrose Liber no. 39.
Melrose Liber, no. 196. This charter is not included in the MS in the BL,
Melrose Liber, no. 197.
NLS, Adv. MS 34.4.11, lo.xxxviii'' (or fo. x l i i \  depending on how the folio markings 
are read); Melrose Liber no. 198. It should be noted that the later Eskdale charters are in 
the same place as the earlier one from William I’s reign. The printed version has them 
separated by reign. Roger’s charter is datable to the reign o f Alexander II and before 
1235.
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Returning to Robert Avenel, it is interesting that his charter uses the rare 
word incartavi in that section when referring to his gift to the monks 
during the reign of Malcolm IV. This term is also used in the confirming 
charter of Gervaise. This word, which may be translated as ‘to grant by or 
embody in a charter’^ '' would only be used in the context of a grant, and 
then only where there was a charter reflecting the grant. It may, indeed, 
have been used where the charter itself is part of the granting process, as a 
symbol of what has been granted.
Robert Avenel had been a justiciar under William 1."^  Presumably, he 
would have been as aware of any procedural customs or rules in use to 
enforce grants or prevent later claims as the monks. This is not to imply 
any specialised ‘legal’ knowledge on his part, but it supports the 
conclusion that he and his son were perhaps more sophisticated than many 
o f their peers regarding the ensuring of their donations. There are multiple 
confirmations of grants, recitation of procedural history and generally 
more attention to detail than is normally found in confirmations. The 
chirograph, with its quitclaim regarding the four merks which the monks 
had been rendering for Eskdale, is a record of past acts and provided for 
future acts as well. The provisions for payments regarding his wife Sybil 
and his son Gervaise are carried over into Gervaise’s confirmation. The
R.E. Latham, Revised M edieval Latin Word-List, from  British and Irish Sources, with 
Supplement (London, 1999), 240.
Barrow, RRS, i, (Edinburgh, 1960), 50.
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major difference between the two is that the king’s brother, David, is 
named as Earl David in the chirograph but not in Gervaise’s charter. If he 
had been present when the transaction reflected in Gervaise’s charter was 
conducted, most likely, but not certainly, he would have been included.
By the same reasoning, the chirograph was not drafted at the same time as 
William I’s second confirmation charter, since Jocelin, Bishop of Glasgow 
is not listed, nor are some of the other ecclesiastics we find in the prior 
charters. Surely persons so illustrious would have been included if they 
had been present?"^ The fact that the monks were so thorough in 
obtaining so many confirmations raises the question of whether they had 
doubts about the security of their claim on Eskdale. While there were 
several purposes for obtaining a confirmation charter, the two most 
important and which seem to have been operating here, were validation 
and authentication of the grant or gift, and enforcement of the terms.
If one aeeepts that each charter reflects a decision-making process, 
whether a donation, confirmation or resolution of an actual dispute, 
referencing prior charters or companion charters serves several functions. 
There is a contextualisation of the particular charter in relation to other 
charters and the actions depicted therein. There is a bolstering of 
credibility, and thus, authenticity of both the charter referred to and the
G.W.S. BaiTOW, ‘Witnesses and the Attestation o f  Formal Documents in Scotland, 
Twelfth-Thirteenth Centuries’, 16(1995) ,  1-20. Although this 
presumption cannot be relied upon completely, it is a factor that must be weighed when 
attempting to date the charters, determine the chronology o f  events, or evaluate the 
importance o f  certain witnesses.
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one referencing other charters. There is also the validation of the 
underlying transactions related in the texts of these charters above and 
beyond the authentication or the enforcement aspects. This self 
referencing or recursion which is fundamental to the reproduction of the 
decision making paradigm also serves to demonstrate how the 
evolutionary process of decision-making may at one and the same time 
appear to be and reinforce the perception of linearity, while actually being 
non-linear. If the confirmation charters were simply re-iterations of the 
original grant charters, there would be no additional language, and no 
question about the original terms. There would be no new grants. This is 
not the case since there are charters which give more detail than the 
originals and the confirmations often have additional grants. In those 
charters that include the text of other charters, such as those charters 
incorporating papal charters with judicial mandates, or instructions in 
procedure or law, the effect may be even more marked. The decision 
making process is laid out (so to speak,) in a sequential form. Yet the 
charter is more than a confirmation of the incorporated document; it is also 
a history, commentary and justification of actions ultimately taken in a 
particular case.^^
By reference to the king’s confirmation, requested by Robert in order to 
make his gift stronger and more stable, he is referring to and relying on the
27 Melrose Liber, nos. 101 and 133 are both examples from William I’s reign.
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authority of the king to enforce the agreement even against himself and his 
heirs. These references to charters within charters also demonstrate the 
recursion or self-referencing and functional folding aspects of complexity 
t h e o r y I n  effect, they incorporate the power and authority deemed to 
exist in a royal charter by reference to it, as well as obtaining a separate 
confirmation.
The authority and thus credibility o f the charter was often tied to not just 
the person in whose name the document has been issued, but to whether 
the charter had the symbols of authority, the seal and a formulaic approach 
within the text, the analysis of which is used by modern historians to 
determine authenticity and dating.^^ One by-product of this need for 
formulaic uniformity and authenticity, as well as continuity of the 
transactions of the prior charters, may be seen in the periodic issuance of 
general confirmation charters. These confirmation charters normally 
included references to all the previous donations. Since these earlier 
charters did not always survive, the language cannot be checked in every 
instance for formulaic phrases, but of those that did survive, the language 
usually tracks the original donations, unless there were additional grants 
from the king who issued the confirming charter.^^
G.Harlan Reynolds,‘Chaos and the Court’, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 110, 111.
Barrow, RRS, ii (Edinburgh, 1971), 75-94.
There are several general confirmations to be found In the various cartularies. One 
series that Includes references to grants memorialized in prior charters, fresh grants, and 
references to grants for which no documentation exist is that o f Dunfermline. See 
Dunfermline Registrum, no. 1, (David 1), no. 35 (Malcolm IV), and no.50. It has been
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Confirmation charters show elements of the ‘transition from pre-literacy to 
texuality’ discussed by David Postles in his article ‘Country Clerici and 
the Composition of English Twelfth-and Thirteenth-Century Charters’. '^ 
Relying on Michael Clanchy, Postles discusses the process whereby the 
written record, while becoming more pervasive, still relies on memory.
The recitation of prior gifts, inclusion of prior beneficiaries, and 
sometimes a reiteration of texts of prior charters, as was seen in the Avenel 
charters, shows reliance on the recollections of those involved, but no 
longer does there seem to be complete trust in the accuracy of memories, 
collective or not. Thus orality and literacy, memory and record, are 
intertwined, and to some extent, dependent upon each other for their 
existence. Robert Avenel was relying on memory when he incorporated 
the terms of the earlier grant into the later charter. King William may well 
have relied on memory when confirming the Annandale grant to Robert de 
Brus. His charter may have simply contained the terms of the agreement 
between Robert de Brus and David I, which all had understood before but 
had not felt the need to include in the text.^^ During the intervening years
suggested In the literature that confirmations had to be renewed by subsequent lords 
because a confirmation was only good as long as the person confirming was alive. This 
does not make sense when discussing gifts in alms, or where they were given in 
perpetuity; see Richard Sharpe, ‘The Use o f  Writs in the Eleventh Century, A hypothesis 
based on the archive o f Bury St. Edmunds’, Anglo-Saxon England 32 (2003), 247-91.
David Postles, ‘Country Clerici and the Composition o f  English Twelfth- and 
Thirteenth Century Charters’, in Charters and the Use o f  the Written Word in Medieval 
Society, ed. Karl Heidecker (Turnhout, 2000), 27-42.
Barrow, RRS, ii, no. 80. I am indebted to Dr. Broun for pointing out that this also could 
represent the settlement o f  a dispute over jurisdiction; hence the detailed listing o f  those 
regalia  or pleas o f  the crown which the king reserved to himself. The king also reserved
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they gradually became more dependent on the written record rather than 
memory, and make use of the documents as proof of what their memories 
told them, when they referred to other charters, or incorporate the terms of 
another charter as reflecting the terms of the instant charter. This may be 
seen most clearly in the phrases 'notiantur et continentur in cartis Domini 
Roherti AveneV in William’s second confirmation charter, and the phrase 
'sicut carta Roberti Avenil eis testatur et confirmaf. This internal 
referencing of prior charters is fairly commonplace by the mid-twelfth 
century, although there are references to prior charters found much 
earlier.^^
‘The growth of reliance on writing has been a continuing process without a 
precise beginning or end.’^ "' In the Avenel charters we see a discrete 
example of these changes, and the increasing importance attached to 
having a written confirmation in addition to original charters. The 
increasing numbers and more precise and formulaic language seen in 
confirmation charters demonstrate that by the reign of William 1 there is a 
clear, conscious and transparent (in the sense it is explicitly stated in the 
charter) reliance on the crown for enforcement of legal rights in property, 
and in the charter as evidence of such.
the right to name a man o f the fief as prosecutor and that all such causes would be 
brought before the king’s justiciar.
See for example, confirmation charter o f David I, while still titled ‘Earl’, to Prior Algar 
and the monks o f Durham regarding the donation o f Swinton made by his brother King 
Edgar; BaiTow, Charters o f  King D avid I o o d h v x d g e , ,  1999), 56.
M. T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307, (Oxford, 1993), 
42.
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David I and Earl Henry - Assent and Consent
As was seen in the Avenel charters, Robert and Gervaise obtained the 
assent and consent of their heirs and so stated in their charters. This 
phrase or some variation appears frequently in donation charters, but is not 
present in all of them. Whether obtaining assent and consent of either the 
lord or one’s heirs was necessary to effect a transfer of property has been 
addressed in the literature. Tabuteau, in her study of property transfers in 
eleventh century Norman law, has detailed the two most important 
questions concerning consent: whether it was legally necessary, and if not, 
why was it so often obtained, sometimes at great trouble?^^ There is no 
absolute concurrence among historians: some have concluded that this 
custom may have been a good idea, but was not legally necessary,^*’ while 
others have concluded that there seems to have been sound practical 
reasons for getting the assent and consent of one’s relatives. Professor 
Duncan has commented on Tabuteau’s work, stating that she has ‘greatly
Emily Zack Tabuteau, Transfers o f  Property in Eleventh-Century Norman Law (Chapel 
Hill, 1988), chapter 8 generally, and 170.
Paul Hyams, ‘Charters and the Early Common Law’, The Journal o f  Legal History, 12, 
(1991), 173-89; Stephen D. White, Custom, Kinship and Gifts to Saints, The laudatio 
parentum in Western France, 1050-1150 (London, 1988). See also J.G.H. Hudson, 
‘Diplomatie and Legal Aspects o f the Charters’, in The Earldom o f  Chester and Us 
Charters, ed, A.T. Thacker (Chester, 1991), 153-178. He mentions the debate on 
participation, and points out that ‘references to gifts made with a lord’s permission are 
extremely rare in English charters.’ He notes that ‘participation o f  a donor’s heirs might 
be desirable, [but]... [was] in no sense strictly legal,’ and points out that very few of the 
grants by Chester include the heir’s consent, 170-171.
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elucidated the significance of signatures and of the consent of relatives.’ 
Such consent ‘was often expressed in Norman charters.. .most frequently 
that of sons, wife or brothers, suggesting that a relative’s right to inherit 
made his or her consent desirable.’^^
The contrary position is that obtaining consent in the charters alienating 
property, especially in Northern France, was a norm which amounted to a 
rule. While, ‘[n]o legislation prescribed that change, yet the increasing 
appearance of such consent in the charters demonstrates the evolution of a 
new norm, which became a rule and developed into the standard retrait 
lignager o f thirteenth-century customary law.’^  ^This did not hold for 
England, except perhaps in the boroughs.^^ The general trend in Anglo- 
Norman law after the conquest was towards free alienation of land, but 
this was a slow process."'^ While an ultimate answer to whether the 
custom of obtaining the assent and consent of heirs was in fact a rule may 
not be satisfactorily answered here, the charter evidence for Scotland tends
A.A.M. Duncan, ‘Yes, The Earliest Scottish Charters,’ SHR, LXXVIII, (1999) 1-38,
13.
Gavin I. Langmuir, ‘Community and Legal Change in Capetian France’, French 
H istorical Studies, 6, (1970), 275-286, at 278.
The right o f the expectant heir to redeem the family land that had been alienated by his 
ancestor seems to have applied in English boroughs; see Pollock and Maitland, History o f  
English Law, Vol.ii, 330. They also confirm that in England, ‘There is no retrait 
lignager, the landowner can sell or give without the consent o f his heir,’ and under 
tenure. Pollock and Maitland note that ‘if the English law knows no retrait féodal, it 
knows no retrait Ugnager\
S.E. Thorne, ‘English Feudalism and Estates in Land’, Cambridge Laxv Journal (1959), 
193-209, 202-203. Thorne, at 195, argues that the giving and receiving o f  homage was at 
the crux o f the need for consent, not heritability.
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towards the conclusion that it may well have been more important than 
previously thought, at least in some cases.
Tabuteau has detailed several instances in eleventh-century Normandy 
where consent seemed to have been important. One of the approaches she 
takes in discussing the necessity of consent is to examine instances where 
consent was refused. This was apparently effective only in cases where a 
donor was attempting to transfer property held by a tenant. One of the 
cases she discusses involved a donor who gave two-thirds o f the tithes of 
certain lands, except for those held by tenants who refused to consent to 
the tithes being transferred. This and other charters examined lead 
Tabuteau to the conclusion that tenants, but only tenants ‘could block an 
alienation completely.’"" This was not true of lords or even of relatives. 
While a lord’s consent may have delayed a transfer, it did not prevent it. 
Likewise, a relative refusing to consent does not seem to have prevented a 
transfer. She cites two cases where a donor’s son refused consent, the 
transfer occurred anyway, and the son later consented."'^ Even so, consent 
of relatives appears over and over again. One of the most compelling 
points she makes is that ‘...the clear impression left by the charters is that
E. Z. Tabuteau, Transfers o f  Property (Chapel Hill, 1988), 171. Tabuteau refers to 
several other cases which also seem to support this position.
Ibid, 172.
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recipient churches were much more worried about the consent of relatives 
and tenurial superiors than about the consent of tenurial subordinates.’"'^
There are very few extant cases where consent, or the lack thereof, was 
used as grounds for complaint. Tabuteau discusses one that involved the 
absence o f consent on the part of a chapter. The monks of Saint-Pierre de 
Préaux invited Roger de Beaumont to their chapter and he enquired about 
their affairs. They complained to him that the previous Abbot, Ansfrid, 
had alienated land donated in a charter confirmed by both Roger de 
Beaumont and his father without the license or consent of the monks.
Upon hearing this Roger ‘ordered that everything which had been 
dispersed without the license or consent of their convent should return to 
the monks’ demesne just as it was written in the charter.’"'"' Although 
Tabuteau uses this as an example of the charter being taken as proof of the 
extent o f the monastery’s holdings, it also shows (perhaps more strongly 
than her examples in the chapter on Consent) that in eleventh-century 
Normandy, a lack o f consent of an interested party, in this case the 
convent, was grounds to force return of alienated property. Granted, the 
property in question had been given by Roger de Beaumont and he was 
ensuring that it stayed where he had intended, but the lack of consent was 
still grounds for nullifying the subsequent transfer. Consent itself seems to
Ibid.171-173. But Tabuteau has doubts. She points out that the charters taken as a 
whole demonstrate that ‘the consent of relatives and lords [was reported] mueh more 
often than that o f  tenants,’ 173.
E. Z. Tabuteau, Transfers o f  Property (Chapel Hill, 1988), 214.
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have been a form of acknowledgement, which would bind the heirs and 
others to uphold the terms of the transfers. This is supported by Bracton, 
where he states: ‘[A]nd that one may give land in free, pure and perpetual 
alms, more freely than he himself holds it of his feoffors and chief lords, 
and that his heirs are bound to warrant i f  they have acknowledged his 
charter or it has been proved.. (emphasis added). Although it is true 
that Bracton comes somewhat later, the requirements with regard to 
charters and confirmation of which he writes are borne out in Scotland by 
the evidence in David Ts reign and beyond.
This seems to be something separate and apart from any feudal practices, 
but more to do with obtaining quiet title, and preventing possible heirs 
from making later claims. Susan Reynolds has commented that,
The earliest references 1 have found to the need to get 
consent to alienation of property seem in other countries 
to have nothing to do with anything that could be called 
feudal tenure. They concern the objection that members 
o f a donor’s family might make to his or her gifts to a 
church of property that they expect to inherit. From the 
ninth century churches in the Frankish kingdom began to 
record consents of wives and heirs in their charters so as 
to secure their titles against later claims. Then when
Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, (On the Laws and Customs of  
England) (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), at 93-94.
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churches in France no longer had effective protection 
from kings they began to get consents or confirmations 
from local lords who might offer it instead. By the 
twelfth century custom had hardened and lords were 
beginning to require those over whom they claimed 
authority, including people with alods or free 
inheritances, to get permission to alienate."'^
According to Reynolds, then, there was a shift in who was asked to give 
consent. It began as an agreement involving the heirs, to safeguard against 
later claims by the family, and gradually shifted to essentially obtaining 
permission from one’s lord, again for protection against later claims.
Milsom also discussed the evolution of the lord’s consent to a transfer, 
from a custom to a rule in his Legal Framework. He postulates that the 
change was not in the customs, but in the tenant’s view of what he had and 
what he could do with it. ‘Before royal control, and in particular before 
mort d ’ancestor allowed an heir to feel that he entered in his own right 
rather than under a grant to himself from the lord, no tenant could think 
that he had something which he could by himself give for ever to an
Susan Reynolds, ‘Fiefs and Vassals in Scotland: A View from Outside’, SHR, LXXXII, 
(2003), 187.
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institution which would last for ever: of course the lord must join in.. ..The 
gift was unthinkable without [the lord’s confirmation].’"'^  According to 
Milsom, the change was that the tenant had a title which he could transfer 
on his own, and there may have been marginal loss to the lord. ‘[Ajnd so 
we find lords beginning to propound the custom as a rule: sine assensu et 
voluntate intrusit se in feudum...contra consuetudinem regnid^^ He goes 
on to state, ‘[Gjrantees and their successors allege compliance, but nothing 
visibly turns on it: we do not see the heirs of grantors getting the land back 
on the ground that the rules were broken.’"*^ These alternate views bring 
us to the fundamental question: if it was not a norm or custom amounting 
to a rule, why was it so prevalent?
In examining the Scottish material, it becomes apparent that there is a 
mixture of consent and assent by heirs, and confirmations by both 
superiors and heirs, as seen in the Avenel charters. There are also cases 
where failure to obtain the assent or consent of heirs, by whatever means, 
was associated with a claim by the heirs regarding the subject property.^'' 
Pollock & Maitland have asserted that nowhere does Glanvill indicate that 
the consent and assent of the lord was required in all transfers, but he 
writes at some length concerning ‘the restraints on alienation that are set
'^ ’S.F.C. Milsom, The Legal Framework o f  English Feudalism (Cambridge, 1976), 120. 
“U bid, 121.
Ibid, 123
See discussion o f  the de Frivill case, below.
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by the rights of expectant heirs.’ '^ It was prevalent in the French 
cartularies, not only for alienation of property in pure alms, but in transfers 
by sale or exchange/" Glanvill discusses several scenarios where the 
consent of heirs is necessary. These include situations where a free man 
has given land heritably, in recompense for service but without seisin/^ 
and where a gift has been made on a death-bed or last will transfer.^"' 
Whether the donor had inherited the land or acquired it by other means 
was vital in determining whether consent or assent was needed. If a free 
man had only inherited land, then he could give a certain part to anyone, 
but if he had only acquired land, he could give a part o f the acquired land 
but not all of it, ‘because he must not disinherit his son.’ *^’ Glanvill is very 
clear on the distinction between the different types of land: ‘If he [the 
donor] has both inherited and acquired land, then it is beyond question that 
he can give in perpetuity any part or all of his acquired land to whom he 
pleases; he can also, notwithstanding this, give a reasonable part of his
Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History o f  English Law Before 
the Time o f  Edw ard  /, 2d ed. (Union, NJ, 1996), I, 332.
There are numerous examples throughout the cartularies o f monastic houses in France, 
as well as in the French royal charters. See M. Jean Dufour, Recueil des Actes De Louis 
VI, Roi de France ( î  108-1137) (Paris, 1992); J.-J. Vernier, Chartes de L'Abbaye de 
Jumièges (v. 825 à 1204) (Rouen, 1916), Tome 1, II; M. Lucien Merlet, Cartulaire de 
L'Abbaye De La Sainte-Trinité de Tiron (Chartres, 1883), Tome I, IL 
Glanvill, VI, 18- VII, 1, 69: ‘Every free man...can give a certain part o f his free 
tenement to whom he pleases in recompense for his service, or to a religious place as 
alms. If seisin follow s... the land will remain for ever with the donee and his heirs, if  it 
was given to them heritably; however, if  no seisin follows such a gift, then after the 
donor’s death nothing can be claimed in reliance on such a gift against the will o f the 
h eir...’
Ibid, at 70, ‘ ...a  gift o f  this kind made to another in a last will can hold good if  made 
and confirmed with the heir’s consent.’
Ibid.
Ibid, 71.
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inherited land.. These rules^^ must be taken into account when 
analyzing grant charters, particularly where there is inconsistency in 
wording. Nowhere is it more glaring than in the donation charters of 
David I.
There are several examples where the assent and consent of the heir or 
heirs is noted in the donation charters of David I and just as importantly, 
there are charters which do not have these words. While Geoffrey Barrow 
has presented arguments that explain the use of these words in these 
charters as proof o f a dual or joint kingship between David I and Earl 
H e n r y , h i s  explanation does not seem to work legally, or beyond the 
royal charters. The phrase is used in non-royal charters as well,' '^  ^and one 
must look outside the framework of government administration to 
determine why these words were used in specific charters, but not in all 
charters.
Barrow asserts that ‘more than a fifth of the surviving acts of David I 
either imply or explicitly state that the royal government of Scotland 
between the mid-thirties and the early fifties of the twelfth century was a 
joint government of father and son.’^ ' His conclusion is based upon the
Ibid, 71.
This is the term used in Glanvill, 70.
Barrow, Charters o f  D avid  /, 5-8.
There are numerous examples throughout the Scottish material as well as in other 
cartularies, such as the Avenel charters discussed above.
Ibid, 7.
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number o f charters that reflect Heniy’s assent or consent to alienation of 
lands, confirm gifts made by David, or where David I and Earl Henry are 
listed as witnesses to the other’s acts. He relies heavily on the phrase, "rex 
designatus' which appears in a couple of charters produced by St. 
Andrews, and concerning properties granted to St. Andrews by David 
The first, in David’s name, is a general confirmation of all that had been 
granted by Bishop Robert of St. Andrews to the cathedral priory,^^ and the
St. Andrews Liber, 189-91, 192-3. But see Dauvit Broun, The Charters o f  Gaelic 
Scotland and Ireland in the Early and Central Middle Ages, Quiggin Pamphlets on the 
Sources o f  Medieval Gaelic History (Department o f Anglo-Saxon, Norse, and Celtic, 
University o f Cambridge, Cambridge, 1995), 27: ‘[t]he coincidence is notable, but it need 
only be the Latin phrase, not the concept o f “king designate” itself, which travelled from 
France to St. Andrews.’
St. Andrews Liber, 189-91; Barrow, Charters o f  D avid 1, no, 126. The language in this 
charter is striking. It refers to Henry as 'heres mens et rex designatns' and the verb used 
to confirm is plural, but there is a separation between the joint confirmation o f Bishop 
Robert’s gifts and the gift by David I. There, the granting language is singular, and the 
confirmation plural. Technically, it is not a joint grant. While the phrase rex designatns 
may have been how Bishop Robert saw Henry, and he was David’s heir, this 
confirmation charter is not an act o f joint government. It is a confirmation. It could 
easily have been two or more separate charters: separate confirmations by David and 
Henry, a separate grant by David, and separate confirmation by Henry. In fact, the 
confirming language at the end o f the charter is separate.®  ^St. Andrews Liber, 189-01; 
Barrow, Charters o f  D avid I, no. 126. The language in this charter is striking. It refers to 
Henry as 'heres mens et rex designatns' and the verb used to confirm is plural, but there 
is a separation between the joint confirmation o f Bishop Robert’s gifts and the gift by 
David I. There, the granting language is singular, and the confirmation plural. 
Technically, it is not a joint grant. While the phrase rex designatns may have been how 
Bishop Robert saw Henry, and he was David’s heir, this confirmation charter is not an act 
o f joint government. It is a confirmation. It could easily have been two or more separate 
charters: separate confirmations by David and Henry, a separate grant by David, and 
separate confirmation by Henry. In fact, the confirming language at the end o f the charter 
is separate. St. Andrews Liber, 189-91; Barrow, Charters o f  D avid I, no. 126. The 
language in this charter is striking. It refers to Henry as 'heres mens et rex designatns' 
and the verb used to confirm is plural, but there is a separation between the joint 
confirmation o f  Bishop Robert’s gifts and the gift by David I. There, the granting 
language is singular, and the confirmation plural. Technically, it is not a joint grant. 
While the phrase rex designatns may have been how Bishop Robert saw Henry, and he 
was David’s heir, this confirmation charter is not an act o f joint government. It is a 
confirmation. It could easily have been two or more separate charters: separate 
confirmations by David and Henry, a separate grant by David, and separate confirmation 
by Henry. In fact, the confirming language at the end o f the charter is separate*’^  St. 
Andrews Liber, 189-91; Barrow, Charters o f  D avid I, no. 126. The language in this 
charter is striking. It refers to Henry as 'heres mens et rex designatns' and the verb used
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second is a confirmation of King David’s charter. Barrow notes that 
Henry’s confirmation is probably close in date to David’s charter, and 
dated them to 1144, although he had noted that canons had been 
introduced at St. Andrews by 1140 or so. "^' Both charters confirm property 
from Bishop Robert to St. Andrews priory. The St. Andrews charters are 
the only ones that refer to Earl Henry as rex designatns?^
There is one charter where David I and his son participated in a joint grant 
to Dunfermline A b b e y T h i s  involved the land of Balchrystie and 
Newburn, both lying above the Forth. Of the charters referring to Henry 
as rex designatns, this is the only one which could be considered a joint 
grant. Yet it is issued in the name of King David alone, and cannot be 
considered an act of governance; it is a donation made for the benefit of 
their souls.' '^^
to confirm is plural, but there is a separation between the joint confirmation of Bishop 
Robert’s gifts and the gift by David I. There, the granting language is singular, and the 
confirmation plural. Technically, it is not a joint grant. While the phrase rex designatns 
may have been how Bishop Robert saw Henry, and he was David’s heir, this 
confirmation charter is not an act o f joint government. It is a confirmation. It could 
easily have been two or more separate charters: separate confirmations by David and 
Henry, a separate grant by David, and separate confirmation by Henry. In fact, the 
confirming language at the end o f the charter is separate.
Barrow, Charters o f  D avid  /, 94, comment; A.A.M. Duncan, ‘The Foundation o f  St. 
Andrews Cathedral Priory, 1140’, SHR, LXXXIV, (2005), 1-37, 2.
Duncan, Scotland: The Making o f  the Kingdom  (Edinburgh, 1975).
Barrow, Charters o f  D avid  /, 171.
Ibid, no. 177. A distinction must be made in the granting o f perpetuities. Those made 
to religious houses for the benefit o f the donor’s soul are not related to the administration 
o f  government. Those made to an individual in exchange for military service or 
administrative service are, in fact, ‘governmental’ in nature. David did make several 
grants to his men, such as Walter o f Ryedale, which were not joint acts with Henry even 
though they were in the south. This reinforces the notion that any joint action with regard 
to granting perpetuities was not considered an act o f government.
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Barrow noted in his argument for a joint government that the ‘joint action 
seems to have been confined, with almost no exceptions, to perpetuities, 
charters granting or confirming permanent property, privileges and 
r i g h t s . W i t h  regard to administrative and legal brieves, there are no 
duplications or ‘dual production of b r i e v e s . M o r e  significantly, and 
Barrow acknowledged the importance of this fact, ‘there are comparatively 
few examples of joint documentation for the country north of F o r t h , A s  
for Dunfermline, Earl Henry did not take any part in their affairs except 
for the two diplomas given to the Abbey by David I. This is true as well 
for the charters concerning grants to the Isle of May. Henry is noticeably 
absent. Most telling of all is the confirmation to St. Andrews priory 
confirming David’s gift of property in Haddington. As Barrow noted, ‘it 
does look as if Earl Henry’s activity in royal government was largely 
confined to Scotland south of the Forth, to Cumbria, and of course to 
English Northumbria.’^ ' While Barrow’s explanation is certainly 
attractive, especially considering the experiments in government 
throughout northern Europe in the twelfth cent ur y , t he  use of the phrase 
rex designatns in the French royal char t er s , and the English dual 
kingship with Henry 11 and young King Henry, it is not the only
Barrow, Charters o f  D avid I, 7. 
Ibid.
Ibid, 7-8. In fact, they are mostly limited to the three where the phrase rex designatns 
appears.
Ibid, 8.
Judith Everard, ‘The Assize o f  Count Geoffrey’ (1 185): Law and Politics in Angevin 
Brittany’, in Expectations o f  Law in the Middle Ages, ed. Anthony Musson (Woodbridge,
2001), 54-55.
M. Jean Dufour, Recueil des Actes De Louis VI, Roi de France (1108-1137) (Paris, 
1992). There are numerous examples.
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explanation which fits these facts. It may have simply boiled down to the 
fact that grants of property owned by the king were not seen as primarily 
royal acts but rather as governed by the same norms or rules as any other 
transfer of property.^"' A review of how these lands came into the 
possession of David I supports the conclusion that the king followed these 
rules concerning the assent and consent of the heir when transferring these 
properties, primarily land, especially to religious houses.^^
In 1094, King Duncan’s charter asserted that he was king by right of 
inheritance.^*" In his charter, he also lists his brothers, among others as 
those for whose souls the donation is given. In addition, he states, "Et 
quoniam volui quod istud donum stabile esset Sancto Cuthberto, feci quod 
fi^aters mei concesserunt, Taken alone this would perhaps raise no 
eyebrows, but it becomes important when considering the royal charters of 
Duncan’s half brothers, Edgar and David.
In 1097, Edgar made the same assertion regarding inheritance.^^ It is an 
assertion repeated in Edgar’s other charters. In 1107, King Edgar died.
Glamnll, 69-70.
Most o f the examples concern donations to religious houses, but the rule seems to have 
been applicable regardless o f who or what the donee was.
Lawrie, ESC, no. xÜ. Although one could argue that both Duncan II and Edgar had 
acquired the kingdom by ‘conquest’, since they had to fight for it and both required help 
from William II, they do not seem to have considered it a conquest, so much as a retaking 
o f what was rightfully theirs.
Ibid.
Ibid, no. XV. See also Gordon Donaldson, ‘Early Scottish Conveyancing; 
Supplementary to Formulary o f  Old Scots Legal Documents’, ed, P. Gouldsbrough 
(Edinburgh, 1985).
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leaving a will which divided his dominium between his two surviving 
brothers. Alexander was to be King. David, Alexander’s presumptive heir 
to the Scottish throne, was to have Cumbria and some parts of Lothian, but 
not all, before 1124. Between 1107 and 1124, David ruled as princeps of 
Cumbria. If Cumbria and part of Lothian were considered the appanage of 
the heir to the Scottish throne, it would in part, explain why Henry is so 
frequently a part of any charters concerning properties in these areas. But 
there must be more involved. More because the charters that include 
reference to the assent and consent of Henry with ‘almost no exceptions’ 
relate to perpetuities, property, privileges and rights; in short, property 
rights o f whatever stripe. There are no acts of joint governance which 
concern royal brieves or commands. The only joint acts occurred outside 
what may be deemed to be official, governmental acts. All such acts of 
David I and Earl Henry, since they involve property rights, may just as 
easily have been performed by other, non-royal individuals. This is not to 
say that David I always acted in concert with Henry even in granting 
perpetuities in the south. There are examples of such grants made by 
David I alone
In addition, there is the issue of Moray. David I did not gain control of 
this land until 1130, when he obtained it by right of conquest, not direct
R.L. Graeme Ritchie, The Normans in Scotland  (Edinburgh, 1954), 125. But see 
A.A.M. Duncan’s discussion, in Kingship o f  the Scots, 59-61.
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inheritance/^ This distinction is vital when placed in a context where the 
one who had acquired or conquered the lands wishes to dispose of some or 
all of them. Glanvill sets out the rules concerning the distinctions in 
treatment between inherited and conquered land very clearly: ‘.. .the 
general rule is that any person is allowed to give freely in his lifetime a 
reasonable part of his land to whom he pleases... A man cannot 
disinherit his son, so must not give all his inherited land away. Nor, if he 
only has acquired land, may he give it all away at the expense of his son. 
But ‘if he has both inherited and acquired land, then it is beyond question 
that he can give in perpetuity any part or all of his acquired land to whom 
he pleases; he can also, notwithstanding this, give a reasonable part of his 
inherited land, as has been explained above.’^^
There are only a few charters dealing with land in Moray, two of which 
are donations to the church. By comparison with other charters, these 
would normally include some reference to assent or consent of the heir, as 
was David’s practice. This of course would be true except in one 
circumstance. If Heniy’s assent and consent were not necessary as the 
heir, there would be no need for his consent to be reflected in the charter. 
As land held by conquest, when there were other lands inherited and held
The Ecclesiastical History o f  Orderic Vitalis, trans. And ed. Marjorie Chibnall, Vol. 
IV, Books VII and VIII (Oxford, 1973), 277. With the defeat o f Angus, earl o f  Moray, 
the territory o f  Moray ‘no longer had a lord and defender, and (David) conquered the 
whole o f that extensive duchy. In this way David grew more powerful than his 
predecessors.’
Glanvid, 70.
Ibid, 71.
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in patrimony for the heir so that his rights were not at issue, Henry had no 
heritable claim to the lands of M o r a y D a v i d  did not need his assent or 
consent and could dispose of these lands as he wished.
This is precisely what David did. In the two charters concerning the Holy 
Trinity at Urquhart, an offshoot of Dunfermline, David was implementing 
his policy of settling religious houses in Moray, and did this without any 
input from Henry. There is no assent or consent, no pro anima clauses and 
no confirmation by Heniy. The dating put forth by Barrow for both of 
these charters is late in the reign. One of them at least could well be dated 
to the year Henry died, 1152. So it could be argued that there is no 
mention of Henry in this act because he was dead. While this is true, it 
does not explain why there was no confirmation by Malcolm IV, nor does 
it explain why there was no mention of successors.
Compare the situation here with that faced by William the Conqueror, when allocating 
his lands between his sons. He gave the patrimony, Normandy to his eldest son, but 
England, obtained by conquest, he designated to William Rufus. See discussion o f this in 
Orderic Vitalis, above. Primogeniture does not seem to have been firmly established 
during the first half o f  the twelfth century; succession did not become a problem in 
Scotland, however until the Great Cause, see A.A.M. Duncan, Kingship o f  the Scots, 
(Edinburgh, 2003), especially chapters 12 and 13 (on the Great Cause) ; but see 80-81, 
where Duncan notes that “In Scotland primogeniture in the male line became the rule for 
heritage in the time o f  David I, if  not earlier...and the royal house itself was probably 
committed to lineal descent, as became apparent in 1153.’ This makes the reference in 
Duncan IPs charter to obtaining the consent o f his brothers, not his w ife or his children, 
even more marked. Although one could argue that his children were not o f age to give 
consent, one explanation is simply that his heirs to the kingdom and its lands were his 
brothers, not necessarily his children. This is in keeping with the experiments in 
government discussed earlier. I am indebted to Neil Strevett for the many conversations 
we have had concerning these issues.
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In support o f this interpretation is the fact that King David commanded 
Earl Duncan to take his grandson Malcolm throughout Scotia, the 
provinces north of the Forth and proclaim him the heir to the Scottish 
kingdom/"' This is significant for two reasons. David was not bequeathed 
the kingdom on Alexander’s death, and there may have been a question of 
succession of such a young king. But even more important is that this 
parade of the young heir was not conducted in the South. Perhaps it was 
deemed unnecessary since Malcolm IV was the heir of Henry, and the land 
would have been presumed to go to him by inheritance.^^
One must take into account the charters of Malcolm IV. Out of the 
approximately 160 charters of which we have extant texts, only three 
indicate that Malcolm’s brother William gave his assent or consent. The 
first is a grant to the cathedral church of Glasgow and concerns the church 
of Old Roxburgh, the chapel of the king’s castle at Roxburgh and land 
attached to it. It is datable to 1153x1156, and before William lost the 
earldom of Northumbria. The precise phrase is Willelmo Comite fratre 
meo illud idem concedente, but there is no mention of assent as such.^^
Barrow, RRS, i, 6.
Another explanation is that there were no other ‘suitable’ heirs. Although Duncan IPs 
son, William had a place at David’s court, there is no mention o f him succeeding David I 
or any contest for the succession before Earl Henry’s death. William fitz Duncan was 
dead by 1152, probably in 1151, so this would not have been an issue after Henry’s 
untimely death.
Ibid, no. 114. It would seem that it was enough to get his consent rather than the entire 
phrase.
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The second charter of Malcolm IV that contains similar language is a 
confirmation and grant to Melrose Abbey, It is for easements through the 
king’s forest of Selkirk and Traquair, several parcels of land and certain 
fishing rights. This charter is datable to 1162x1165.^^ The phrase used 
there is the full annuente et concedente Willelmo fratre meo.
The third and final charter with this language is datable to the last year of 
Malcolm’s life. It concerns a grant to the cathedral church of Glasgow of 
the land now known as Glasgow Green. William is listed as the first 
witness: Willelmo fratre Regis idem concedente The last two charters 
both have extensive pro anima clauses and are in the later years of 
Malcolm’s reign.
A common denominator for these three charters is that they are all grants 
of property below the Forth. Although Malcolm made several other grants 
during his reign, and some of them were in the same general area, there 
does not seem to be the same pattern with Malcolm as was seen with 
David. The reason for the phrases appearing in these particular charters is 
not entirely clear, especially since there were many other similar grants 
where no such language was used. Since they were all in the more 
southern part of the realm, it may well be a similar situation of William 
being the presumptive heir to the lands in question. With regard to
Ibid, no. 235, Barrow notes that the dating is probably 1162x1165 because o f the 
reference to Richard de Moreville who had succeeded his father in 1162.
Ibid, no. 265.
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Malcolm IV, factors which might have influenced the use (or lack) of 
these terms could well be the minority of the king and his brother and the 
lack of clear designation of William as his heir until later in his reign. 
There is also the possibility that the area outside Scotia was deemed to be 
held of the English king (unlikely, since this was never explicitly 
acknowledged), but may have had customs more like those o f England,
A number of royal charters dating back to Duncan II had consent language 
included for lands south of the Forth. If assent and consent had been 
required or at least strongly indicated in any donation because it was 
alienating land away from the patrimony, and these were the king’s own 
lands and/or rights, then the assent and consent may have been 
procedurally important, possibly even necessary, to ensure the validity of 
the gift. A confirmation was also required to validate the gift. If one 
accepts that as late as David I’s reign, there was still the idea that a 
kingdom was ‘personal’ that is, heritable and could be disposed of by the 
king, as the king in fact did when he donated lands to the church and gave
A. A.M. Duncan, Kingship o f  the Scots (Edinburgh, 2002), 56. He has argued that the 
charter in Lawrie wherein Edgar holds o f the English king is in faet genuine, although 
Barrow disputes this. The question o f  English lordship presumably would not have 
applied to Scotia, only, if at all, to the southern portions o f the kingdom. Whether this 
was actually the way those areas outside Scotia were regarded is unclear, but there are 
some indications that the English king did have an interest in the disposition o f  portions 
of southern Scotland. Duncan, at 107, points out that in 1195, when William 1 was ill, he 
began to make plans for the throne to pass to his daughter Margaret. He initiated 
arrangements for a betrothal o f  Margaret to Otto o f Brunswick, who was also nephew to 
Richard I o f  England. Under the proposed arrangement, ‘Otto was to be given Lothian, 
Northumbria and Cumberland, but the English king was to have in cnstodia  Lothian and 
its castles, the Scottish king Northumbria, Cumberland and their c a s t l e s .T h i s  
arrangement received strong support from Richard I, but was jettisoned because Queen 
Ermengarde became pregnant and William was hoping to have a son.
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land to retainers in exchange for service, then it makes sense to get the 
assent and consent and then the confirmation of the heir.^^ Henry is in fact 
named as the heir.
There is no way to be certain that obtaining the assent and consent of the 
heir or successor was legally required in the twelfth century, but it was one 
way of ensuring the royal gift remained with the beneficiary. The practice 
in England in the early twelfth century seems to have been the same. With 
regard to the requirement of assent, in donation charters and with regard to 
the necessity of a confirmation from the king, the case brought by the 
Abbey of Thorney against Robert of Yaxley, infra, is instructive.^’ 
Robert’s failure to obtain the assent and consent of the chapter and the 
confirmation of the king was fatal to his case.
De Frivill - pro anima clauses
In addition to the assent and consent clause, donation charters usually 
included a clause stating that the gift was made for the souls of the donor,
^°This question was never addressed directly in the Scottish material until the Great Cause 
at the end o f the thirteenth century. See E.L.G. Stones and Grant G. Simpson, Echvard ! 
and the throne o f Scotland, 1290-1296: an edition o f the record sources fo r  the Great 
Cause (Oxford, 1977, 1978) (2 vols.).
D.M.Stenton, English Justice Between the Norman Conquest and the Great Charter, 
1066-1215 (London, 1965), Appendix IV, 140-147. Stenton took this case from the Red 
Book o f  Thorney, 3, fo. 417, It is datable to 1113x1127, within the period when David I 
would have had control o f the Honour o f  Huntingdon. This case is discussed above with 
regard to the role o f the sheriff acting as judge.
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his or her family, lords, ancestors and successors.^' For the most part, this 
phrase, included in the term laudatio parentum, has been considered to 
indicate the motive behind the gift.^^ There is no evidence that this phrase 
was required when donating property in alms,^'’ but on occasion, it may 
have been used as additional ammunition, consideration^^ or persuasion to 
support the security of a gift. Even though it may not have been required 
to effectuate a gift, there are some cases where the lack of such a phrase is 
associated with a failed gift, and where subsequent confirmation charters 
included amended pro anima clauses.^^
While this is normally referred to as the laudatio parentum, I have separated the assent 
and consent clause from the pro  anima clause for the purposes o f this discussion. It 
seems to me that they are not interchangeable; although they were often used together, 
they served different, but related purposes. The assent and consent clause may have been 
more important in securing a gift that alienated part o f an heir’s inheritance, while the pro  
anima clause gave a more intangible benefit to those included in its prayer, I have found 
no instances where someone who could not have made a claim to the property in question 
had been included in the pro  anima clause.
E. Z.Tabuteau, Transfers o f  Property 1988), 15.
See generally. White, Custom and Gifts to Saints; Hyams, ‘Charters and the Early 
Common Law’ where they both conclude that assent and consent were not required.
They do not specifically separate the assent and consent from the pro  anima, as 1 have 
here.
The requirement o f consideration for a contract to be valid would not have truly 
developed under English law until the thirteenth century, but there are earlier cases where 
the monks who received lands from a family member demonstrated that the heirs had 
received something in the exchange, thus defeating their claims to the property.
^  One such series is that involving the de Colville charters. Melrose Liber, nos. 192, 193, 
194, 195. The pro anima clause in this first charter was short and to the point: pro anime 
mee et omnium antecessorum meorum. The language in this second charter appeared to 
be essentially the same as the first, but with an addition in the pro anima clause. It 
included language concerning the king and his predecessors by name: 'pro salute anime 
mee & pro anUnabus david, malcolmi, Williami Regum Scocie & omnium antecessorum  
meorum.... ’.
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Richard de Frivill donated two pieces of land to Arbroath Abbey. The first 
was a full ploughgate of land in ‘Balekelsan’^  ^ and the second was a half 
ploughgate of land in the territory of Mondynes, in Fordoun, Mearns, on 
the Bervie Wa t e r . T h e r e  was a confirmation by William 1 of the half 
ploughgate.^^ The two donation charters are datable to 1178x1180;
Barrow dates William I’s charter of confirmation to ‘ 1178x1188, perhaps 
1 1 7 8  > 1 0 0  apparently were objections by the heirs of Richard de
Frivill over these gifts of land to Arbroath. There are several possibilities 
for this, although all are based more or less on speculation rather than firm 
evidence. The objections may have been based on the claim that Richard 
de Frivill had no right to donate these lands in the first place, or that the 
way he did it was not proper, such as in a death-bed situation where none 
of the heirs was present or consented. It may have left his heirs destitute, 
which would mean the family/heirs would have the right to object. Or it 
may be that Richard de Frivill did not follow certain customs or rules 
when he donated these lands, rules that were to protect the donor, the 
heirs, the donees, and any other interested parties.
The first donation charter of Richard de Frivill concerns the land of 
Balekelsan.'^’ This charter is addressed to the universal holy mother
NLS, MS. Adv.34.4.2, fo. 66. Registrum Veferi; Arbroath Liber, no. 90. The present 
name o f  this land Is undetermined.
NLS, MS. Adv. 34.4.2, fo. 66^; Arbroath Liber, no. 91.
Ibid, no. 91 {bis), p. 63; Barrow, RRS, ii, no. 225.
Barrow, LiRS, ii, no. 225.
NLS, MS, Adv. 34.4.2, fo. 66, Registrum Veteri; Arbroath Liber, no. 90.
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church, and starts out (as many donation charters do) with the 'Sciatis me 
dedisse et concessisse et hac carta mea confirmasse..., ' Richard de Frivill 
had given one full carrucate (ploughgate) in land, by its right boundaries, 
f r o  animahiis Regis David et Regis M, et pro animabns antecessorum 
meorum et pro salute Regis Willhelmi et pro salute anime mee \ The 
witness list is as follows: ‘Turpin bishop of Brechin, Walter archdeacon 
St. Andrews, William son of the Earl of Angus, Angus of Dunlopyn, John 
of Hastings, William son of Freskin (fretheschyn), William Malvoisin 
(mauuesyn) clerk of the king, Walkin the brewer, David of Forfar, 
Malcolm of Kettins (ketenes); this charter is datable to 1178x1180, shortly 
after Arbroath was founded.
Although this looks in form and language like other donation charters, and 
seems to have all the pertinent parts, there are significant omissions. First, 
the pro anima is only for Richard’s ancestors, himself and the kings of 
Scotland. There is no mention of his successors, his children, his heirs. 
Second, there are no witnesses who appear to be relatives of any kind. 
There is no inclusion of others in the benefits of the gift other than his 
ancestors and himself, except the reference to kings, especially to William
1. There is no assent or consent by any family members. There does not 
appear to be a specific confirmation charter from the King for this 
donation either. While there were general confirmations from both King 
William I and his son Alexander II, there were several donation charters,
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including the second donation charter of Richard de Frivill, where a 
specific confirmation from the king was obtained.
The second charter from Richard de Frivill concerns his gift of land in 
Mondynes, in Fordoun, Mearns, on the Bervie W a t e r . T h e  address is 
the same as in the previous charter. The donation is of''illam termm in 
territorio de monethechen propinqiiam aque de Beruyn per dimidia 
carucata terre per rectas divisas This piece of land had been 
ploughed’®^ by Richard de Frivill and several others, including John 
Hastings, Walter Scot, and the Abbot of Arbroath. The text refers to "siciit 
ego ipse et Johannes de Hasting et Walterus Scotiis cum ipso abbate de 
Abirbrothic et pluribus aliis peraravimus \ The land is given for the souls 
o f King David, King Malcolm and f r o  animabus antecessorum meorum\ 
and for the health of King William and himself. The text of this charter 
includes the phrase, 'Testibus Rege Willelmo et hoc idem concedente ' and 
then is followed by a list of other witnesses, none of whom appear to be a 
relative or heir of de Frivill, although there are several high ranking 
individuals.” '^’ There is no laudatio parentum, no assent and consent, and 
no confirmation from anyone except the king.
NLS, MS. Adv. 34.4.2, fo. 66^; Arbroath Liber, no. 91, 62.
Literally, peraravimus, ‘we ploughed through, furrowed’.
The witnesses include the Bishop o f Aberdeen, Earl David, the earl o f Angus, Robert 
de Quincy and several o f the king’s close associates as well as a number o f churchmen. 
The consent o f de Frivill’s lord, the king, concurs with Susan Reynolds conclusions set 
forth above, and the requirements for royal consent in the Thorney vs. Yaxley case, 
above, p. 163.
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The third charter in this series is the confirmation of William I for the 
donation by Richard de Frivill of the land in Mondynes.”’^  In this charter 
William conceded and his charter confirmed that half ploughgate in land 
in the territory of Mondynes which Richard de Frivill gave to the monks. 
The land is to be held as freely and quietly fully and honourably as the 
charter of the same Richard stated and confirmed, saving the king’s 
service. Many of the same witnesses that appeared in Richard’s charter 
are also named in the king’s confirmation.”’^  The dating indicates that this 
may have been one of the earliest donations to the Abbey,
This is not the end of the story regarding this donation, however. There is 
another charter from William l .”’^  This second charter granted to 
Arbroath one ploughgate of arable in Mondynes, on the Bervie Water.
The land had been measured, at the king’s order, by several o f the king’s 
men, some of whom were also witnesses to the other charters. The king 
stated his reasons for giving this land to Arbroath:
Volo quidem ad omnium noticiam pervenire quod per hanc
carucatam terre quam eis dedi adquietavi ab eis unam carucatam
NLS, MS. Adv. 34,4.2, fo. 66'', Arbroath Liber, no. 91 {bis), 63. This was the 
accepted format. See J.G. H. Hudson, ‘Diplomatic and Legal Aspects o f the Charters’ in 
A.T. Thacker (ed), The Earldom o f  Chester and Its Charters (Chester, 1991), 162, where 
he notes that ‘ .. .from c. 1130, most confirmations o f vassals’ gifts distinguish between 
the vassal giving and the lord confirming.’
Barrow, RRS ii, no. 222.
NLS, MS. Adv. 34.4.2, fos. 6T  ; Arbroath Liber, no. 92.
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terre et dimidiam quas ex dono Rîcardi Frivill’ habuerunt et de 
quibus cartas suas eis dederatJ^^
The purpose o f his actions was further elaborated:
Unde non liceat alicui heredum predicti Ricardi si qui eorum 
terram illam recuperaverint super predicta terra erga eos aliquam 
questionem move re.
Barrow renders this as, ‘so that none of Richard’s heirs may bring any 
lawsuit against the abbey in respect of the 1 ploughgates if they should 
recover them’.”’^  The witness list to this charter included several of the 
same individuals, but this time, their titles were i n c l u d e d . Wh i l e  this 
may not be significant procedurally, it may indicate an attempt to give the 
charter more weight. Barrow dates this as 1183x1188, and notes that the 
compensation offered by the King to the Abbey may have been for 
warrandice. ' ’ ’
The verb acquietare means to pay; to free or discharge; to acquit. The passage 
translates roughly as: ‘I will that notice reach all that by this carucate in land which I have 
given to them I have acquitted from them one carrucate and Vz which they had from the 
gift o f Richard Frivill and by his charter he gave to them.’
Literally, the phrase may be translated: ‘So that none of the heirs o f Richard, if  any o f  
them recover that land, may be permitted to move any question towards (against) them 
over the said land.’
' Witnesses were Hugh, bishop o f St. Andrews, John, bishop o f Dunkeld, Robert, Abbot 
o f Scone, Earl Duncan the Justiciar, Richard de Moreville the Constable, Walter Olifard, 
Philip de Valognes, Roger de Berkeley, Walter de Berkley the Chamberlain.
' ‘ ’ Barrow, RRS, ii, no. 277.
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There are some conclusions that may be drawn fairly clearly from the 
charters. First, that Richard de Frivill believed he had good title, and the 
king actively supported this (at least as to Mondynes) since he is listed as a 
witness in the donation charter, and he confirmed the gift with a separate 
charter. There is no indication in the charters themselves where Richard 
got this land, but Barrow notes that the de Frivills were one of the families 
settled north of the Forth by William I during his reign, as part of his 
policy of granting crown lands in exchange for military service, or as an 
extension o f the policies of David I and Malcolm IV. He notes that, ‘[t]he 
individuals whom we know from authentic records to have been infeft in 
land in the Mearns in the time of William I include,.. .Richard de 
Frivill...’” " Barrow also connects this Richard de Frivill with the family 
of de Freville, attached to the house of Warenne.”  ^ It is more than likely 
that Richard had been given this land by William I sometime before 1178 
in return for military service. There does not seem to be a donation charter 
that has survived reflecting the grant from William I to Richard de Frivill 
or his relatives.
Second, there is no mention in either of the two donation charters of any 
family or heirs of Richard de Frivill. This could be because he was not 
married and had no legitimate offspring at the time of the donation, but it 
would not account for any siblings or parents. There is no mention of any.
Ibid, at 17.
’ Ibid, no. 225, comment, p. 269, where he refers to EYC, viii and that one Ralph de 
Freville witnessed Warenne charters during the period 1159x1196,
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nor are there any names in the charter that may be ascribed to Richard as 
either relatives or heirs. Thus, there is no indication that his heirs (for he 
apparently did have them) knew of his donations, or in any way consented 
to them or confirmed them. Although one could argue that his reference to 
ancestors may include his parents, they would not be his heirs. Since the 
lines o f succession according to Glanvill normally descend,'”  the term 
‘ancestor’ refers usually to those who have died rather than anyone 
living.”  ^ In addition, the term ‘successors’ would not cover parents, but 
might cover collateral heirs such as brothers, sisters and their collateral 
descendants, and more remotely, paternal and then maternal uncles, aunts 
and their descendants.” ^
The third fact which may be gleaned from the charters is that sometime 
after c. 1180 and before 1183 at the earliest and 1188 at the latest, Richard 
de Frivill died. Thereafter, his heirs appear to have raised a claim 
regarding Richard’s donations. The king’s charter gives no details about 
who these heirs were, how the issue was raised, nor even the grounds upon 
which the claim was based. It could have been either directly with the 
king when the heirs attempted to claim the property of their deceased 
relative, or even raised by the monks of Arbroath, who may have noticed a
G/artv///, 73.
See, for example, the charter o f Walter son o f Alan the Steward in his donation o f the 
church o f Inner wick and o f Ledgerwood and a ploughgate o f land o f  Hassendean, etc. 
where he specifies ^antecessorum meorum defunctorum  and then goes on to include the 
living. Charter is datable to 1 165x1173, Registrum Monasterii de Passelet {Paisley 
Register) (Edinburgh, 1832), 7.
Glanvill, 75.
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‘defect’ in the language of the charters. It may be that the lack of pro 
anima language or anything with similar effect was an indication that there 
was something irregular about the transaction. It seems more likely, 
however, that the heirs may have been approached for a confirmation by 
the Abbey, and refused. Donations could be confirmed by the heirs after 
the death o f the donor, and often were.
Since the record of this series of charters is found in the cartulary and no 
originals remain, there is no way to determine if the originals were drafted 
by a royal scribe or someone from Arbroath. Assuming, however, that the 
charters were drafted by a scribe from Arbroath, the question remains 
regarding the omission of any reference to successors. If Richard had not 
married by the time of the donations, and had no apparent heirs, the monks 
may not have considered the lack of reference to heirs or successors an 
issue. Alternatively, he may have died before the monks could obtain a 
confirmation charter from his heirs, who then refused to confirm post 
mortem. Although this would perhaps be unusual, as the heirs had a duty 
to protect the reasonable donations of those from whom they inherited,' ”  
their objection would be understandable if Richard had failed to provide 
adequately for his heirs before his death. It could also be a problem if 
Richard did not have clear title, although as indicated, this is less likely. 
None of these possibilities can be excluded, however, since there is no
‘The heirs o f  donors are bound to warrant to the donees and their heirs reasonable gifts 
and the things given thereby.’ Glanvi/l, 74.
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clear reference to how the claim of the heirs was made. The explanation 
for this could be any of the above reasons, but the most appealing, 
(because it fits with what Glanvill indicates was a good reason to negate a 
gift) is that the gift was made on Richard’s death-bed, and none of the 
heirs was present to acknowledge or assent to it, and they refused to do so 
later. Nor in fact, can it be ruled out that the omission by Richard of any 
reference to heirs or successors was deliberate.
The charter evidence above allows for a slightly different interpretation, at 
least for Scotland, of the premise in Stephen White’s book that the 
laudatio parentum was not a ‘legal’ rule. White suggests that ‘[T]he 
laudatio parentum can therefore be regarded as a precautionary practice 
that flourished in a conflict-ridden society where knightly strength often 
overcame monastic justice and where the moral or customary rights of a 
donor’s relatives sometimes overrode the legal title of his monastic 
donee.’' ”  He further notes that the available evidence does not provide a 
clear answer to the question of whether the laudatio parentum was 
required by law or merely procured out of prudence.”  ^White notes that 
‘[TJhere is little evidence, for example, that legal rules were routinely and 
systematically differentiated from other sorts of norms or that people 
clearly distinguished between what would now be considered legal, moral,
' Stephen White, Custom, Kinship, and Gifts to Saints: The Laudatio Parentum in 
Western France, 1050-1150  (Chapel Hill & London, 1988), 68.
“ "Ibid, 69.
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religious, or customaiy duties and rights.’” ’’ White concludes that “like 
the norms cited by poets, the rule or adage that gifts should be made with 
the laudatio articulated only a general standard of customary practice.’” ' 
At least with regard to de Frivill, the lack of any mention of or 
acknowledgement from heirs, or later confirmations led to the failure of 
the gift.
Alienation of land to the detriment of one’s heirs has been discussed 
briefly above. It dates back to the Roman period, where the rule was that 
one could not alienate the inheritance of ones heirs to their detriment.'" 
There was a similar, though not so particular customary law that one could 
not alienate one’s property to leave heirs destitute, followed generally 
throughout northern Europe. This customary rule might have required 
notification and/or consent of the heirs for any alienation to actually be 
effective. Failure to notify, and to prove notification, could provide 
grounds for recoveiy of the property by the heirs. Bracton notes that a 
gift, to be effective, must have certain elements, which generally follow 
the Roman law but with some addi t i ons . Al t hough Bracton is later than 
these charters, the requirements he discusses probably were not. This is
Ibid, 70 
Ibid, 73
122 The prohibition can be traced to the lex Falcidia  o f  40 BC, where ‘legacies were not to 
be allowed to reduce what remained to the heir below a quarter o f the value o f the net 
inheritance. If less than a quarter remained, the legacies were reduced pro rata, see Barry 
Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (London, 1962), 266; see also James Brundage, 
M edieval Canon Law (London, 1995), 87-89; W.M. Gordon, O.F. Robinson, The 
Institutes o f  Gains, II (London, 1988), 224-228.
Bracton on the Laws and Customs o f  England, Vol. II trans, Samuel E. Thorne, and 
ed. George E. Woodbine, Vol. II (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 62.
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reinforced by the fact that Bracton states, ‘the gift will be more secure’ if 
there is a charter, ‘for a gift may be proved more easily and more 
effectively by a writing and instruments than by witnesses or suit.’” '' 
Although there is not enough evidence to say that what is happening in 
this group of charters is a concrétisation of what had been a convention, 
norm or custom, into a legally enforceable rule, it does show that the 
language used in the pro anima clause may have carried more weight than 
previously thought.
There is another aspect which must be considered. Although the consent 
o f one’s superior lord seems to have been required, and may questionably 
be dated to the reign of William I,”  ^there were limitations on this, and it 
does not (at this point) appear to have extended to one’s heirs. According 
to Pollock and Maitland, the lord had a right to prevent alienations which 
would seriously impair his own interests.”  ^ Burgess points out that the 
first attempt to define this position is made by William I, in a statute 
providing:
Ibid. Although Kenneth Pennington states that Bracton is not really a Roman lawyer, 
he was trained as both a Roman and canon lawyer. It would be hard to imagine that he 
could simply divorce himself from his training to any great extent. See Kenneth 
Pennington, ‘Roman and Secular Law in the Middle A ges’, at
http://facultv.cua.edu/penning.ton/Law508/histlaw.htm. This article was also published in 
M edieval Latin: an Introduction and Bibliographical Guide, F.A.C. Man tel lo and A.G. 
Rigg (eds.), (Washington, D.C., 1996), 254-266.
Robert Burgess, Perpetuities in Scots Law (Edinburgh, 1979), 58.
Burgess, Perpetuities, 58; Pollock & Maitland, History o f  English Law, vol. I, 344.
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L Nullus liber homo potest dare, vel vendere alicui plus de terra 
sua, quam de residuo terrae posit fieri domino feudi servitum ei 
debitum; et quod pertinent ad feudum;
2. Et si qui oppositum fecerit, si vocetur forisfactum ad curiam ea 
de causa, omittet id quod tenet, nisi Domini superioris ad hoc 
habuerit benevolentiam aut confirmationem}^^
He notes that although there is a similar provision in the Magna Cartae of 
1217 and 1225, in England they had little effect and were not observed by 
the time of Bracton. In Scotland however, according to Burgess, this 
provision ‘was refined so as to prohibit alienating more than one half of 
the fief without the consent of the superior and continued in existence until 
the abolition of wardholding.’” ® This approach to alienation can be seen 
in the charters themselves, especially starting from William’s reign, where 
there are often references to excepting the king’s service in the donation 
charter itself. It does not appear to be a stretch to argue that this consent 
requirement by the superior was evident in the donation charters and 
confirmations at least as early as William I’s reign, and perhaps earlier.
But it does not answer the consent requirement for heirs and successors.
Burgess, Perpetuities, 58, referencing ‘Leg. Gul. c.3L . I cannot find this reference. It 
does not appear as chapter xxxi in The Acts o f  Parliaments o f  Scotland, Vol. I, 1124- 
1303, (1844); There are provisions discussing what a man may do with inherited property 
or that acquired by conquest, but these provisions are not the same as those quoted by 
Burgess. Burgess does acknowledge that ‘the authenticity o f  this provision as being o f  
William the Lion has been doubted, (cite omitted)’ although it is cited in some o f the late 
cases on recognition.
Ibid, 59.
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Stephen White concluded that the laudatio parentum found in so many 
donation charters was not a legal requirement to effectuate a gift to 
religious houses.”  ^ Although White’s study concerned the north and west 
of France between 1050-1150, Hyams had concluded the same about 
England. ‘To seek the assent of selected kin to one’s dispositions was thus 
often prudent, sometimes an emotional necessity, but never, in England, a 
legal requirement.’ Glanvill appears to contradict the conclusions of 
Hyams and White, at least in part. As Reynolds pointed out, obtaining the 
consent o f relatives was a preventative measure, and was indeed a prudent 
thing to have in any donation. But if, as has been shown in David I’s 
charters, there is a consistent pattern of obtaining the consent of the heir as 
to certain lands but not to others, it seems reasonable to infer that David 1 
was following the rule that the heir’s consent was necessary, at least as to 
inherited land.
There is a difference, however, between obtaining the assent and consent 
o f heirs, and making a donation for the benefit of someone’s soul. The pro 
anima clause was at once more inclusive, and less particular. One could 
make a donation for the benefit of the souls of one’s family, lord, or ruler, 
and all the ancestors and successors attached to them. But one would 
hardly make a donation for the soul of someone to whom no duty could
White, Custom, Kinship and Gifts to Saints (London, 1988).
Paul Hyams, ‘Charters and the Early Common Law’, The Journal o f  Legal History, 
12, (1991), 173-89, 183.
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possibly be owed. One might take advice from friends and relatives about 
a particular matter, but one would normally only obtain the assent and 
consent of the heirs.
The previous examples show how the charter, and in particular the 
wording of the specific charter, could be used to prevent disputes from 
arising as the result o f a donation to a religious entity. The various parts of 
the laudatio parentum each had a role to play. Whether the phrase was 
indeed necessary to protect one’s gift may have been dependent on the 
circumstances as well as the wording. While it does not look as if such a 
phrase was mandatoiy in all transactions, it may well have been so for 
those situations where someone had an interest in the property being 
alienated. Thus, for relatives in general, one’s lord, spouse or king, the 
pro anima clause could be used as a dis-incentive to making a claim after 
the death of the donor. With regard to the necessity of the assent and 
consent clause, there is a more concrete example of its necessity, at least 
as far as the royal donations of David and Malcolm’s reigns are concerned.
Wedale
One of the most striking examples of the changes in perception with 
regard to the importance of charters is the Wedale case. The details of the 
case are recorded in an entry in the Chronicle of Melrose and in a spurious
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charter datable to the mid-thirteenth century which was supposed to have 
been issued by William I. The monks of Melrose do not seem to have 
thought it necessai-y to have a charter drawn up shortly after the dispute 
was settled, although it was one in which the king took an active part, yet 
approximately one hundred years later, they fabricated a charter including 
the king’s seal.” '
This controversy was between the Abbey of Melrose and the men of 
Wedale, datable to William Fs reign. The case is recorded in both the 
Chronicle o f  Melrose and RRS, ii. The Acts o f  William /  but there are 
differences between the two accounts, mostly concerning the descriptions 
of procedure. The charter was written substantially later than the 
Chronicle entry. This raises the question of why, when there is an account 
of what transpired in the Chronicle, would a later concoction have been 
deemed necessary? Although this charter was created much later than 
the events it reflects, the account recorded in it seems to follow the 
Chronicle in many respects. There does not seem to have been an 
intention to deceive the reader of the later charter as to the occurrence of 
these events, only as to the date and authenticity of the charter itself.
Barrow, RRS, ii, no. 253, and notes. The spurious charter appears to have had a seal 
attached, but It no longer remains.
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Heidecker has pointed out that every charter may be considered a ‘forgery’ 
since it is a cultural construct.” " Later concoctions are also cultural 
constructs, but of a different context; the information such a charter 
provides may be more directly related to the time and context of its 
creation than to the culture it purports to reflect. Subsequently created 
charters provide information not only about the importance of a charter at 
the time it was created, but the differences in detail in the text of the 
charter compared to other, more contemporary written records of the 
events allow for inferences to be drawn about the relative value of such 
details.”  ^ This is clearly illustrated in the case of this dispute.” '' While 
the essence of the chronicle entry is repeated in the later charter, there are 
discrepancies, most evident in the details concerning p r o c e d u r e . W h y  
the monks fabricated the charter may never be clear, but by comparing the 
two types of documents, it is possible to discern what may have been 
significant to them at different times. Since there is a period of 
approximately 100 years between the drafting of these d o c u me n t s , wh a t  
was important to note about the procedures may well have changed. By 
the latter half of the thirteenth century, swearing on relics may not have
K. Heidecker, ‘Introduction’, in Charters and the Use o f  the Written Word, 11.
Although charters were created subsequent to the transactions they detailed, there were 
several reasons for this, such as changes in the terms of the original grant, or a lost or 
damaged charter. There were in fact charters drafted which incorporated the terms o f  
earlier agreements where no earlier agreement has survived. See the Avenel charters, 
above.
Chronicle o f  Melrose, 93; Barrow, RRS, ii, no. 253, and notes. While there are other 
subsequent fabrications, most cannot be measured against a contemporary chronicle 
entry.
See Procedure, infra.
Barrow notes, in RRS, ii, at 288, in the comments to no. 253that the writing is ‘almost 
certainly o f  the second half o f the thirteenth century’.
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been as critical as including the more ‘legalistic’ descriptions of 
perambulation, and reservation of rights by the king. Also by that time, 
having a royal charter authenticated by the king was deemed to be vital.
One of the critical factors to note when comparing the chronicle entry 
written shortly after the settlement before the king in 1184 and the later 
charter is the shift in importance of these records. The mere fact that the 
monks thought it necessary to fabricate a sealed charter a century later 
shows the perceived importance of having such a document. It was not 
just that the monks wanted a record reflecting their interests; they needed a 
royal charter authenticated by the king, in spite of any risks associated 
with such a fabrication.”  ^ The Chronicle entry is only a narrative about 
the proceedings, its focus the chain of events and the favourable outcome 
for the monks. The royal charter shifts the focus to the king himself, and 
his role. This gives the authenticated charter, however false it may be 
more weight as proof of rights in property.
There are two other possible explanations for the differences between the 
chronicle entry and the charter. There is of course, the argument that these 
are two different types of documents, and what would be perceived as 
acceptable in a chronicle entry, a more narrative text, would not always 
reflect what was deemed appropriate in a royal charter. The entry
137 As noted infra, the penalties for forgery were quite severe.
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concerning papal privileges would substantiate this conclusion, in addition 
to demonstrating bias. This is especially noteworthy since it would have 
been thirteenth century monks deciding what should have been included in 
the charter, while the chronicle entry is clearly more contemporary. While 
these were undoubtedly different types of documents, they were both 
generated by the same monastic house. Although Duncan pointed out that 
the lack of a charter may have been an indication of the lack of status of 
the men of Wedale,”  ^these men did not gain in stature over the course of 
a century. The second is the possibility that there had been an authentic 
royal charter which had been damaged or lost. While this could explain 
the dating of the charter hand, it does not address the misdated 
witnesses.”  ^ There is no indication that this actually happened. Neither 
of these points adequately accounts for the differences between the two 
records. What did change during the period between the chronicle entry 
and the creation of the royal charter was the perception of the importance 
of a sealed, authenticated royal charter as proof of the property rights 
described in the document.
In short, charters became increasingly important as legal documents and 
they must be read as such. They were issued by a person in authority, to 
one or more individuals or groups, for a specific purpose. They most often
Duncan, Scotland: The Making o f  the Kingdom  (Edinburgh, 1996), 420. ‘The fact that 
the Wedale decision was not recorded in a charter, while the de Moreville one was, 
confirms that the men o f Wedale were o f  little social consequence.’
Barrow, RRS, ii, 288-289.
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concerned rights in property of some sort. As legal documents, the 
wording used is crucial. The appearance of certain words or phrases, and 
just as importantly, when these words or phrases were absent, identifies 
the type of document, its purpose and in some cases, its effectiveness.
The use of charters in the transfer of property became more accepted and 
even necessary in the twelfth century. Although the existence of the 
charter was important, even more crucial was the wording in the charter. 
These phrases were not simply formulaic rote. Each played a role in 
securing the property transferred, and preventing future disputes.
The role of the charter in the resolution of disputes is equally informative. 
Charters were used to prove rights in land, and prevent someone else from 
asserting rights in the same land. As evidence, they became the proof of a 
property right, absence of which could negate any claim, as well as the 
primary tool for preventing and resolving disputes. As with the nature of 
charters and their wording, how they were used as evidence also evolved. 
The next chapter explores the use of charters in the resolution of disputes.
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CHAPTER VI 
EVIDENCE and PROCEDURE’
There is a debate among scholars about whether the settlement of disputes in 
the early to mid twelfth century was informal, flexible, political and oriented 
towards a compromise where all parties had some satisfaction, or whether 
such disputes were decided by legal argument and according to legal norms. " 
This divide in opinion followed the earlier conclusions that older modes of 
trial were inflexible, rigid, and strictly according to form s.  ^ Milsom’s 
conclusions concerning this issue were that legal decisions could only be 
based upon a full understanding of the facts, and these were rarely, if  ever
' The law o f procedure is normally distinguished from the law o f evidence, but will be 
discussed together here since the intellectual distinctions between the two are o f more recent 
vintage than the twelfth century. Procedure is defined as ‘the mode o f  proceeding by which a 
legal right is enforced, as distinguished from the law which gives or defines the right, and 
which, by means o f  the proceeding, the court is to administer; the machinery, as distinguished 
from its product.’ Black’s Law Dictionary, (T'’ ed.), (St. Paul, 1968), 1367-1368. Evidence 
comprises any type o f  proof, ‘legally presented.. .by the act o f the parties and through the 
medium of witnesses, records, documents, concrete objects, etc .... As a part o f procedure 
“evidence” signifies those rules o f law whereby it is determined what testimony should be 
admitted and what should be rejected in each case, and what is the weight to be given to the 
testimony admitted.’ Ibid, 656-657.
 ^John Hudson, ‘Court Cases and Legal Arguments in England, c. 1066-1166’, in 
Transactions o f  the Royal Historical Society, X, (Cambridge, 2000), 91-115. Paul Hyams, 
‘Norms and Legal Argument Before 1150’, in Law and History, Current Legal Issues 2003, 
Vol. 6, eds. Andrew Lewis and Michael Lobban, Vol. 6, (Oxford, 2004), 41-61; Stephen D. 
White, ‘ ''''Pactum.,. Le gem Vincit et Amor Judicium" The Settlement o f  Disputes by 
Compromise in Eleventh-Century Western France’, American Journal o f  Legal History, 22, 
281-308, (Philadelphia, 1978); Georges Duby, The Chivalrous Society, trans. C. Postan 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1980), especially chapter 2, ‘The evolution o f  judicial 
institutions’, 15-58; Frederic Cheyette, "'Suum Cuique Tribuere”, French Historical Studies, 
VI, (1970),287-299; S.F.C. Milsom, Studies in the History o f  the Common Taw(London, 
1985).
 ^ .lames B. Thayer, ‘The Older Modes o f  Trial’, Harvard Law Review, V, (1891), 45-70.
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adduced. With regard to legal development, ‘the limit at any time is the extent 
to which the legal process presents the facts for legal handling.”  All seem 
agreed that there were procedures followed and that these were based on long 
established customs. Some have argued that the primary goal was amicable 
settlement, either by arbitration or compromise, although war was also an 
option.^ The ordeal in property disputes was also a possibility, although there 
is evidence that it was offered as a negotiating tool to achieve compromise 
rather than in earnest.^ The nub of the argument is expressed most clearly by 
Hyams and Hudson. Hudson takes the position that there were legal norms 
and legal argument and they were important during the century after the 
Conquest.^ Hyams asserts his ‘inclination to minimize the prevalence of a 
clear distinction between legal norms...and other more general imperatives.”  
The real problem, unstated by Milsom, Hyams and Hudson, is that from a 
modern perspective, it is the records themselves that are lacking, not the 
normative value of the decisions made or the facts upon which these decisions 
were based.
S.F.C Milsom, ‘Law and Fact in Legal Development’, in Studies in the H istory o f  the 
Common Law, 171-189, 171.
 ^ Cheyette, "'Siium Cuique Tribuere”, 291.
 ^Stephen D. White, ‘Proposing the Ordeal and Avoiding it: Strategy and Power in Western 
French Litigation, 1050-1110, in Cultures o f  Power, Lordship, Status, and Process in 
Twelfth-Century Europe, ed. Thomas N. Bisson, (Philadelphia, 1995), 89-123. See also, Jane 
Martindale, ‘Between law and politics: the judicial duel under the Angevin kings (mid-twelfth 
century to 1204), in Law, Laity and Solidarities: Essays in Honour o f  Susan Reynolds, eds. 
Pauline Stafford, et al. (Manchester, 2001), 116-149.
’ Hudson, ‘Court Cases and Legal Arguments, c. 1066-I I 66.
® Hyams, ‘Norms and Legal Argument Before 1150’, I
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Putting aside the relative dearth of charter and chronicle evidence in Scotland 
for this period, an examination of the records that do exist shows that the 
evidence could be read to support either side. There were customary 
procedures that did not rise to the level of the forms of action or the 
systematized approach of the later common law. But the records do show a 
rational and pragmatic handling of these disputes, which appears to have been 
informed by facts and legal norms that may be discerned from an analysis of 
the texts. A central point to keep in mind in reading these records is the 
evolution in how disputes were recorded, and how this changed not only the 
procedures themselves, but how they were perceived.
The evidence for customary procedures for the presentation and preservation 
of a claim with regard to property rights, or the settling of a dispute regarding 
such a claim in Scotland may be datable from the early twelfth century, 
mostly due to the lack of written records before then. The more formal writs 
of procedure modeled after those in England appear in Scotland from about 
1230.^ But there were inquests’ hearings and perambulations throughout the 
twelfth century which were conducted according to certain procedures or 
customary norms in order to prevent and settle disputes. These are recorded
 ^ Ian Douglas Willock, The Origins and Development o f  the Jury in Scotland, (Edinburgh, 
1996), 31. Chapter V discusses early civil procedure in Scotland, but focuses on the 
thirteenth century. For more in depth and detailed discussions see Hector MacQueen, 
Common Lcnv and Feudal Society in M edieval Scotland, (Edinburgh, 1993).
F, Pollock and F.W. Maitland, The History o f  English Law, Vol. I, (Union, NJ, 1996), 144, 
and fn 3. The authors note that from David 1 onward, Scottish kings used the inquest, and 
conclude that ‘On the whole we take it that the jury has much the same history in Scotland 
and in England; it spreads outward from the king; it is an ‘assize’, an institution established 
by ordinance.’ Since the records for most inquests are in the form o f noticiae, they will not 
be covered here.
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in the noticia and charters, and a few are also found in the chronicles. Many 
of the cases reflected in these documents involved judices and were 
communal affairs.’ ' Accounts detailing customary practices appear much 
earlier both on the continent and in Anglo-Saxon England.’  ^ Records from 
throughout medieval Europe show that these procedural norms followed in 
the prevention and resolution of disputes were similar, and became more 
regularized as they were written down.’  ^ This standardization of practice was
” The Judex has been discussed elsewhere, and will not be covered in this chapter, nor the 
origins o f the jury. There is some disagreement regarding how ‘communal’ these matters 
were. See Willock, The Origins and Development o f  the Jury in Scotland, (Edinburgh, 1966), 
5. He makes it clear that the ‘jury’ in the modern sense can be traced to the thirteenth 
century. Compare the cases involving Kirkness, which was indeed a communal affair.
Rosamund McKitterick, The Carolingians and the Written Word, (Cambridge, 1989), 23- 
75, where she points out that there was ‘resort to written means in a wide variety o f  cases, 
[which] is reinforced by the surviving examples o f Merovingian p la c ita \  at 25; Michael 
Cianchy, From Memory to Written Word, (Oxford, 1993), generally, and specifically 272- 
278; Ann Williams, Kingship and Government in Pre-Conquest England, c. 500-1066  
(London, 1999), 88-89, chapter 9, where she notes that the king’s officials used written orders 
in the administration o f  government, at p. 108, and procedures in the shire courts are 
described in the ‘vernacular notifications o f  the late tenth and early eleventh centuries’; these 
notifications were used for a variety o f purposes including lawsuits. Documents were used in 
lawsuits to record the events o f  the hearing and outcome; in addition, written declarations 
were also used during a hearing and seem to have been witness statements. Williams does 
not find clear evidence that the proceedings began with a written pleading, however; see p.
110-115, especially 113. Patrick Wormald, Legal Culture in the Early M edieval West, 
(London, 1999); Wendy Davies and Paul Fouracre (eds.), The Settlement o f  Disputes in Early 
M edieval Europe (Cambridge, 1986).
A comparison o f the records themselves shows such similarities, and that these similarities 
were customary in many parts o f  Europe. Many o f the custumals produced from the end o f  
the twelfth century through the fourteenth show great similarity in procedures. See, for 
example, the procedure for summoning someone to court: ‘Those who are going to deliver a 
summons can make their summons wherever they find the person, and if they do not find him 
by chance they should go and deliver the summons to his residence where he resides,’ in 
Philippe de Beaumanoir, The Coutumes de Beauvaisis ofPhillippe de Beaumanoir, F.R.P. 
Akehurst, (trans.) (Philadelphia, 1992), Chapter 2, para. 69, 36; ‘Again, in all the 
aforementioned pleas which are pleaded by wrang and unlaw with respect to moveable 
property, the summons should be made at the dwellings o f  those who are impleaded -[that is,] 
where they have their residences- and in no other place,’ in Quoniam Attachiamenta, T.David 
Fergus (Edinburgh, 1996), chapter 2, 120-121; ‘And if any such offender fled and could not 
be found, the baron should have him summoned in the place where he was from (according to 
written law in the Code, De faro  competenti, 1. Juris ordinem and in the Decretals De dolo et 
contumacia, capitulo Causam quae where this matter is discussed), and in the church o f the 
parish where he lived ...’ in. The Etablissements de Saint Lotus, Thirteenth-Century Law 
Texts from  Tours, Orléans, and Paris, trans. F.R.P. Akehurst (Philadelphia, 1996), Book I,
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greatly impacted not only by the use of written records to preserve an account 
of the proceedings, but also to affect the outcome of the disputed matters.
Use o f documents in the proving of a claim was not unheard of before David 
I, although evidence for this is outwith Scotland. Most often though, 
procedures for the presenting of evidence in proving a claim had been oral 
rather than written. The twelfth century saw marked changes in the way 
proofs were presented and how proceedings were recorded. Van Caenegem 
has focused attention on the changes in the rules of procedure and shift from 
‘customs’ to more formal legal rules in his article on procedure.’"’ As he 
points out, there were essential characteristics common to all of Europe.
Some of the customs or norms were incorporated with the more formal rules 
adopted from Roman and Canon law. These ‘rules of procedure were no 
more left to develop unattended and unconsciously, but became the subject of 
systematic attention and study on the part of scholars and judges: custom 
turned into reasoned law.’’^
The question remains however, whether the Scottish records indicate to what
extent these customs and changes in practice were followed in Scotland. Do
the charters reflect a decision making process of applying a norm, rule or law
28, p. 23. These rules seem to assume a written procedure for summoning, in keeping with 
the rule established by Henry II that ‘no one is bound to answer for any freehold o f  his in his 
lord’s court without a royal writ.’ Nevertheless, oral summoning continued until much later. 
Cianchy, From Memory to Written Record, 273.
''’R.C. Van Caenegem, ‘The Developed Procedure o f the Second Middle Ages, XII-XV, in 
International Encyclopaedia o f  Comparative Law, XVI (Civil Procedure), ed. M. Cappelletti 
(Tübingen, 1984), 11-53.
Ibid, 11. But see Hyams, ‘Trial by Ordeal’, where he notes that legal proeess is mostly 
oral, and thus, each new case considers custom in light o f the current situation, which of  
course leads to modification.
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to a set o f facts by a decision maker? How were these norms applied, what 
type of evidence was allowed and how was it judged?’*"
There are only a few cases where procedures in the decision making process 
are discussed, and even fewer where elements of what was considered as 
evidence are noted. These few cases are important precisely because, aside 
from the survival factor, those making the decisions behind these documents 
thought the procedural and evidentiary aspects were important enough to be 
recorded. The cases discussed below show that while there were norms or 
customs regarding the presentation of evidence during this period, they were 
mutable, inconsistent, and the importance of specific procedures often varied 
depending upon who was recording and preserving them. Two of the cases 
are from the first half of the century, before and during the reign of David I. 
The latter two are from William f  s reign. There are none from Malcolm’s 
reign discussed in detail. As Barrow has noted, ‘[N]ot a single document 
relating to Scotland survives from his [Malcolm’s] reign that can be called an 
official record of a lawsuit or of a trial terminated in the king’s court.’ 
Although there is evidence of sheriffs courts and administration, there is a 
dearth of evidence in the charters of Malcolm IV concerning actual disputes, 
and none that highlights the importance of charters in the resolution of 
disputes as well as the four cases discussed here.
Warren Brown, ‘The Use o f Norms in Disputes in Early Medieval Bavaria’, Viator, 30 (Los 
Angeles, 1999), 15-40, 16: ‘Norms’ have been defined as ‘rules that purport to govern 
behaviour-embody authority’. See also, Simon Roberts, Order and Dispute: An Introduction 
to Legal Anthropology, (London, 1979).
Barrow, The Acts o f  Malcolm IV, 49.
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Charters were also used to ensure compliance with a negotiated settlement or 
agreement, however unwilling the parties were to come to an accord. The 
Wedale case especially, demonstrates how important a charter detailing an 
agreement had become by the thirteenth century. Forging a royal document 
was no light matter, even if it did represent the events more or less 
accurately.’  ^ Finally, the charters discussed in these cases also demonstrate 
that the impact o f writing and of written records may be viewed as a gradual 
process, not a consistently progressive one, but having a permanent effect on 
the way disputes were prevented and resolved.
THE CASES
The land known as Swinton'^ had been the subject of disputes through 
several reigns. One of the earliest records concerning it issued from King 
Alexander 1, who sent a brieve to the prior of Durham, telling him to do 
nothing about the land of Swinton (over which there had been a dispute) until 
the king arrived. The charter is the earliest extant brieve, and contained a 
personal message from Alexander to the prior, about ‘many secret things’ that 
Alexander wished to discuss with the prior."” This land had been granted to
Pollock & Maitland, History o f  English Law, Vol. 11, 504, 540,
Both Swinton and Horndean disputes show elements o f jurisdictional sharing and possible 
friction between Alexander I and Earl David.
A. C. Lawrle, Early Scottish Charters Prior to A.D. 1153, (Glasgow, 1905), 22.
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Durham by King Edgar; the grant was confirmed by Earl David after Edgar’s 
death and before he became king.^’
There are three documents from David 1 concerning Swinton. While the first 
two (more properly writ-charter notifications) vary in wording to some extent, 
their reference to prior written records and to physical acts of donation and 
confirmation indicate that David relied heavily at times,^^ but not uniformly, 
on charters as a basis for his decisions very early in his reign. In the records 
concerning Swinton, he referenced his brother Edgar’s charter to the monks of 
Durham in his confirmation of the g r a n t , a n d  to the same charter in a letter 
to ‘John, bishop (of Glasgow) and the brothers Cospatric, Colban and Robert, 
and all his faithful drengs of Lothian and Teviotdale.’"'’ The third document 
referring to this land looks like an original grant; there is no reference to 
written documents, nor to prior gifts, although it appears that some of the 
lands mentioned had been previously granted. Barrow commented that the
DCD. M.C. 762, G.W.S. Barrow, The Charters o f  King D avid I, (Woodbridge, 1999), no.9.
G.W.S. Barrow, The Charters o f D avid I, nos 9, 10, 11. These charters are in fact pre- 
1124, and are the first in Barrow’s edition to refer to prior charters. This appears to be related 
to the way these prior documents were used in the process rather than straightforward 
confirmations. The fact that other charters do not refer to earlier documents however, cannot 
be taken to mean that there were no prior charters for a particular grant. See no. 12, the 
confirmation by David o f Thor the Long’s gift, where a prior charter has survived, but was 
not mentioned in David’s confirmation.
Ibid. This is, o f  course, another example o f the ‘self-referencing’ which serves to validate 
the current actions by incorporating past acts and past documents.
Ibid, no. 10. This address implies that these were officials presiding over the shire court. 
See Richard Sharpe, ‘The Use o f Writs in the Eleventh Century, A hypothesis based on the 
archive o f Bury St. Anglo-Saxon England 32 (2003), pp. 247-91, 247. There is a
Cospatricio vicecomite listed as a witness in The Charters o f  D avid I , no. 14, datable to 
1114x1124. Barrow notes that it is probably 1120x1121 or 1123x1124. While there is no 
firm proof that this is the same Cospatric, the time frame places those addressed in charter 
nos. 10,11 and the witness in 14 in the same area during the same time period. See also, 
Norman H. Reid and G.W.S. Barrow, The Sheriffs o f  Scotland, An Interim List to c. 1306, (St. 
Andrews, 2002), 37.
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language and the witnesses leave the authenticity of the charter in some doubt, 
but he also noted that there were ‘authentic seals of David I ‘attached’ to the 
charter. One factor is the difference in the dating of the charters. The first 
two are datable to after David I’s marriage to Maud de Senlis,^” and appear to 
be in the nature of notifications of prior acts by David while he was still an 
Earl. The last is datable to shortly after he became king, and is in the form of 
a new royal grant.
During the same time period, another notice was issued in David’s name 
addressed to Bishop John of Glasgow, and to Colban and Cospatric,^^ In this 
document, Earl David reminded them that a judgement had been rendered 
before him {iudicatum fu it ante meŸ^ concerning Horndean. This land had 
been the subject of a dispute between the monks of St. Cuthbert and David’s 
drengs of this same land. The charter stated that if the monks had either 
lawful witnesses, {legales testes) or the charter {breve) of his brother (Edgar), 
the land shall remain with the monks. David I could have been answering a 
procedural inquiry as to what evidence was required in order to prove a claim.
Ibid, nos 31, 32, and comment. There were two versions o f  the same grant.
Ibid., nos 10, 11. No. 10 is datable to ‘ 1 114x1118, probably 1116x1118’; no. 11 is 
probably also 1116x1118. Barrow notes that the hand o f these three charters is the same, a 
Durham scribe, who is probably the same as the one for nos 31,32, and earlier charters, 
although his identity is unknown. See Barrow, The Charters o f  Da\ud I, 25, and comments to 
nos 9, 10, 1 1 ,3 1 ,3 2 .
Ibid, nos 31, 32. If the effectiveness o f a donation charter expired when the donor died, it 
may also have expired when the donor became king even though he would still have held the 
Honour o f Huntingdon. It may also be an example o f the monks being overly careful o f their 
records.
^^G.W.S. Barrow, (ed.). The Charters o f  D avid I, (Woodbridge, 1999), no. 11. In the 
introduction, Barrow indicates that the bishop is perhaps a justiciar and the other two local 
officers. His conclusion is that this brieve commanded them to enforce the judgement o f the 
court, at 10.
Ibid. Barrow translates this phrase as ‘judgement has been made before him’.
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More likely, the monks had presented some evidence, either witnesses or a 
written charter, and those sitting in the local sheriffs court, Bishop John, 
Colban and Cospatric, had refused to accept it as valid proof.
His response included information about his own review of the charters: ^Et 
ideo volo sciatis quod ego ipse vidi breve et donum fratris mei Eadgari Regis 
quod ad vos etiam misi, et quicquid illud breve eis testatur... Not only had 
David I reviewed both the gift and the charter and found them acceptable 
proof, but he was ordering his officials to accept the charter or witnesses as 
w ell?’ This is one of the clearest and earliest statements of accepted ‘rules of 
evidence’ or procedure in any of the twelfth century Scottish charters.
Circa 1170, the monks of Melrose became involved in a long running dispute 
with Richard de Moreville, constable of the king, which continued for
G.W.S. Barrow, The Charters o f D avid  /, no. 11. While this charter is not conclusive 
proof that David could actually read the charter, it lends credence to that assumption. Duncan 
seems to have also interpreted this chartei" as showing that David actually read the charter of 
his brother. See A. A.M. Duncan, Kingship o f  the Scots, 62. This language supports the idea 
that David presided over the proceedings, and even determined what evidence was 
acceptable, which would indicate a division between decisions regarding the facts and 
procedures to be followed.
' Barrow, The Charters o f  D avid I, no. 11. It is unclear whether this means that David 
actually viewed the land itself, or if  he simply read the charter and was acknowledging the 
gift set forth in that charter. There is no indication o f  where the charter was issued, which 
could have supported the inference that he did, in fact, view the land. Barrow interprets this 
language in a slightly different manner. He states that ‘King Edgar’s deed o f  giving and the 
breve or brief charter by which his deed was announced to all his lieges throughout his 
realm...was apparently one and the same thing.’ See Barrow, ‘The Scots Charter’, in Studies 
in M edieval History presented to R.H.C. Davis, eds. Henry Mayr-Harting and R.l. Moore 
(London, 1985), 149-164, 153.
Referring to a ‘rule o f evidence’ at this stage is anachronistic, since such rules appear later, 
in the thirteenth century; but it seems the best term for what is happening in this charter. 
Norms followed may have been more like rituals that objective rules. See generally, Hyams, 
‘Trial by Ordeal’ and Rancor and Reconciliation in M edieval England.
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approximately ten years?^ It was finally deeided in the presence of the King 
and his brother Earl David and 'coram aliis tam ecclesiasticis quam 
secularibus personis innumerisf^^ In this famous dispute, both parties 
claimed rights in the area of Threepwood, between the Gala and Leader 
waters. This case highlights the shift in land use during the twelfth century, 
from primarily a combination of forest and pasture used for hunting and 
grazing, to more tillage and plowed fields.^^ As more grants issued from the 
kings over the course of the century, this shift became the basis for disputes 
between the new or recent grantees, most often the religious houses, and the 
more established land us e r s . Al t hough  the earlier grant charters to the de 
Morevilles no longer survive, there are several documents concerning this 
dispute.
This is not the first charter dealing with ascertaining the boundaries o f  the lands o f Melrose. 
Among others, there is also a charter in the Dryburgh cartulary, no. 113, between Melrose 
Abbey and Dryburgh Abbey, concerning the metes o f Kedslie and Colmslie, datable to 
c .l 160. This date is listed in the ‘Tabula’ o f the Dryburgh Cartulary, although Cooper dates 
the charter to c. 1170. Cooper, in his article on Melrose Abbey versus the Earl o f Dunbar, 
asserts that this charter was confirmed ‘by the Bishop o f Glasgow, within whose diocese the 
property lay’, but the only confirmations 1 have found are general confirmations by the 
Bishop o f  St. Andrews, Dryburgh Cartulary, nos. 235, 236, 237. There are also grants 
concerning the land o f  Kedslie and Colmslie from Walter son o f Alan (no. 112), and Earl 
Patrick o f  Dunbar and his heir (nos. 114, 115). I do not find a confirmation o f the agreement 
between Melrose and Dryburgh by either King Malcolm IV or William I, although there is a 
general confirmation o f  the property and privileges o f Dryburgh Abbey by King William, 
datable to c. 1165x171 which refers to Jandam totam que vocatur C addisleya \ but does not 
mention the agreement with Melrose, see Barrow, RRS, U, The Acts o f  William I, no. 65.
Chronicle o f  Melrose, 90.
M cNeill and MacQueen, Atlas o f  Scottish History to 1707, 455. The map sets out several 
locations mentioned in the charters reflecting a number o f disputes Melrose had with its 
neighbours. Most, but certainly not all, o f  those with whom they had disputes seem to have 
been concentrated in the eastern part, along the Leader. There were several landholders 
whose properties bordered the Leader, including the de Morevilles to the north, the Stewarts 
and the Earls o f Dunbar; see map on p. 412, and Melrose Liber, nos. 93-112.
Lord Cooper o f Culross, Selected Papers, (Edinburgh, 1957), 81.
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There are three sources for information on this dispute: a charter from Richard 
de Moreville?^ a chirograph?^ and an entry in the Chronicle o f  Melrose, The 
chirograph is in the king’s name, in the first person. It related that the king 
himself perambulated the area with his honourable men when the dispute was 
finally resolved in 1180. By the chirograph, Richard and his heirs quitclaimed 
any right they had to the wood and pasture between the Gala and Leader. In 
exchange for the quitclaim, the monks gave them 1 GO merks of silver. The 
charter of Richard de Moreville however, does not indicate any reference to a 
quitclaim, nor does it mention the 100 merks, although the chirograph does.^^ 
These charters are confirmed in the king’s full court and in his presence. The 
Bishop of Glasgow and David, brother of the king are also present and set 
their seals to the chirograph as well."’”
There is an entiy in the Chronicle o f  Melrose for the year 1180, which 
indicated that this controversy had been settled in the presence of King 
William and his brother, Earl David and many other persons. Compared to 
other entries, this one does not give many details about the procedures 
followed. The entry refers to 'coinitis David fratris siiV which means the 
entry itself may have been made after March 1185."” There is also the phrase
Melrose Liber, no. 110.
Melrose Liber, no. I l l ;  Barrow, RRS, H, The Acts o f  William I, no. 236.
Melrose Liber, no. 110 (Richard de Moreville’s charter) and no. I l l  (Chirograph).
Ibid, no.l 11. Also, Barrow, RRS, ii. The Acts o f  William I, no. 236. The importance of 
seals and the language concerning them in the text seems to have been for enforcement as 
well as authentication.
This is when David became Earl o f Huntingdon, but since he already held the Earldom o f  
Lennox, it is possible that he was called earl in 1180, although most often he Is referred to as 
‘David, brother o f the king.’ See also, A. A.M. Duncan, ‘Sources and uses o f  the Chronicle o f
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'et Dei adjutorio respondebat monahcis justitia sua in hac parte, ita videlicet 
quod, chartarum suarum merito et privilegiourum Romane ecclesie 
auctoritatie, ipsis adjudicata estpossessio!^~ This phrase is not reflected in 
King William’s charter, or in Richard de Moreville’s, nor are there any 
references to Rome in these lay charters.
The next dispute involving the monks of Melrose occurred c. 1184, between 
the Abbey and the men of Wedale (Stow), located on the northwestern edge 
of the area most fought over by the monks and the various other 
landholders."’^  It was again over boundaries, forestland and pasture rights. As 
with de Moreville, the dispute was decided in the presence of the king, his 
brother and several earls and barons. The Chronicle o f  Melrose indicated that 
the judgement was made at Crosslee by Richard de Moreville constable of the 
king and twelve faithful men, who swore over relics of the church with fear 
and trembling regarding the boundaries of the lands belonging to Melrose."’"’ 
There is also a charter, included in The Acts o f  William /, which Barrow 
concluded is spurious since the witnesses do not fit the time frame."’^  The 
charter contains specific language regarding a perambulation while the 
chronicle entry does not have such language. Both, however, do state that the
Melrose, 1165-1297% in Kings, clerics and chronicles in Scotland, 500-J297, ed. Simon 
Taylor, (Dublin, 2000), 146-185, 147.
Chronicle o f  Melrose, 90. For comparison, see the entry for the controversy with the men 
o f Wedale, discussed at 180-185.
The Wedale charter was discussed in the previous chapter.
Ibid, 93. This again shows procedural elements o f the ‘jury’. Compare the judex  cases, 
infra.
Barrow, The Acts o f  William I, no. 253, and notes.
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judgement was made by Richard de Moreville and twelve faithful men, 
agreeing on some key elements of procedure. Even though the charter is not, 
and aceording to Barrow, eannot be authentic, he states that there is no reason 
to doubt that such an event took place on the date indicated, as it is described 
in the Chronicle o f  M e l r o s e . It is noteworthy that this entry in the Chronicle 
o f  Melrose also includes reference to 'iUj. sive v. Romanorum pontificum 
privelegia, firmiter confirmata, et irrefragabiliter solidata.
There are other differences between the chronicle entry and the charters for 
both these cases. With regard to the de Moreville case, the chronicle entiy is 
brief and to the point. The chronicle entry for Wedale is more detailed. For 
Wedale, the entry in the Chronicle included information about where the 
dispute was decided."’^  This information is not included in the charter. The 
entry in the Chronicle o f  Melrose included the same reference to papal 
confirmation noted a b o v e . T h e  spurious royal charter lacks any such 
reference. The charter also has much more detail about the terms of the 
judgement in question, including the mandatory language common in 
William’s charters, as well as his reservation of hunting rights for himself and 
his heirs.^”
Ibid.46
Chronicle o f  Melrose, 93.
Barrow, The Acts o f  William I, 288-289. While I have found no proof that this is where 
they actually met, there is a hill at Crosslee Rig just to the north o f Crosslee, where there 
would have been space to have a moot which had included so many people.
Ibid, The comment implies that the one writing it was inferring backwards from his own 
present. Because it would have taken some time for a papal confirmation to be returned, the 
Chronicle entry must have been somewhat later than the events it records.
Chronicle o f  Melrose, 93.
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The four cases taken together show the evolution in the importance of 
charters, from administrative brieves and writ charters directing the 
proceedings both during and after a hearing, to documenting the outcome, and 
preservation of the charter as evidence of title, even if forged. Because of the 
difference chronologically as well as the distinctive features of the cases 
themselves, these four studies can be divided into two groups, and will be 
discussed as such.
THE DISPUTING PROCESS
Swinton and Horndean are similar in the way charters are used, both 
administratively and with regard to the charter as proof during a dispute 
hearing. Barrow has detailed the different types of brieves, but has not 
discussed the charter as evidence.^’ Swinton incorporates distinctions made 
between the type of charter used for administration and the more formulaic 
grant charter. The first two records concerning Swinton from Earl David are 
of the mixed style variety. Within each of these documents there are 
references to prior acts o f donation by Edgar, to his charters which bear 
witness to Edgar’s gift, and enforcement provisions. The enforcement 
language is in the nature of an indirect prohibition in no. 9, and a direct 
prohibition in no. 10. The difference is most probably related to the ones to
Barrow, The Charters o f  King D avid I , Introduction, 9-11.
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whom these two charters are addressed. The first, to Prior Algar, indicated 
David’s willingness to enforce the grant and protect the prior and his monks 
o f Durham concerning the gift. The second, addressed to John, bishop of 
Glasgow and three brothers who were prominent in the area is essentially an 
order to enforce the grant and protect the monks in their possession of the 
property.^^ Both Hudson and Barrow have noted a wide variety in the address 
and language o f charters; Barrow does not attribute to the royal scribes the 
intent to distinguish between the various formulae used in the charters, 
especially early on in the twelfth century. Yet these early documents were 
directed to speeifie individuals eommunicating essentially the same 
information, but using language sufficiently different that it is clear there was 
purpose in the choice of w o r d s . T h e  distinction in verb forms seems most 
marked in the use of dare, in grant charters and clauses, and concedere in 
confirmations.^"’ Mortimer dates this to the later eleventh century in Anglo- 
Norman charters; the distinction is evident in the eonfirmation charters of
”  See J.G.H. Hudson, ‘Diplomatic and Legal Aspects o f the Charters’, in The Earldom o f  
Chester and Its Charters, A Tribute to Geoffrey Barraclough, ed. A.T. Thacker (Chester, 
1991), 156. This was not uncommon. Hudson notes that a wide variety o f addressees in 
English charters, ranging from those who were involved in a dispute or transaction to officials 
for the purpose o f  conveying orders, or as notification to men o f the locality. See also, 
Richard Mortimer, ‘Anglo-Norman Lay Charters, 1066-c.l 100, A Diplomatic Approach’, in 
Anglo-Norman Studies XXV, ed. John Gillingham, (Basingstoke, 2003), 153-175, 160. He 
notes that many eleventh century charters did not have an address clause: ‘whole types o f  
document omit any mention o f  their audience.’ Mortimer, like Barrow, comments on the 
variety shown in the verb forms.
Ibid, and Barrow, ‘The Scots Charter’, 156-157. Barrow’s point is well taken in that there 
is a multitude o f  verbal formulae used, but behind the variety was a particular purpose for 
each charter. Mortimer, like Barrow, comments on the variety shown in the verb forms.
Mortimer, ‘Anglo-Norman Law Charters’, 164. He states that ‘there seems during the later 
eleventh century to be a slide towards a distinction between grant and confirmation, expressed 
in the use o f  the verbs dare and concedere.'
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David I shortly after his marriage to Maud de Senlis?^ Although the two 
verbs are used together in some donation charters, this does not seem to be the 
case when David was confirming prior grants of his wife or grants that had 
been made before he became Earl of Huntingdon.
Distinctions were important in the Horndean case as well: a writ-order, even 
with language confirming a grant to one of the parties appears to have been 
insufficient to prove rights in property, though they do reflect those rights for 
the religious.^*" While the Swinton charters make reference to the breve of 
Edgar as support for the actions taken by the Earl, in Horndean these 
documents become not just ‘witnesses’ to the gift, but proof of it.^  ^ The 
monks had to provide either the grant charter itself or oral witnesses to show 
title.^^ A possible explanation for this is that the notifications were not in the 
form of a grant charter, and thus were not written proof of title. Notifications 
or noticiae do not seem to have been used to prove title in a disputed matter.
Barrow, Charters o f  D avid  /, confirmations using concessisse only, nos. 1, 2 ,4 ,7 , 13; 
dedisse and concessisse, no.6, 9,12. The pattern continues after he becomes king.
Ibid, 154. These charters might be considered ‘mixed-style’ documents as discussed by 
Hudson.
G.W.S. Barrow, ‘The Scots Charter’, in Studies in M edieval History presented to R.H.C. 
Davis, eds. Henry Mayr-Harting and R.l. Moore, (London, 1985), 149-164, 153. Barrow’s 
interpretation in no way detracts from the point being made here. Whether the charter is seen 
as the gift itself, or merely proof o f  it, the equation with oral witnesses remains significant for 
purposes o f  evidence in a hearing.
Tabuteau, in Transfers o f  Property, also comments on the use o f  charters ‘as a reservoir o f  
memory o f  alienation’ whieh eould be used in disputes, ‘in addition to or instead o f  
witnesses.’ She refers to several cases where charters were presented as proof and another 
where the absence o f a charter was important, 213. This practice, o f using both witnesses and 
charter evidence was in use during the period immediately after the eonquest as well. See 
English Lawsuits from  William I to Richard I, Vol. 1, ed. Van Caenegem, 49; in a royal 
charter from the conqueror, it was noted that the abbot could prove that he was entitled to 
certain customs by witnesses and charters.
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whereas grant charters were. There were mixed-use charters for quite some 
time after this, however. Richard Sharpe has a related explanation for 
apparently ‘fresh’ grants of the same property to the same party or parties.
His hypothesis is that the writ-charter ‘was not a privilege that bore perpetual 
witness to a transaction. It was in its nature a communication in writing to the 
shire court, and the privileges to which it referred were not grants o f property 
but of prerogative rights alienated, on a temporary basis, by the king.’^^  This 
may explain why, even though the writ-notifications reflect grants of property 
rights, the monks sought writ-charters with more formulaic grant language 
and royal confirmation charters.
POST-DISPUTE
An analysis of Moreville and Wedale must focus more on the importance of 
the written word after a dispute was settled or resolved. The ‘great 
controversy’ between Richard de Moreville and the ever acquisitive abbey of 
Melrose is a good example of the ways in which charters were used to prove 
something during the decision making process, and also to enforce the
Richard Sharpe, ‘The Use o f Writs in the Eleventh Century, A hypothesis based on the 
archive o f Bury St. Edmunds’, Anglo-Saxon England 32 (2003), 247-91, at 247. There are 
still questions however. The writ-charter notification is often the only record o f a particular 
alienation or donation from the king. The records for most o f the monastic houses in 
Scotland are not as complete as the arehive at Bury St. Edmunds. Even so, one would expect 
that there would be more extant grant chatters as records o f a particular donation rather than 
just the notifications, unless o f course, one accepts the idea that especially early in the twelfth 
century, having a grant charter or confirmation charter was still a relatively ‘new’ innovation 
that was not yet deemed necessary. 1 am not sure this is the case, and lean toward the idea 
that archival practice may be the real culprit in the lack o f grant charters following a writ- 
charter notification.
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results?” The Wedale controversy highlights the increasing importance of 
having a charter, even if forged, to prove rights. For both of these disputes, 
the Chronicle and the charters indicate an emphasis on the written word not 
seen in earlier disputes, although a comparable approach was taken by 
Melrose in the Avenel charters, used to prevent future discord.
The number and variety of charters concerning the de Morevillle dispute and 
its resolution show that not only was it a great controversy, but that the monks 
had serious questions as to whether Richard de Moreville would abide by the 
settlement. These documents are more than just a plethora of settlement 
agreements. The chirograph runs in the king’s name, and is counter sealed by 
the king, his brother Earl David and the Bishop of Glasgow, as well as the 
feuding parties. Both sides would have received a copy, and the language 
indicates prohibitions against both sides, and penalties and procedures to be 
followed should there be an infraction of the terms of the agreement. In 
addition to this extensive and detailed document, Richard de Moreville also 
gave the monks a quitclaim. The separate charter of de Moreville reads like a 
regular grant and confirmation, with the phrase, 'dedi et concessV operating 
as the primary verbs. But when put in context with the chirograph, it is clear 
this was more than a simple donation for the benefit of his soul. He received 
money in return, which fits well with Cheyette’s view of settlement 
procedures. The procedures followed, including the participation of the king.
Melrose Liber, no. 110 (Richard de Moreville’s charter) and no. 111 (Chirograph).
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the language in the chirograph pointing to enforcement and penalties for 
infractions, and the explicit nature of these terms, show that this was not 
really an amicable settlement, nor was it one where the parties went away 
happy, although neither were ‘empty-handed’.
Charters had been and would become vital in the proof of rights in property 
because of their inherent nature as a record of prior transactions. In this, they 
differed not only from narrative accounts that were in the forms of noticiae 
but also from the chronicle accounts. Each type of record describes the 
proceedings differently. One of the most striking aspects of the descriptions 
in the chronicles is their similarity to the procedures described by Brice, the 
king’s judex  several decades la t e r .Al though  there is no mention of a judex, 
many o f the same procedures are followed as described by Brice. It is possible 
but less likely that Richard de Moreville, as constable, may have been 
performing the judex  duties described by Brice somewhat later. Both the case 
described by Brice and the dispute between Melrose and Wedale involved a 
jury who swore on relics, and was led by someone in addition to the twelve 
juratores. The precise nature of the role assumed by de Moreville in this 
dispute remains unclear. As constable, his role should have been primarily 
military.^" There do not seem to be any explicit cases where the constable is 
described in the charters as performing duties normally ascribed to a sheriff or 
judex, although there are cases where Richard de Moreville is listed as taking
See discussion o f the ju dex  cases elsewhere.
Richard Oram, The Lordship o f  Galloway (Edinburgh, 2000), 155.
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part in perambulations along with other men of William I’s nearest 
associates?^
There is also the possibility that there was no judex. This dispute was in 
Roxburghshire, an area to which the Norman institutions of sheriff and justice 
had come very early, and where there do not seem to be many references to a 
judex, as such, in the twelfth century. Hector MacQueen, in discussing the 
dispute between the men of Wedale and Melrose, points out that this is a jury 
composed o f ‘Richard de Moreville and twelve other faithful men.’^ "’ 
Although he noted that it is in William Ts reign that ‘we first see the jury in 
regular use, acting as witnesses to the truth of a disputed ma t t e r , be ca use  of 
the striking similarities between this account and the q?lû\qï judex  cases, it 
would seem that the jury or something very similar, as a body of sworn 
witnesses, had been in use since at least David’s reign,
PROCEDURES and EVIDENCE
The standard methods of proof in the secular courts may have been by ordeal, 
battle, and compurgation,^” but there is little evidence of this in the Scottish
See The Acts o f  William I, nos. 130, 215, where Richard de Moreville is required by 
William I to recite the boundaries perambulated during Malcolm IV’s reign.
MacQueen, Common Law, 48.
Ibid.
^^Charles Donahue, Jr, ‘Proof by Witnesses in the Church Courts’, in On The Laws and  
Customs o f  England: Essays in Honor ofS.E. Thorne, eds. M.S. Arnold, et al. (Chapel Hill, 
1981), 127-158, 128. These ‘irrational’ modes o f  trial and proof have been discussed 
elsewhere. See .lane Martindale, ‘Between law and politics: the judicial duel under the 
Angevin kings (mid-twelfth century to 1204), in Pauline Stafford, Janet L. Nelson and Jane
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charters of the twelfth century. There is virtually no reference to these 
‘irrational’ modes of proof in the extant charters of David I, where 
chronologically at least it is most likely to be found, except in some 
foundation charters and confirmation of property rights.”^  In these latter types 
of charters, the proprietaiy right to hold court where the ordeal may be used is 
mentioned, but no references to actual trials conducted by these means. The 
Scottish records from the first half of the twelfth century do not give as clear a 
picture of precisely how a dispute progressed in terms of evidence received 
and judged as do the later charters, and especially those after the mid 
thirteenth century. Procedures have been generally described in the 
literature.”  ^ A comparison of the records from Scotland with what is known 
from the English and French twelfth century charters, however, shows that all 
three had similar elements where evidence is concerned.
Martindale (eds.), Law, Laity and Solidarities: Essays in Honour o f  Susan Reynolds, 
(Manchester, 2001), 116-149; Paul Hyams, ‘Norms and Legal Argument Before 1150% in 
Law and History, Current Legal Issues 2003, Vol. 6, eds. Andrew Lewis and Michael Lobban 
(Oxford, 2004). 41-61.
It is true that the absence o f references to these forms o f proof does not mean they were not 
used. There just is no evidence o f it in the charters concerning property disputes.
F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, The History o f  English Law before the time o f  Edward I, 
(Union, NJ, 1996), Vol. I, 138-144, where they discuss the differences between jurors, 
doomsmen and witnesses, and the various procedures o f inquest, recognition, verdict and 
judgement, and Vol. II, Chapter IX, ‘Procedure% Paul Hyams, ‘Trial by Ordeal: The Key to 
Proof in the Early Common Law% in On The Lmvs and Customs o f  England: Essays in Honor 
ofS.E. Thorne, eds. M.S. Arnold, et al. (Chapel Hill, 1981), 90-126, where he notes that there 
was no remedial appeal available, final proof was left to the judgement o f God, and finally, 
that in England at least, the ordeal seems to have been confined to criminal matters; property 
disputes were not normally settled this way but rather, with a judicial oath. See also, R.C.Van 
Caenegem, The Birth o f  the English Common Law, (Cambridge, 1973), 9.
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While exact procedures were not detailed in the charters, the accounts do 
allow for some conclusions. The parties could combine types of proof such as 
grant charters and/or oral testimony of credible witnesses; either was 
considered competent. Enforcement of this principle was direct. After 
judgement had been entered, if the writ order was not followed by the local 
officers, the aggrieved paity could go back to the king for redress, as seems to 
have been done in Horndean.”” While this appears to have been similar to an 
appeals process, the evidence for this is slim;^” the king certainly had the 
power to reverse the judgement of his subordinates, but there is not enough 
evidence to say this was a formal appellate process such as is found at a later 
date.^' Assuming however, that this was an ‘appeal’ from the results of the 
proceedings before this group of officials, Bishop John, Colban, and 
Cospatric, the grounds for it, failure to recognise a proffered proof, would be 
procedural or evidential, rather than f a c t u a l T h e  writ notification in the
This is, perhaps, an early example o f the ‘royal correction and control’ discussed by 
MacQueen for the thirteenth century, in Common Law and Feudal Society, 66.
™ Van Caenegem, ‘The Developed Procedure o f the Second Middle Ages, XII-XV Century’, 
Encyclopaedia o f Comparative Law XVI (Civil Procedure), (Tübingen, 1984), 11-53, 30, 
where he states that ‘The Common Law knew nothing o f an appeal, i.e., a rehearing of a 
case...consequently there were no real appeal courts either. Appeal was linked with Roman 
Law, which was alien to the Common Law, and it presupposed a hierarchy o f  courts unknown 
in England...’ As has been discussed earlier, there was a hierarchy o f officials to whom a 
subject could go should the lower level official fail to do justice.
See, Van Caenegem, ‘The Developed Procedure o f the Second Middle Ages, XII-XV 
Century’, Encyclopaedia o f  Comparative Law XVI (Civil Procedure), (Tübingen, 1984), 11- 
53,where he discusses the practice o f ordinary people obtaining redress from the king ‘along 
extra-judicial lines, through peremptory, executive orders of restitution, reparation and 
protection...’ at 24. While there are certainly writs from Scottish Kings that fit this 
description, these two cases do not, because o f the references to judgement before David, 
among other elements o f the charters. See examples o f this in Barrow, Charters o f  D avid I, 
nos. 67, 75,100,115,117,128. All these charters seem to have been issued by David I to 
address a problem, and several require enforcement by the king’s officials, yet there is no 
indication o f  a contested hearing or judgement.
Van Caenegem, ‘The Developed Procedure o f the Second Middle Ages, XII-XV Century’, 
Encyclopaedia o f  Comparative Law XVI (Civil Procedure), (Tübingen, 1984), 11-53, 18.
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Horndean matter was in fact an order to grant equal weight to these types of 
evidence.
The later cases, de Moreville and Wedale, were decided before William I, 
during whose reign there is clear evidence of influence from Roman and 
Canon law.^^ Simon the Chantor’s letter referred to the proceeding 
concerning Moorfoot as an ordo judiciarhis, but the description in William’s 
charter for the Newbattle matter is of a perambulation much as is seen in 
other, earlier cases. The de Moreville and Wedale cases appear to have been 
more in line with the English (or Scottish) Common Law than with Roman 
law.^"’ There is no indication that there was individual examination of 
witnesses, only that the judgement was made by faithful men. They were 
settled in a very pragmatic way, with a perambulation of the boundaries, 
sworn jurors, and finally, documentation to bind the agreement for the parties 
and posterity. Although it is clear that there were similar procedures followed
One of the main features o f Canon Law was the procedure o f  appeal. This assumes a 
hierarchy o f  courts. While there was something o f  a hierarchy being established under David 
I, both Horndean and Swinton were before his inauguration. The evidence supports the 
conclusion that this may well have been a sheriff’s court, but these two charters alone are 
insufficient to conclude that there was a firm and formal appellate procedure in place before 
David became king. After his inauguration, there is evidence o f a hierarchy o f  courts;
Barrow, Acts o f  Malcolm IV, no. 258, 242 (Glasgow); 233 (St. Andrews Priory; Acts o f  
William /, nos. 132, 281, Moray Registrum, no. 1. These involved the payment o f  teinds to 
the Church and were in several different regions. While there may have been no formal 
hierarchy, the principles o f justice allowed for a party who felt he had been wronged to seek 
redress from the king.
See the letter from Simon the Chanter, Newbattle Register no. 3. The date for the 
perambulation in Simon the Chanter’s letter was 1184.
“^ Charles Donahue, Jr., ‘Proof by Witnesses in the Church Courts o f  Medieval England; An 
Imperfect Reception o f  Learned Law’, in On the Laws and Customs o f  England, Essays in 
Honor o f  Samuel E. Thorne, eds. M.S. Arnold, et al., 127-158, 128, fn.4. The ‘first piece of 
academic writing directed to someone conducting a court’ was by Bulgarus, datable to the 
period 1123x1141. Susan Reynolds notes that ‘[T]he first surviving ordo to require separate 
and private examination o f witnesses seems to have been written c. 1182-85.’ Reynolds, ‘The 
Emergence o f  Professional Law in the Long Twelfth Century’, 21 Law &Hist. Rev. 347 
(2003), at 357.
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in both of these cases, and in many others where a sworn body of twelve came 
to a judgement, there is insufficient evidence to say that William I was acting 
according to the Roman influences or simply following the procedures set 
down by his grandfather?”
It has already been shown that oral witnesses were deemed on a par with 
charter evidence and either could be used to prove a claim of property rights. 
The preferred method seems to have been declarations by witnesses, rather 
than questioning them.^” Although witnesses are mentioned fairly often in the 
charters of the twelfth century, it cannot be presumed that they were 
questioned individually. There is no solid indication in the Scottish charters 
of exactly how oral testimony was presented during this period. The Roman 
or Canon law manner was that the witness testimony and evidence would be 
taken 'in camera and away from the public’^  ^and then presented to the 
decision maker. In the tradition of the Common Law, witnesses were called 
to testify on the day and would have done so in public.^^ Although
F.L, Cheyette, ‘Custom, Case Law, and Medieval “Constitutionalism”: A Re-Examination’, 
in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 78, Issue 3 (Sep., 1963), 362-290, 367. Fie seems to 
equate eustom with procedural rules, and concludes that ‘law’ was imposed on the case after 
the fact, by rulers.
Ibid. But see the ‘Decreet o f  the Synod o f Perth, dated 1206, concerning the matter 
between William, Bishop o f  St. Andrews and Duncan o f Arbuthnott, where the witnesses 
each gave a statement which was recorded in some detail in the decreet, in Spalding 
Miscellany V, 209-213.
Ibid, 12, 17, Van Caenegem points out that in England, ‘pleading remained oral and the all 
important use o f the jury (also in civil cases) made the completely professionalized treatment 
of cases in camera  impossible.’
This is also what appears to have been done in the Kirkness dispute, the Inquest o f  Glasgow 
and the Peverel case, all o f which were recorded in noticiae. See also, David Bates, ‘The 
Land Pleas o f  William I’s Reign: Penenden Heath Revisited’, Bulletin o f  the Institute o f  
Historical Research, 51 (1978), 1-19; R.C Van Caenegem, (ed.), English Lawsuits From 
William I to Richard I, Volume /, (London, 1990), ‘Having heard the conclusion o f  this plea,
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questioning of witnesses may not have been the most accepted procedure, the 
testimony of witnesses ‘was the means of proof par excellence The oath 
would have been a vital part o f any procedure, both for the jury, swearing on 
relics and for the witnesses?” This was seen in the judex cases discussed 
earlier; oath taking for witnesses seems to have been just as important 
although the descriptions of this were more detailed for the thirteenth century 
rather than the twelfth?’ While the cases Indicate that witnesses were a vital 
part of these cases, not just in the testing clause but in the proceedings before 
judgement, there is no firm evidence of their oral contributions. There are no 
case reports from before 1200 o f ‘witness X said this’ and witness Y replied 
thusly.’ It seems fair to conclude that they were part of the perambulation, 
where indicated, and were relied upon for proof, but nothing more definitive 
may be concluded at this stage.^"
Other cautionary notes must be sounded regarding the records themselves. 
There are similar problems in these records as found with the record of the 
Kirkness dispute, namely, that it is an entry made by a member of one of the 
parties to the dispute, and thus is undoubtedly biased. The different
based on numerous witnesses and arguments...% 10, and in another account, ‘ ...in  the 
presence o f all he deraigned the freedom of his land by the testimony o f  old Englishmen who 
were versed in the laws o f the land...’at 12,
Van Caenegem, ‘The Developed Procedure o f the Second Middle Ages, XII-XV Century’, 
Encyclopaedia o f  Comparative Law XVI (Civil Procedure), (Tubingen, 1984), 11-53, 19.
Paul Hyams, ‘Trial by Ordeal’, 92-93.
See the judex  cases discussed earlier. Also, see Willock, The Origins and Development o f  
the Jiay, 32-33, where he discusses a couple o f  cases from the late thirteenth century.
®^See Hyams, ‘Norms and Legal Argument Before 1150’, 45. He comments on what he 
believes would have been normal ‘pre-trial discussions o f rights and wrongs’ before 
perambulations and probably before and during court proceedings generally.
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interpretations of the case may be seen in the contrast between the 
monastery’s account in the chronicle, and comments by Barrow that ‘it would 
not be rash to guess that the abbey was seeking to encroach upon or 
monopolise ancient shieling grazings,’ ”^ Duncan also has noted that while 
there is a chronicle entry concerning the Wedale dispute, there was no 
authentic charter, which may reflect on the perceived unimportance o f the 
men of Wedale compared to Richard de Moreville, Alan son of Walter or the 
Earl of Dunbar, all of whom were involved in similar disputes?"’ There does 
not seem to be any reason, however, to doubt the description of the procedural 
aspects of the dispute.
Lord Cooper of Culross cited the Wedale case as well, noting that this was a 
case first brought before the king rather than before Papal judges delegate.^” 
Cooper’s interpretation is even more cynical than either Barrow or Duncan. 
His portrayal of the actions of the monks of Melrose during the latter part of 
the twelfth and early part of the thirteenth century is of greedy, systematic and 
planned exclusion of all others from the common pasture and forest area 
between the Gala and Leader.^” Considering the tone of the references to 
Roman authority in the chronicle entry, it would seem that the monks felt 
entirely justified in pursuing their rights so vigorously.
Barrow, Kingdom, 236. See also Duncan, Scotland, The Making o f  the Kingdom, 420, who 
described the monks as ‘in ruthless pursuit o f grazing rights and, no doubt, o f  the profits o f  
the wool trade.’
Duncan, Scotland, The Making o f  the Kingdom, 420. The other cases are discussed below. 
Cooper, Select Scottish Cases o f  the Thirteenth Century, (Edinburgh, 1944), xlvlii. Duncan 
®^ Ibid, 81-83. One must also acknowledge the possibility o f bias against the Roman Church
on the part o f  Cooper.
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In the charter contained in the Melrose Liber concerning the dispute with the 
men of Wedale,*^ it was the king who decided the dispute. Barrow points out 
in the note to the charter that the statement in the Chronicle o f  Melrose 
indicated that 'the dispute between Melrose and the men of Stow was settled 
.. .by Richard de Moreville (emphasis added) and other twelve faithful men, 
in the presence of the king, his brother David and bishops, earls and barons. 
Although they are procedural rather than substantive, since the one presiding 
could either be the king or someone on his behalf, the language may have 
been changed when the charter was drafted well after the entry in the 
Chronicle of Melrose, to give the charter more authority. The procedures 
indicated would in fact, be similar to the procedures followed during the de 
Moreville dispute.
The initial question remains. Do these cases support the conclusion that facts 
were presented to the decision maker, and the decision was made according to 
legal norms or rules? The evidence may not be as explicit as that which came 
later, with all the facts neatly set out to please the modern legal eye, but they 
were there. Legal norms can be discerned as well. The simplest case and the 
one most easily read for a normative decision is the Horndean matter. The 
norm is very straightforward. Either witnesses or a charter were acceptable 
proof of rights in property.
Melrose Liber, no. 112, RRS, ii, no. 253, 
Barrow, RRS, ii, 288-289.
89 Reynolds, quote at beginning o f Judex section.
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This conclusion may not be acceptable to others. Hyams would argue against 
it, since the terms of modern law, such as proof, do not mean the same things 
in the twelfth century. Proof can be differentiated between ‘irrebuttable 
proof and what might be called ‘party proof, that ‘evidence summoned by 
one party or another to support his case and counter that of his opponent. 
While his conclusions may be generally applicable, they are not universally 
so, especially in light of the charter material discussed here.^'
Hudson’s position seems to argue in favour of recognizing the legal norms 
implicit in the facts and decisions behind the charter texts, although his 
conclusions were based upon records much more detailed that the Scottish 
material. But the approach is similar. In analyzing the arguments actually put 
forth in twelfth century trials, he comes closest to following the paradigm of 
decision making set out earlier, where the decision maker applies the norms, 
rules or ‘law’ to the facts. Again, referring to the charter on Horndean, where 
David I tells the Bishop and Col ban and Cospatric to recognize either 
witnesses or the charter, which he had already seen, the following facts and 
procedural steps may be discerned. First, that the monks had come to David 
regarding this property, probably to get a confirmation, although that is not 
certain. David had examined the charter. The monks thereafter asserted their
Hyams, ‘Norms and Legal Argument Before 1150’, 46. The term ‘party-prooP is my own, 
but the definition is his.
Ibid, 47. Hyams asserts that ‘In the early eommon law, charters were seldom or never 
treated as conclusive proof o f title’, but the evidence here, is directly contrary.
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claim regarding this property before the three locally prominent men, based 
upon either witnesses or Edgar’s charter, and these men had refused to 
recognize their rights. The monks returned to David, whereupon he issued the 
writ-charter in question stating that either form of proof was aeceptable.^”
Both faets and the applicable norm may be discerned from the charter, even 
though not explicitly stated.
Milsom states that
[T]o us a law-suit should first ascertain the facts and then apply the 
law. Relevant facts are therefore stated; and although we cannot know 
whether any particular party is telling the truth, we can be fairly sure 
that it would be lawful to act as he did if the facts were as he says.
This last of course is always so; and to the extent that facts are stated 
at all in the earliest records the legal and social order is faithfully 
reflected. But the reflections are fragmentary because early law-su its 
did not work by ascertaining and examining the facts. The plaintiff 
alleged the basic ingredients of his case in a set form of words-for 
example that his ancestor was seised of the land in dispute and that he 
was heir; the defendant normally made a general denial; and the 
business of the court was to decide which side should swear to the 
justiee of his cause and how the oath should be tested-for example by
It is tempting to go even further, and adopt Hyams’ Idea o f ‘clashing norms’ In this case. If 
the monks asserted that only a charter would be adequate proof o f their rights, and the laymen 
asserted only witnesses would be adequate, David’s decision could be seen as a compromise, 
since he neatly affirmed both positions. ‘Norms and Legal Argument’, 53-54.
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battle. The only faets stated are those required of the plaintiff, and 
most of what actually happened is lost in that general denial.
For the cases discussed here, even if the statement of facts by the complainant 
were simply an abbreviated ‘ I elaim that Richard de Moreville damaged my 
forest rights as set forth in the ehirograph, and I demand emendation for my 
injuries’ the allegation would be there; the facts would have been put before 
the decision maker. The chirograph would have been reviewed and the 
measure of the damages would then be aseertained. The same analysis applies 
to the other cases. Milsom’s complaint is not that there were not enough faets 
elicited during the case itself, but that readers several centuries later cannot 
read these faets in the eharters. The writers did not include them in the 
record, but that does not negate their presence, or that they were judged 
according to customary norms.
The charters from Scotland in the twelfth century do not have the detail found 
in England or France, nor are they as numerous. The legal arguments Hudson 
was able to find and diseuss in the English charters are not so apparent north 
of the border. The material likewise does not support an irrational approach 
to settling disputes. There are no cases of ordeal or trial by battle over 
property rights in this century. The most detailed accounts are found during 
the reign of William I, where it is clear that there were perambulations,
93 S.F.C. Milsom, The Legal Framework o f  English Feudalism, (Cambridge, 1976), 2.
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witnesses (but no definitive evidence that these witnesses were questioned 
singly or simply swore to a formulaic statement made by one of their 
number), and the use of charters for both proof and enforcement. There is 
however, enough in the charter texts to show that the decision making process 
was followed each time.
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CHAPTER VII
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction has been used as a marker of identity and sovereignty,' along with 
lesser forms of authority, autonomy and control, and arguments may be made 
that subsume identity and sovereignty into a power construct? The most 
important aspect of jurisdiction however, is its fundamental meaning: it is the 
‘power to declare the law: potestas iuris dicendi'^ One measure of 
jurisdiction is the geographical extent to which it may be seen to reach? This 
depends on enforceability, again relating back to power, but also to an 
acknowledgement of the claim of jurisdiction by those to whom such a claim 
would apply, and a willingness to abide by the limits demarked by the 
boundaries of the effectiveness o f such jurisdiction. This active participation 
o f those governed by such jurisdiction is intimately tied to identity,^
Hector MacQueen, ‘'Regiam Majestatem, Scots Law, and National Identity’ in SHR, Vol. 
LXXIV, 1 (1995) 1-25,4.
 ^ Ibid, 1. ‘For in a very literal, even physical, sense law and jurisdiction do indeed define what 
Scotland is.’
^G.R. Evans, Law and Theology in the Middle Ages (London: 2002), 43, quoting from 
Irnerius. Evans also points out that jurisdiction means ‘authority over’ and distinguishes 
between the possession o f  jurisdiction and the exercise o f it.
Ibid, 37.
 ^ MacQueen, Regiam Majestatem, 3-5. Although he does not deal precisely with this 
argument, MacQueen ties this notion o f jurisdiction to Scots identity and sovereignty in his 
discussion o f  the purpose behind the composition o f Regiam, and the effect on the same by 
Edward I’s attempts to force appeals to be heard in England. In terms o f recognition, the 
converse is equally true; in the end, the Scots refused to acknowledge, to ‘recognise’ the right 
o f Edward I to exercise jurisdiction over Scotland or the Scots.
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Normally, when discussing the issue of jurisdiction in the twelfth century, the 
focus would be on feudal jurisdiction or seigniorial, (including royal), 
jurisdiction, fealty and owing suit to one’s lord’s court? Although feudal or 
seigniorial jurisdiction is an integral part of this discussion, it is not the main 
focus here. The more encompassing struggle over jurisdiction, and one which 
had far reaching consequences, took place at one remove from the issues 
arising from lord and tenant in the twelfth centuiy; between secular authority, 
specifically the king, and ecclesiastical authority. It is within this larger 
framework that certain disputes were conducted in the latter half of the 
twelfth and early thirteenth century. This struggle was not merely about 
power. It was about autonomy for both the Church and the secular authority 
within the territorial bounds of the kingdom.
Background
Although there had been tensions between Church and royal authority during 
the twelfth century and before, both of these entities needed the other in order 
to establish and solidify their own positions.^ The seeds of the conflict had
 ^F. L. Ganshof, Feudalism  (New York, 1961), 158, ‘feudal jurisdiction, meaning by it cases 
arising out o f  the contract o f  vassalage and concerning its terms or affecting the fief itself. 
This jurisdiction normally belonged to the lord, who exercised it over his vassals and over the 
fiefs held from him.’
This was especially true in Scotland. Without royal support and protection, the monasteries 
could not have taken root so strongly in Scotland. Without the support o f the Church, the 
Scottish kings o f the twelfth century could not have extended and consolidated their power 
throughout Alba and what is now Scotland. By the mid-twelfth century, the Church, 
especially the monasteries, had become integral to the life o f  every day Scotland. See
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been there from the beginning of Christianity? The separation of jurisdiction 
between the Church and State had been recognised early on by the Roman 
Pope, but neither side thought the other should have equal power. ‘Although 
each recognized the independence of the other, one almost inevitably tried to 
dominate.’^  Each not only thought it should be supreme within its own 
sphere, but the Church took the position that it had moral jurisdiction over the 
entire world. It could do little to enforce its claims to superiority. For several 
centuries, it appeared that the secular rulers were able to dominate the papacy, 
insisting on their right to invest church leaders with the secular trappings of 
their ecclesiastical offices."^ This began to change in the eleventh century 
under the reforming popes starting with Leo IX. " The assertion of superior 
jurisdiction was stated most emphatically by Pope Gregory VII (1073-1085), 
who declared that the pope could absolve subjects from obeying a sinful ruler 
and could even depose emperors.'" The conflict between the two entities was 
impacted by the use of writing and the new emphasis on law and legalities in 
the twelfth century. ‘Popes and bishops, in their ceaseless battles to uphold 
their privileges against kings, nobles, and one another, valued documents and 
legal expertise.... [rjeligious houses assembled their charters, inventing and
Barrow, The Kingdom o f  the Scots, (2"^  edn.) (Edinburgh, 2003), 169-170; Barrow, Charters 
o f D avid  1, 3.
* ‘Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s . . . ’ (Matt. 22.21).
 ^Edward Grant, G od & Reason in the Middie Ages (Cambridge, 2001), 22, referring to a 
quote from Pope Gelasius (492-496); ‘There are ...tw o by whom principally this world is 
ruled: the sacred authority o f the pontiffs, and the royal power.’
Brian Tierney, The Crisis o f  Church and State 1050-1300 (Toronto, 1999), Part II 
generally, and 33-44 regarding lay investiture and the arguments put forth by Humbert and 
Peter Damian.
" James A. Brundage, M edieval Canon Law (London, 1995), 34-41.
Ibid, 23.
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retouching them where necessary.. .kings had access to similar skills.. .[i]n 
order to uphold their authority in the face of what could appear an intolerable 
clerical assault, they defined what they saw as their own rights in written 
form ...’.'^
Although most historians do not emphasise this conflict in Scotland or in 
Scottish history, choosing to focus more on the Scottish Church’s struggle for 
independence from the Archbishopric of Y ork,'Scotland was not immune to
Robin Frame, The Political Development o f  the British Isle 1100-1400 (Oxford, 1995), 73, 
referring to the Constitutions o f Clarendon. See also David Crouch, The Reign o f  King 
Stephen, 1135-1154 (Harlow, 2000), Chapter 15, 295-319; Georges Duby, The Age o f the 
Cathedrals, Art and Society, 980-1420, trans. Eleanor Levleux and Barbara Thompson 
(Chicago, 1981), 137, ‘And the pope attempted-and nearly managed- to include all o f the 
sovereigns o f  Europe in an intricate web o f  feudal homage with himself at the summit.’ See 
also Brian Tierney, The Crisis o f  Church and State 1050-1300 (Toronto, 1988), chapter 4. 
Although there is ample evidence o f papal action which supports this conclusion, Tierney 
points out a different slant taken by some historians: that the actions o f  the Pope (specifically, 
Innocent III) were ‘inspired by the highest spiritual motives and that his theory o f  church and 
state was based on a cautious dualism, not on a theocratic doctrine attributing supreme 
temporal and spiritual power to the papacy’, 128. But see Tierney, Crisis o f  Church and 
State, 50-51, the letter from the pope to Solomon, king o f  Hungary where the pope asserts 
that the kingdom o f Hungary was ‘surrendered to St. Peter by King Stephen as the full 
property o f  the Holy Roman Church under its complete jurisdiction and control.’
Lord Cooper o f Culross, Selected Papers, 1922-1954 (Edinburgh, 1957), 84, referring to 
the case o f  Melrose v. Dunbar as ‘one o f the very few echoes which we hear in Scotland o f  
the bitter controversy which had been raging in England and elsewhere between Church and 
State.’ Throughout most o f  the twelfth century the tensions were both within the Church and 
with the secular rulers, especially with regard to appointments; the Scottish Church strove to 
maintain its separate identity in the face o f pressure both from the Church in England and 
from Rome, at least until the Papacy o f  Alexander III. Although a number o f  popes had 
ordered Scottish Bishops to submit to York, some o f their actions actually counter-acted their 
words. Adrian IV, the English Pope, invited the bishops o f Scotland to present any reasons 
they might have for failing to obey the Archbishop o f  York (see A.D. M. Barrel, ‘The 
Background to Cum Universi: Scoto-papal Relations, 1159-1192’ Innes RevieM’ 46 (1995), 
116-38, 116-117 and fn7.), and Pope Alexander III, while at first supporting the independence 
of the Scottish Church from York by appointing the Bishop o f Moray and then the Bishop of 
St. Andrews as papal legates in Scotland, subsequently returned to form by ordering the 
bishops o f Scotland to show obedience to York in a papal bull o f 21 September 1162. In 
1164, in the midst o f  the Becket controversy, the pope consecrated the bishop elect o f  
Glasgow, over the objections o f York. In 1174 when Henry II tried to make the Scottish 
Church subordinate to the Church o f England in the Treaty o f  Falaise, the Pope objected, 
claiming it was an infringement o f  the Church’s liberties, in a bull o f  1176. Throughout the 
1180s there are several accounts of the tensions between King William 1 and the Church over
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these forces nor should these forces be seen as entirely separate.'^ There are 
exceptions. Both Barrow and Duncan have addressed jurisdictional issues 
between secular and ecclesiastical powers, but more generally than here and 
without examining the cases in detail.'^ Hector MacQueen has also addressed
the appointments o f  Hugh and John the Scot to St. Andrews. In 1192, with the issuance of 
Cum Universi, Rome stated clearly that the Scottish Church was subject directly to the Pope 
with no intermediary. See Registrum Episcopatus Glasgiiensis, Vol. I, no. 19; A.D. M. 
Barrel, ‘The Background to Cum Universi: Scoto-papal Relations, 1159-1192’ Innes Review  
46 (1995), 116-38; Bruce Webster, M edieval Scotland, The Making o f  an Identity 
(Basingstoke, 1997), 50-70 covers this struggle for independence o f  the Scottish Church 
throughout the twelfth century, both within the Chureh in its refusal to submit to York, and 
the refusal o f  the kings o f Seots to allow any such submission, but he does not cover the 
jurisdictional tension played out in the courts. A. A.M. Duncan, The Kingship o f  the Scots 
(Edinburgh, 2002), 114-116, discusses the problems with the papacy with regard to obtaining 
an archbishopric for Scotland, and rites o f  coronation, but does not focus on jurisdictional 
issues with regard to property claims; Duncan, Scotland: The Making o f  The Kingdom  
(Edinburgh, 1996), chapter 10, does discuss relations both over submission to York and 
conflicts with the king; Barrow, Kingship and Unity, Scotland 1000-1306  (Edinburgh, 2003), 
61-83, discusses the transformation o f the Church in Scotland after the advent o f Queen 
Margaret, and the conformation to the continental reforms, but barely mentions jurisdiction 
and does not discuss secular and ecclesiastical conflicts regarding it. But see John Dowden, 
The M edieval Church in Scotland, Its Constitution, Organisation and Law  (Glasgow, 1910) 
briefly discusses ‘The Conflict o f Civil and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction’, but focuses primarily 
on the thirteenth century; he does discuss both the Leuehars and Dunbar cases, 208-212; the 
works o f Hector MacQueen, especially more recently, also discuss the jurisdictional aspects 
of the relationship between the twelfth century Church and State in Scotland: See 
‘Expectations o f  the Law in 12'*’ and 13"' Century Scotland’, Tijdschrift Voor 
Rechtsgeschiedenis, LXX (The Hague, 2002), 279-290.
The topic o f jurisdiction generally becomes more popular with Scottish historians in the 
thirteenth century. See Hector MacQueen, above noted article, and ‘Scots law under 
Alexander IIP, in Scotland in the Reign o f  Alexander III, N.H. Reid, (ed), 84-6; MacQueen, 
Common Law and Feudal Society in M edieval Scotland {Edmhuvgh, 1993), 85-9; and Hectoi 
MacQueen, ‘Canon Law, Custom and Legislation: Law in the Reign o f Alexander 11, in The 
Reign o f  Alexander II, 1214-1249, ed. Richard D. Oram (Leiden, 2005), 221-251. This last 
contains a substantial amount from the Tijdschrift article. See also, Barrow, The Kingdom o f  
the Scots (Edinburgh, 1973), 91-2; A. A.M. Duncan, Scotland: The Making o f  the Kingdom 
(Edinburgh, 1975), 264, where he notes that ‘The Scots had exploited the weakness o f their 
opponent’s position brilliantly, identifying him to the pope as Henry II, author o f the 
Constitutions o f Clarendon and o f the murder o f Becket.. . ’.
Barrow, The Kingdom o f  the Scots (Edinburgh, 2003), 72-73; The Acts o f  William /  various 
comments to royal charters and Introduction; A.A.M. Duncan, Scotland: The Making o f  the 
(Edinburgh, 1996), chapters 10, 11.
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these issues, especially lately, but not in the same way as discussed here, nor 
are some of the conclusions expressed here in accord with all of his? ^
There were several cases in the twelfth century that, when read in context 
with the events, point to how jurisdictional matters actually played out 
between the two contesters. While relations do not seem to have been as 
contentious in Scotland between secular and ecclesiastical authority, there 
certainly was jurisdictional conflict?^ There was also a spirit o f cooperation 
and accommodation, with the Church at times requesting and obtaining 
secular intervention and enforcement of its rights, and receiving confirmations 
and enforcement of judgements from the king. In spite of this more amicable 
state o f affairs, the Scottish king did not allow the Church as much control as 
it wished in the twelfth century. There are a number of Scottish cases that 
encapsulate these competing forces, with two of them more remarkable than 
the rest; several of these began in the late twelfth century-early thirteenth, and 
often continued for several years right up to the end of the reign of William I. 
This series of cases, for it must be viewed as a series, demonstrate the 
evolution in how jurisdictional differences were perceived and how the issue
See previous works cited above, generally. Although MacQueen discusses the twelfth 
century in several o f  his writings, he focuses more on the thirteenth and considers the twelfth 
century evidence to be ‘very patchy’ at best. See ‘Canon Law, Custom and Legislation’, 225.
This can be seen as early as Alexander I’s reign. Barrow, The Kingdom o f  the Scots 
(Edinburgh, 2003), 175-176; Lawrie, ESC, nos. XXXVII-XLV, and notes. These documents 
consist mostly o f  letters between Alexander 1 and Canterbury concerning Eadmer’s refusal to 
follow the customs o f  Scotland, correspondence with the papacy, as well as letters from the 
Pope to Bishop John o f  Glasgow ordering him to obey his metropolitan, York.
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of jurisdiction was used as a mechanism of power, authority and autonomy?^ 
While several historians have commented at various times on the cases 
discussed below, few have discussed them in light of the impact of acts such 
as the Constitutions of Clarendon or Cum Universi on the way jurisdiction 
was viewed, or how these and other events may have affected the process of 
dispute resolution evident in these cases.
Cases concerning lands subject to competing claims from clerics and from the 
laity were nothing new. '^^ While the earlier part of the centuiy did not 
demonstrate such acrimonious relations between the Scottish secular courts 
and the ecclesiastical, with cases often being brought before one or the other 
of these fora, this changed towards the latter part of William I’s reign, 
especially after Innocent III became pope in 1198. Matters came to a head 
earlier and were more contentious further south. In England, by Henry II’s 
reign, disputes that included jurisdictional issues had progressed to the point 
of having a specific assise to determine which forum should hear the dispute. 
The type of property at issue determined which forum should be used. If it 
were a lay holding, the dispute would be heard in the secular courts. If 
ecclesiastical, that is, land or property that had been given in free alms, then 
any dispute was to be decided in the church courts.
This was especially true for the Scottish king. See MacQueen, ‘Scots Law and National
Identity’, 7; ‘Law was closely associated with kingship as a mark o f Scottish identity in the
thirteenth century.’20 See Bates, ‘The Land Pleas o f  William I’s Reign: Penenden Heath Revisited’ Bulletin o f  
the Institute o f  H istorical Research, 51 (1978), 1-19, and generally, English Lawsuits from  
William I to Richard I, Vol. I, William I to Stephen, (nos. 1-346) ed. R.C. Van Caenegem, 
(London, 1990). While the number o f such cases is limited in Scotland, they do exist.
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Questions involving competing claims between church and state about land 
were in all likelihood one of the earliest to be brought before a jury? ' The 
assisa utrum was ‘a “recognition” by twelve lawful men .. .to decide whether 
{utrum) the land in question was alms or lay fee.’"^  This jurisdictional issue 
was at the heart of much of the litigation between Church and State in the 
twelfth century. The rule that lay holdings should be brought before the 
king’s courts seems to have been the practice well before Henry II’s reign, 
both in England and in Scotland; many of the cases concerning disputes 
involving the church, either its propeity or as a party, were brought before the 
Scottish king during the twelfth century, perhaps in part at least, because most 
of the donations were from him?^ Although not evident immediately, the
Pollock & Maitland, History o f  English Law, Vol. I, 144.
Ibid, 145. See also, John Hudson, The Formation o f  the English Common Law (London. 
1996), 129-130.
Melrose Liber, ed. Thomas Thomson, (Edinburgh, 1832), ix-x; he asserts that as early as 
the reign o f  Malcolm IV, the Crown was ‘held to be the origin o f  all real property.’
Examining the earlier charters leads to the conclusion that this was the prevailing 
understanding as early as David I’s reign. This would have made the grantees, whether lay or 
ecclesiastical, holders o f  the king, and he would have exercised feudal authority over them, 
including holding court and administering justice. See Barrow, The Charters o f  D avid I, nos. 
29, 30, 43, 97, 98,164. These last three charters concern Moorfoot. Many o f  the grants made 
by David I and Earl Henry are o f various churches, some with land as well; see nos. 
45,46,52,56,72,85,86,87,91,108, 133, 147,150,180,200,205,215. None o f  the grants specified 
that the gift o f patronage was also being donated, with the possible exception o f  no. 91. The 
language in that charter is 'sciatis me concessisse et confirmasse in perpetuam elemosinam  
donum ecclesic dc Sprostun quod Johannes Glasguensis episcopus dedit ecclesie Sancte 
Marie de Kelcho, abbati et monachis, in elemosinam perpetuo possidendam. ’ Barrow 
translated this as ‘the gift made to it by John bishop o f Glasgow o f the church o f  Sprouston’. 
It seems to me that 'donum" may be referring to the gift o f the living, or patronage of the 
church. See Barrow, The Acts o f  William 1, nos. 211, 249, where Barrow translates 
'donacione ’ as patronage. During Malcolm IV’s reign, the pattern continues: not only were 
there multiple donations to the Church o f specific chapels and churches, but there is no clear 
language that the patronage o f  the church was being donated with it. There were also a 
number o f apparent disputes between the church and laymen and between two church entities 
that appear to have been resolved either before King Malcolm IV or with his aid. See 
Barrow, The Acts o f  Malcolm IV, nos.
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king’s jurisdiction over these cases was affected by the issuance of the papal 
bull, Cum Universi. While some have noted that the king’s authority was 
augmented by the bull in the specific privileges included for the king of 
Scotland, it could be argued that the effect with regard to disputes involving 
land elaimed by the church was to pre-empt the king’s jurisdiction?''
One area where this power struggle appeared between these two entities was 
the right of advowson, which gave rise to two separate procedures, the assises 
utrum and darrein presentment. Although utrum was an earlier assise in 
England, it was no less important that the subsequent assise instituted to 
resolve one of the most common disputes between church and state. Under 
Henry 11, the assise of darrein presentment was for the purpose of 
determining who should exercise the right of patronage. This was a 
possessory action, where the jury was asked to determine who had last 
presented an incumbent to the living. This was not the first step taken to 
address such questions. According to Pollock & Maitland, this possessory 
action was derivative of the writ o f right of advowson. There had been 
litigation concerning the patronage of churches before this assise was
114,122,127,13 5,151,186,187,194,195,196,197,199,218 for gifts o f churches; nos. 
149,153,173,202,233,237,239,240.251,257, for what appear to be disputes between both lay 
and ecclesiastical parties. There were even more such cases under William I.
Paul C. Ferguson, M edieval Papa! Representatives in Scotland: Legates, Nuncios, and  
Judges-De le gate, 7 /25-/25(5 (Edinburgh, 1997), 1-2. The papal bull set out three privileges 
for the Scottish king, one o f which was that cases arising about the Church’s possessions in 
Scotland were not to be referred outside the realm unless by appeal to Rome. See also 
Plabakkuk B isse t’s Rohnent o f  Courtis, Vol. Ill, ed. Hamilton-Grierson, 25, where he notes 
that the church had Jurisdiction in ‘all matters respecting ecclesiastical persons and property, 
such as tithes and advow sons....’ It is unclear that this was actually true during the twelfth 
century before the Bull was issued. In any case, such pre-emption was not always recognized 
by the king, either before or after the Bull.
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developed, and there had been customary rules followed in the presentation of 
the claim and the process o f resolution."^ Because there was conflict over 
which forum should be deciding these issues, procedural rules were set out in 
the Constitutions of Clarendon in 1164. The first article of the constitution 
stated that ‘[I]f a controversy arise between laymen, or between laymen and 
clerks, or between clerks concerning patronage and presentation of churches, 
it shall be treated or concluded in the court of the lord king.’^^  Although it is 
not clear precisely when the assise itself was instituted, it was arguably after 
the Third Lateran Council of 1179, which provided that the bishop should 
name a parson to any church left vacant for three months or more."^ If the 
living were to remain the gift of the laity rather than the church, possession of 
the right of advowson had to be determined quickly. The question of who had 
presented last was to be answered by the jury, and that person or his heir (or 
successor) were to have the right.
Although the issues were similar in both England and Scotland concerning 
first, the jurisdictional question and second, the right to present the living of a
According to Pollock & Maitland, History o f  English Law, Vol. I, 148, ‘A proprietary 
action for an advowson must be begun in the king’s court by royal writ, “writ o f right o f  
advowson”; the claimant must offer battle; his adversary may choose between battle and the 
grand assise.’ This preceded the institution o f  the assisa de ultima presentatione.
Constitutions o f  Clarendon, c. 1 (1164), 
http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/source/cclarendon.html. Hall, Glanvill, (London, 1965), 
Chapter XIII, \9 -22 ,l6 \~ 3; Pollock &.M ü\t\m d, History o f  English Law, Vol. I, 148-149;
F.W. Maitland, The Forms o f  Action at Common Law: A Course o f  Lectures, eds. A.H. 
Chaytor and W.J. Whittaker (Cambridge, 1948), ix, 42; W.L. Warren, / / e w y / / (Berkeley, 
1991), chapter 9, 317-361, for a general discussion o f the legal reforms instituted by Henry II; 
John Hudson, Land, Law and Lordship in Anglo-Norman England {Oxïovà, 1994), especially 
chapter 9.
Third Lateran Council, clause 17, http://www.piar.hu/councils/ecuml 1 .himI. See also 
Pollock & Maitland, History o f  English Law, Vol. I, 148; Warren, Henry II, 341, and fn.l.
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church, it cannot be concluded from the records concerning either the cases 
discussed here or the Scottish records in general that the procedures in 
Scotland were the same as in England. They certainly were not discussed 
using the same terminology. It appears in fact that there were no exact 
Scottish counterparts to the English assises of utrum or darrein presentment?^ 
There are, however provisions in both Regiam Majestatem and Glanvill 
applicable here. The interesting aspect of these provisions is that they directly 
contradict each other.^^ Book 1, c. 2, o f the Regiam Majestatem entitled De 
Causis ad Ecclesiam Spectantibus et de Jure Patronatus, states that actions 
relating to advocation and rights of patronage belong to the Church, while 
GlanvilVs provision is in accord with the Constitutions of Clarendon. But 
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the provisions in Regiam indicate that lay patrons must 
be careful to name a new parson within four months or they lose the right to 
the bishop. This rule only came into effect after the Third Lateran Council in 
1179, and made the creation of the procedures to address the right to present 
necessary in E n g l a n d . B o t h  before and after that date, cases were brought 
before the Scottish king regarding patronage, without much attention
Cooper, Select Scottish Cases o f  the Thirteenth Century, (Edinburgh, 1944), Ixviii, noting 
in his examination o f  the Ayr and Bute Manuscripts, ‘[TJhere is no trace o f Utrum or o f  
Darrein Presentm ent... ’ ,
The Treatise on the Jaws and customs o f  the realm o f  England commonly called  Glanvill 
{Glanvill) ed. G.D.G. Hall (Holmes Beach, 1983), I, 3; regarding civil please to be pleaded 
and determined only in the court o f  the lord king including ‘pleas concerning advowsons o f  
churches’. Regiam Majestatem and Qouniam Attachiamenta, ed. Lord Cooper o f Culross, 
(Edinburgh, 1947), I, 2.
The dating o f  Regiam Majestatem  has already been set at shortly after 1318; A.A.M. 
Duncan, 'Regiam Majestatem: a re-consideration’. Juridical Review (JR), new series, vi 
(1961).
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seemingly being paid to the jurisdictional issue?' The clearest example of 
this is the case concerning East Kilbride, between the Bishop of Glasgow and 
Roger de Valognes. There the royal charter unequivocally states that the 
patronage of the church had been acknowledged and proved in the presence of 
the king and his full court. While it is true that several cases where both 
parties were ecclesiastical as well as cases where one party was lay were 
brought before judges-delegate, only a handful were specifically concerned 
with the right o f patronage, most being more generally concerned with 
churches as a whole or, especially, its teinds and lands.^" This changed 
towards the end o f the reign of William 1, as is detailed in the following cases. 
Even with the changes in approach, right to the end o f his reign, William I 
decided disputes over the right of patronage.
Although Duncan raised the issue of the assize Utrum, noting that while this 
was used in England to determine whether lands were lay or alms, he does not
Barrow, The Acts o f  William I, nos. 249(1182x1190; Glasgow v. Roger de Valognes re: 
East Kilbride), 477(18 Sept. 1203x1207; The King v. Brice, Bishop o f  Moray v. Gilchrist earl 
o f Mar re: Aberchirder), 491 (20 May 1209x1211, prob. 1210; de Quincy v. St. Andrews 
Priory re: Leuehars), 562 (1202x1214; David de la Hay v. William Malvoisin, Bishop of St. 
Andrews re: land o f  Ecclesdovenauin and patronage o f  church o f Errol). There are also 
grants o f the right o f  patronage made by King William 1. See charters nos. 211 (1178x1188), 
344 and 345 (1189x1193), both grants to laymen, and 527 (1165x1195), a grant to 
Cambuskenneth o f  the patronage o f the church o f Glenlsla.
Paul C. Ferguson, M edieval Papal Representatives in Scotland: Legates, Nuncios, and  
Judges-Delegate, 7 /2 5 - /2 5 6  (Edinburgh, 1997), 209-268. Patronage seems to become an 
issue dealt with by judges-delegate during with the papal reign o f  Innocent III, but not so 
much before. Although there were cases where other matters are in dispute between lay and 
ecclesiastical parties, they were not disproportionately decided before judges-delegate as 
opposed to the king’s court.
See cases and their dates, above. This is not to say that there were no cases brought before 
papal judges-delegate. There were. Contrary to the sense o f the assertions, especially in the 
Dunbar case that the Church had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases, the evidence shows 
that they did not.
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discuss this in any detail with relation to Scotland, simply stating Scotland did 
not have a similar act?'' MacQueen has argued that lay litigants could point 
out that while England had the assise utrum, Scotland did not have a 
comparable procedure?^ While there was of course, no procedure of utrum in 
Scotland, there was in fact, the process o f ‘recognition’ as used in the East 
Kilbride case, which sounds remarkably similar to the procedure in the assise 
u t r u m The East Kilbride procedure was similar to that laid out in the 
Constitutions of Clarendon, and since it was after the reconciliation with Pope 
Lucius, there should have been no impediment to ecclesiastical jurisdiction if, 
indeed, such matters were ‘customarily’ heard in church courts.
While there may not have been formalised procedures called an assise 'utrum' 
or darrein presentment in Scotland, there were methods for achieving the 
same result. The practice set out in East Kilbride had been used well before 
either the Leuehars or Dunbar cases, discussed below. The parallels between 
England and Scotland, both in tensions between secular and ecclesiastical 
power and as a basis for a writ or brieve are there, and it is within this climate 
o f jurisdictional conflict and accommodation that these cases are best 
understood.
Duncan, Scotland: The Making o f  the Kingdom, 288. 
MacQueen,'Expectations o f  the Law’, 284.
Ban-ow, RRS, ii, 249.
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The Cases
Several o f these cases involved the Cistercian monastery of Melrose, 
concerning its boundaries and the rights and privileges regarding lands in the 
surrounding areas?^ Beginning in 1170, Melrose Abbey began aggressively 
to assert its perceived rights regarding these lands, and came into conflict with 
neighbouring holders both lay and ecclesiastical. Some were settled more or 
less amicably, while others resulted in some kind of official action.^^ There 
does not appear to have been a deliberate program in the pursuit of its 
neighbours, even though it may appear to present such a pattern in 
retrospect.^^
Dry burgh, Moreville and Wedale^^
In 1170, Melrose Abbey and Dryburgh Abbey, located to the south, entered 
into an agreement settling their borders. The lands in question were in the 
diocese o f Glasgow, and the agreement was confirmed by the Bishop of
Some o f the cases concerning Melrose’s assertion o f rights have already been discussed in 
the previous chapters, under different subjects and concentrating on different aspects than 
covered here.
Cooper, Selected Papers, 1922-1954  (Edinburgh, 1957), 81-87. Cooper discusses several 
of the cases here, all in relation to the dispute with the Earl o f Dunbar. He does not explore 
the jurisdictional issues to any great extent, although he does mention them.
Ibid. Cooper strongly argues that there was a deliberate campaign by Melrose, Some of 
this material was touched on in the earlier discussion of the de Moreville case, but not with 
regard to jurisdiction.
Moreville and Wedale have already been discussed in detail and will not be separately 
treated here, but mention o f  these controversies helps to place this series o f  cases in 
perspective, both chronologically and thematically.
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Glasgow, but not by the King?' This agreement seems to have been 
amicable; there are no further records concerning any dispute between the two 
Abbeys over this land. The next two disputes chronologically were the 
magna controversia with Richard de Moreville, finally concluded in 1180, 
and the Wedale case, concluded in 1184.''“ Both of these cases involved a 
dispute between the church and lay holders, although neither involved 
patronage of a church. Both were settled before the King, in his full court. 
There is no indication in the records that there was even a question raised 
about whether these matters should be brought before the king or before an 
ecclesiastical tribunal.''^ The next several cases follow the same pattern until 
Leuehars, and then Dunbar, where jurisdictional issues come to the fore with 
a vengeance. It should be noted that up to these last two cases, jurisdiction 
does not seem to have been an issue in spite of the many changes occurring 
both in the relationship of the Scottish Church to Rome, and in England.
East Kilbride
Sometime between 1182 and 1190, a case was brought before William I over 
the right of patronage o f the church of East Kilbride, in Lanarkshire.'''' The
Diybiirgh Cartulary, no. 113. There do not seem to be any royal confirmations o f this 
agreement, and there does not appear to be a comparable charter in the Melrose Liber.
See discussion o f  these cases, infra.
M elrose Liber no.llO , 111, (de Moreville); no.l 12, (Wedale); Barrow, Acts o f  William I, 
no.236, (de Moreville), and no.253, (Wedale). See comments by Barrow regarding both royal 
charters, and discussion by Cooper.
Barrow, RRS, ii. The Acts o f  William I, no. 249( 1182x1190; Glasgow v. Roger de Valognes 
re: East Kilbride).
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contestants were Roger de Valognes, who claimed he had the right to name a 
parson to that church, and the Bishop of Glasgow who claimed that the see of 
Glasgow had for many years had the gift of the church without any objection 
or efforts to reclaim the right of patronage. The procedures described in the 
charter detailing the outeome of this dispute indicate that there was a 
recognition hearing before the king and his court, where witnesses, 
responsible older men and lawful witnesses testified. In the face of such 
evidence, Roger de Valognes renounced his claim to the right o f patronage. 
The renunciation seems to have also included a ploughgate of arable land.
These proceedings are remarkably similar to those in England concerning the 
right to present the living of a church, although there is no reference to this in 
any o f William I’s charters. There are no indications that this matter was ever 
brought before an ecclesiastical tribunal, nor that anyone objected to the 
king’s jurisdiction in this matter.
Mauchline and Blainslie
Up to the mid-1180s, the rule prevalent in England for most of the twelfth 
century and made explicit in the Constitutions of Clarendon,''^ that any case
Constitutions o f  Clarendon, c. 9 (1164),
http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/soLirce/cclarendon.html: this article states: ‘If litigation arise 
between a clerk concerning any holding which the clerk would bring to charitable tenure but 
the layman to lay fee, it shall be determined on the decision o f the king's ch ief justice by the 
recognition o f twelve lawful men in the presence o f the king's justice him self whether the 
holding pertain to charitable tenure or to lay fee. And if the recognition declare it to be
234
involving a dispute regarding property between a lay holder and religious 
should be brought before the king, seems to have been more or less followed 
without any problem in Scotland as well as England?'" There are no extant 
records of litigated cases that deal explicitly with this aspect of jurisdiction 
prior to Innocent III. There appears to have been a generally more relaxed 
attitude towards jurisdiction, with neither side making it an issue until after 
1200 .
The two cases discussed here both involved the family of Walter son of Alan, 
Steward o f the King, and his descendants. These cases highlight this more 
relaxed approach, not because they mark a shift in how such cases were 
conducted, but because they do follow the rule that disputes involving 
property previously granted in alms should be referred to an ecclesiastical 
tribunal, and where disputes are between a layman and a cleric involving 
property whose disposition has been contested, they should be heard by the 
king.
There are two cases with the family, one with roots at the beginning of 
William I’s reign involving a grant by Walter son of Alan of the land of
charitable tenure, it shall be litigated in the church court, but if  lay fee, unless both plead 
under the same bishop or baron, the litigation shall be in the royal court. But if  both plead 
concerning that fief under the same bishop or baron, it shall be litigated in his court; yet so 
that he who was first seised lose not his seisin on account o f the recognition that was made, 
until the matter be determined by the plea.’ The argument here Is not that the Constitutions o f  
Clarendon actually applied in Scotland, merely that the procedures and rules regarding 
Jurisdiction set forth therein have parallels in Scotland without the explicit texts such as is 
found in the Constitutions.
There were some cases brought before Judges-delegate where one party was a layman; see 
Ferguson, M edieval Papal Representatives, 209-212.
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Mauchline?^ although the dispute concerning it came to a head in 1204; the 
other case, of much later origin, concerns a quitclaim from Alan, son of 
Walter, datable to 1189x1193 regarding land on the west bank of the Leader, 
also known as Blainslie. The actions of the Abbey in connection with this 
piece of land were in keeping with their behaviour concerning other 
acquisitions by Melrose of the lands between the Gala and the Leader.''^
Mauchline
Mauchline was originally donated by Walter son of Alan, along with pasture 
bordering the Ayr River and in the forest, also on the north side o f the Ayr; 
other specifications in the charter include a carucate of land to be cultivated 
and five marks to be paid by the monks to the Stewards annually. This gift 
was confirmed by King William I shortly after he began his reign. Although 
the charter clearly states that the gift was in alms, with the boundaries 
perambulated and described in detail, there were exceptions. Walter son of 
Alan reserved the beasts and birds of the forest from the gift, and indicated 
that he and his heirs had rendered forensic service to the king for ‘all the 
aforesaid’.''^  It is this saving clause that became a problem later in the 
century.
This is a donation by Walter I son o f Alan, regarding Mauchline. Melrose Liber, no. 66; 
Barrow, Acts o f  William I, no. 78. The confirmation by Walter Ts son, Alan is no. 67. See 
also Cooper, Select Scottish Cases, 4-6.
M elrose Liber, no. 97; Barrow, The Acts o f  William I, no. 364.
Ibid, no. 66. See also Cooper, Select Scottish Cases o f  the Thirteenth Century, 4-6,
236
In 1204 or shortly before, Alan son of Walter tried to reclaim the donated 
lands, basing his claim on this clause. The monks construed the clause 
narrowly, while the donor claimed it applied to all of the donations listed in 
the charter, which would allow him to reclaim the donated lands as ‘forest’. 
The monks petitioned the pope, who nominated the Abbots of Jedburgh and 
Dryburgh and the Rector o f Lilliesleaf as judges delegate.^^ The pope gave 
instructions to the judges-delegate to place Alan son of Walter under 
ecclesiastical censure, to take the necessary procedural and evidential steps 
and report to the papal curia. This was done and an opportunity for the parties 
to appear, but Alan son of Walter did not appear and judgement was rendered 
in his absence. Although Cooper notes that the pope issued ‘a second 
mandate to the judges-delegate on 7 March, 1203-04 instructing them to carry 
out his decision and appending a reasoned judgment which was later 
embodied in the Corpus Juris Canonicij the mandate of this date refers to 
things to be done, rather than a decision already made.^' The Pope did issue 
a judgement, however, which did become part of Canon law. It set out the
Cooper, Select Scottish Cases, 5. Geoffrey, Abbot o f Dryburgh and Radulf, Abbot o f  
Jedburgh were probably the same as G. Berbur and R. de Burg, who appeared at the Vatican 
and are listed as the Abbots in the Pope’s opinion, listed in the Decretals. See Decretals o f  
Gregory IX, 111, XXIV, Cap. VI. http://freespace.virgin.net/angus.graham/GregDecr.htm: 
D.E.R. Watt and N.F. Shead, The Head o f  Religious Houses in Scotland from  Dvelfth to 
Sixteenth Centuries (Edinburgh, 2001), 58, 117. But see W. H. Bliss, Calendar o f  entries in 
the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland: Papal Letters, Vol. I, I I 98-1304, 
(London, 1893), 16. This entry shows that the mandate was directed to ‘G. de Gedeworde, G 
de Driburg, and Master J. rector o f  Lilleschae dated 7 March, 1204 (2 Non. Mar.), but the 
names o f the parties are misspelled.
Cooper, Select Scottish Cases, 5. The only mandate for 1203-04 regarding this case in the 
Papal Register is the first one, dated 2 Non. March. The language in that mandate is clearly 
before any judgement has been rendered, nor does it appear that there was any judgement 
attached to the mandate. In addition, these mandates are not to be found in the Melrose 
cartulary, another example o f editing by the compiler; one would think that papal letters to 
the Abbey would be considered important and be kept, especially If they refer to litigation 
over land and the judgement was in the monks’ favour.
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rule of law that where gifts are concerned, the most liberal construction 
should be applied, and any restrictions should be read narrowly; this rule was 
incorporated into the Decretals of Gregory IX in the Liber ExtraP  In the end, 
Alan son of Walter died before the matter was finally resolved, and his son 
simply renewed the original gift of his grandfather, mooting the judgement of 
the papal court and its enforcement
Blainslie
The earliest charter on this land was a donation by David I to his foresters?'' 
This property or a portion of it was subsequently granted by King William I to 
William son of Oein?^ On or shortly after 8 March 1185, the king granted 
this land to Melrose Abbey?'" Melrose Abbey was not the only one with 
interests in this area; there appears to have been lay holders who also claimed 
some property rights with regard to Blainslie, including the de Morevilles and 
the Stewards. After the royal grant to the abbey, Melrose obtained grants
D ecretals o f  G regoiy IX, III, XXIV, Cap. VI. 
hltp://fi'eespace.virein.net/angus.graham/GregPecr.htm.
Melrose Liber, nos. 72, 73, 74. Charter no. 72 is the confirmation o f  the donation o f  
Mauchline from Walter son o f  Alan; no. 73 is a ‘relaxation’ o f the payment o f  5 marks 
annually; no. 74 is the confirmation by Walter son of Alan o f the donation o f  the forest on the 
western banks o f  the Ayr that had been donated by his father.
Barrow, The Charters o f  D avid  /, no. 265.
Barrow, Acts o f  William /, no. 581.
Melrose Liber, no. 93; William I, no, 265. Barrow notes that no. 265 was issued at the 
same time as the confirmation o f the Avenel grant, no. 264, which was probably confirmed 
shortly after Robert Avenel died on 8 March 1185. See notes to both charters.
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concerning this land from the de Morevilles and confirmations from the 
king/^ These grants do not seem to have been contested in any way.
The charter from Alan son of Walter and the royal confirmation regarding 
Blainslie show that different procedures were followed, and that there might 
well have been issues contested between the two parties. Alan's charter is a 
quitclaim of all claims and all rights he had in the pasture on the western part 
of the Leader. The charter was confirmed in the presence of the King and his 
full court, and enforcement is guaranteed by Alan’s request to Bishop Jocelin 
and Earl David to append their seals to his quitclaim.^® There is no indication 
that the land claimed by Alan son of Walter was ever given in alms, at least 
by him or his forebears, nor even that Melrose had made that assertion. The 
quitclaim itself and its language, as well as being brought before King 
William I and in his full court point to controversy, as does the enforcement 
clause. There is no indication that this matter was ever brought before an 
ecclesiastical tribunal, or even a question raised about where it should be 
heard and decided.
The handling o f  the two cases involving the Stewards demonstrates that both Church entities 
and the king were abiding by the same rules regarding jurisdiction applicable in England and 
made explicit by the Constitutions o f Clarendon, even though there is no indication that these 
Constitutions were relied upon by either side, (and no contention that they did apply) and no
Ibid, nos. 96, (Richard de Moreville), 95, 99, (William de Moreville), 96, 100 (William I; 
also nos, 301, 307 [the rubric refers to Blainslie, but not the text] in William f).
58 Melrose Liber, no. 97.
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mention was made o f the jurisdictional basis for the procedures followed. The following 
case indicates that far from being an issue o f contention, jurisdiction was flexible for most o f  
the twelfth century.
Bowden
There were several cases where the parties were both religious entities, yet 
these matters were resolved either with the king’s help or in his court and in 
his presence.^^ One of these was the long running controversy between 
Melrose Abbey and its neighbour Kelso Abbey over certain lands, including 
Bowden. The first indication in the records that there was a boundary dispute 
concerning these lands is found in the second general confirmation charter of 
William I to Kelso Abbey, which can be dated to 1189 or thereafter.^^ The 
last charter concerning this dispute is datable to 1210.^' This case is
Barrow, The Acts o f  William I, nos. 35 (Balchristie), 105 (Durham v. Crowland), 249 
(Glasgow V. Roger de Valognes re: Church o f East Kilbride), 252 (Newbattle v. David Uviat 
re: Moorfoot), 260 (Glasgow v. Robert de Brus re: chirograph over several churehes), 319 
(Kelso V. Robt. o f  Kent, et al re: Innerwick), 430 (Glasgow Cathedral & Bishop William v. 
William Cumin re: Muckcroft), 435 (St. Andrews Priory v. Eva, widow o f Wm de la Hay and 
his son David re: Falside), 440 (Kelso v. Melrose re: Bowden), 444 (confirmation of 
proceedings held in the court o f  the prior o f Coldingham), 477 (King William 1 v. Brice 
Bishop o f  Moray v. Gilchrist earl o f Mar re: Aberehirder), plus those cases discussed herein.
The original grant was made by Earl David, confirmed by him towards the end o f  his reign, 
and then confirmed by both subsequent kings. The language used in these donation and 
confirmation charters is important. See, Barrow, Charters o f D avid I, no. 14, (1120x21 or 
1123x1124), the original foundation charter o f  the Abbey o f Selkirk, later Kelso, where the 
boundaries o f  the original donation are described in detail, including Botheldene cum suis 
rectis divisis in terries & aquis, in boscho & piano', no. 183 (1147x1152), David Ts 
confirmation o f  all grants to Kelso; Barrow, The Acts o f  Malcolm IV, no. 131 (25 March 1159 
X middle o f May, 1159), confirmation using the same language found in King David’s 
charter; Barrow, The Acts o f  William I, no. 63 (c .ll6 5  or 1166), confirmation which again 
uses the same language; no. 367, (1 189x 1195, possibly 1193), a second confirmation from 
William 1, referring to lands not previously mentioned, and also referring to the matter in 
controversy between Melrose Abbey and Kelso Abbey regarding boundaries, but not 
describing them; and finally, the two charters concerning the resolution o f the dispute 
between Melrose and Kelso, nos. 440 (9 May 1204) and 493 (22 June, probably 1210).
Ibid, no. 493. All dates are from Barrow.
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noteworthy because Pope Celestine III requested the king’s intervention in a 
matter that, according to the general rule regarding jurisdictional matters 
should have been resolved before judges-delegate. The dating is significant: 
Pope Celestine III held office from 1191-1198.^" It is not until after Innocent 
III becomes pope that there are issues raised over jurisdiction. Even thought 
the litigation over Bowden was protracted, lasting for over 10 years, it was 
resolved in the presence of the king and according to common law procedures 
instituted by the king. King William I held a preliminary hearing on 14 
January 1203, where the parties agreed that the king should conduct an 
inquisition to determine the boundaries between Melrose and Bowden. After 
the inquisition, there was another hearing in the king’s full court at Selkirk on 
9 May, 1204, where a judgement was entered in favour of Kelso.^^ Even 
though judgement had been rendered, the controversy between the two houses 
does not seem to have been at end, since there is also a royal confirmation of 
the ‘amicabilem pacenf and chirograph made between the two houses 
regarding the land of Bowden and other parcels.^"*
The jurisdictional question becomes more important in later cases as 
exemplified in the next two cases. While they both were finalised in the 
presence of the king, jurisdiction was clearly one of the biggest problems 
facing the litigants and over which a great deal of energy was expended.
While one may argue that Pope Celestine III was in fact, upholding the special privileges 
granted to the king by Cum Universi, other than the fact that he requested the king to act as 
judge in the matter after the issuance o f  the Bull, there is no evidence to support this. 
Barrow, Acts o f  William /, no. 440.
Ibid, no. 493, dated 22 June, probably 1210.
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Leuchars
Sometime in the period 1170-1180, Ness son of William gave the church of 
Leuchars with land and chapels and with all just pertinences in perpetual 
alms, to the canons of the church of St. Andrews.^^ Later, Orabilis, daughter 
o f Ness confirmed this donation after becoming the Countess of Mar.*^  ^There 
are also confirmation charters from King William I, Bishop Mathew and Earl 
Duncan.^^ The donation is also noted in the general confirmation of churches 
and other property granted to St. Andrews. During the same time period, but 
probably slightly earlier than the donation of the church of Leuchars, Ness son 
of William had granted the church of Lathrisk to St. Andrews.^^ Although the 
general confirmation listed a donation by Ness son of William, it did not 
include the church of Lathrisk among them.^^ Ness and his daughter had also
St. Andrews Liber, 287. Orabilis is not named as a grantor, but she and her husband, Adam 
son o f  Duncan are listed as witnesses, along with Matthew, bishop o f  Aberdeen and Stephen 
parson o f Leuchars and others.
 ^Ibid, 287, 288. Both the donation o f Ness son o f William and the confirmation o f  Orabilis, 
Countess o f  Mar (the Earl o f Mar was a subsequent husband to Adam, son o f  Duncan), are 
datable to 1172x1188. This confirmation by Orabilis is noteworthy because it states that both 
Bishop Matthew and Duncan earl o f  Fife were 'presente et teste ’ and goes on to note that the 
donation was heard and conceded by Orabilis as heir o f her father, and that she confirms with 
her seal. These actions would meet the requirements o f assent and consent o f  the heir noted 
in the discussions concerning David and Henry. There are also separate confirmations by 
Bishop Matthew and Earl Duncan who used the same confirmation language found in 
Orabilis’ charter, including reference to their seals. The specificity with which the knowledge 
of the heir concerning the donation is noted relates back to the discussion on assent and 
consent, infra.
Barrow, The Acts o f  William 7, no. 271, at 300; St. Andrews Liber, 289. Barrow dates this 
charter to 1175x1190.
Barrow, The Acts o f  William /, no. 150; St. Andrews Liber, 224. Barrow dates this donation 
to 1173x1178. This precedes the joint donation charter o f Ness and his daughter Orabilis 
regarding the church o f  Leuchars, noted below.
Ibid, no. 333.
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given another church at Lathrisk to St. Andrews. One of the witnesses to the 
second Lathrisk donation charter was Yi^m yjudex?^  None o f the donation 
charters explicitly grant the right of patronage {ius patronatiis) along with the 
churches.^^
The relationship between the de Quincys and St. Andrews dated at least from 
the time o f the marriage of Orabilis to Robert de Quincy, whereby he acquired 
Leuchars. They had a son, Saher.^^ The de Quincy marriage had ended prior 
to her marriage to Adam son of Duncan, earl of Fife, her husband when they 
witnessed the donation of her father. Saher as Lord of Leuchars had a 
continuing relationship with this land and the church on it, as well as with St. 
Andrews.^^ For both donated properties, there are confirmations from King 
William
During the period 1205-1207, a dispute arose between Saher de Quincy and 
St. Andrew’s Priory, over the patronage of the church in Leuchars. Both the 
donation of Ness and the confirmation of Orabilis refer to omnibus iustis
™ St. Andrews Liber, 254-255. The date is obtained from Barrow, The Kingdom o f  the Scots 
(Edinburgh, 2003), 64, who listed Henry as judex  for Fife and Fothrif. This is the only time 
Henry appears as Judex. While it is interesting to note that this is a Norman name in a native 
role in the late twelfth century, it is not clear what the significance is.
Other terms which could have been used to denote patronage, such as ius advocacio  or 
donatio do not appear either. See R.E. Latham, Revised M edieval Latin Word-List from  
British and Irish Sources, with Supplement (Loiidon, 1999), for various terms.
Saher de Quincy (1153x1219). For details o f  the de Quincy family, see Grant G. Simpson, 
An Anglo-Scottish Baron o f  the Thirteenth Century, The Acts o f  Roger de Quincy, Earl o f  
Winchester and Constable o f  Scotland, Unpublished thesis presented for the Degree o f PhD 
o f the University o f  Edinburgh in the Faculty o f  Arts, December 1965.
G. Donaldson and R.S. Morpeth, A Dictionary o f  Scottish History (Edinburgh, 1994), 177.
For Lathrisk, see St. Andrews Liber, no. 224; The Acts o f William I, no. 221. For 
confirmations concerning Leuchars, see St. Andrews Liber, no. 289; The Acts o f  William /, 
300, at 337-338.
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pertinenciis but neither use any phrase referring to patronage. Some time 
before 24 October, 1205, her son, Saher de Quincy had apparently put a 
relative, Simon de Quincy, in possession of the l i v i n g , S t .  Andrews 
objected to this as an infringement of their rights and complained to the Pope. 
The Pope appointed three judges delegate to decide the d i sput e , but  de 
Quincy had taken the matter before the king’s court rather than before an 
ecclesiastical court, greatly upsetting the Church and Innocent III.^  ^ To have 
the king decide a dispute involving church properties was seen as an 
encroachment on the Church’s liberties and jurisdiction,^^ and as ‘contrary to 
the custom of the Church of S co tland .A ltogether, Innocent III sent four 
letters regarding this matter.^^ In the midst of this dispute, Saher de Quincy
The name Simon de Quincy appears several times in the charters o f  this period. Although 
he is most often described as 'clericus' there are charters where he has no descriptor. As a 
result, there has been speculation that there was more than one individual with this name. See 
D.E. Easson, (trans. and ed.) Charters o f  the Abbey o f  Coupar Angus, Vol. I, Charters I to 
CXVÎ11, 1166-1376  (Edinburgh, 1947), 44, and charters cited therein. If there is only one 
Simon, and this appears to be so, he was not only a relative o f Saher de Quincy, but a 
'c/ericus de domini regis' who witnessed at least two charters o f William Malvoisin, bishop 
o f St. Andrews c. 1201 and 1202x1204, {St. Andrews Liber, 106 and 155); but also a witness 
to two charters o f  the de Quincys, Earl Saher and his son, Roger in 1217x1219 {St. Andrews 
Liber, 256, 257). These charters can be dated to 1217x1219 because Roger is listed as the 
heir, meaning it is after Saher de Quincy’s first born son, Robert has died, and before Saher 
himself dies in 1219. See Grant G. Simpson, ‘An Anglo-Scottish Baron o f the Thirteenth 
Century; The Acts o f Roger de Quincy, Earl of Winchester and Constable o f  Scotland’ 
Unpublished Thesis, University o f  Edinburgh, 1965, at 15, 21, 22, 60-62. These last two 
charters are crucial in determining that the dispute was settled in favour o f  the de Quincys; at 
least ten years after the settlement before the king, Simon de Quincy is shown to still be in 
possession o f  the living at Leuchars.
 ^St. Andrews Liber, 350.
Saher de Quincy apparently took the case before the king between the time o f the first 
papal bull and the second, dated 7 June 1206.
® G.W.S. Barrow, The Kingdom o f  the Scots: Government, Church and Society fo r  the 
eleventh to the fourteenth century (Edinburgh, 2003), 89-90. But it was in keeping with the 
general rule that seems to have been followed when there was a dispute between a layman 
and the church over property that had not been given in alms, and o f  course, in keeping with 
the rules set out in the Constitutions o f Clarendon.
™ St. Andres Liber, 351; Cooper, Select Cases, 8.
Thomas Thomson, (ed.), Liber Cartarum Prioratus Sancti Andree in Scotia  (Edinburgh, 
1841), 350-352; see also, Barrow, The Acts o f  William 1, nos. 271(royal confirmation to St.
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became earl of Winchester on 13 March 1207.^' Probably shortly thereafter 
and before the third mandate of June 1207, the matter was resolved in Saher 
de Quincy’s favour in the king’s court.
Although the Pope did appoint a third panel to hear the case and decide it 
according to canon law, it does not appear that any judges delegates actually 
heard the case. But the settlement reached before the king was unacceptable 
to the canons. They alleged that the king had used the threat of violence and 
terrorised them into accepting his decision.^^ The records do not specifically 
state the canons’ displeasure, but the physical evidence could not be more 
explicit. As Barrow notes in his discussion of the royal confirmation, ‘[T]he 
whole document, including the rubric, has been crossed out with vertical and 
diagonal lines, and the surface of the vellum has been scraped; the whole has 
then been painted over with an obliterating agent. A substantial number of 
words between 'filii WillelmV and ^Testibiis' have been regarded as illegible, 
but a proportion o f them might be recovered after prolonged s t u d y . B a r r o w
Andrews datable to 1175x1190) 300, 337-338, notes. The letters are respectively, a mandate 
naming the Abbots o f  Coupar, Arbroath and Lindores as judge delegates, dated 24 October 
1205, a letter o f  rebuke dated 7 June, 1206,complaining to the panel that they were neglecting 
their duties to settle the matter in a timely fashion, a second mandate to a new panel o f judge 
delegates including the Abbots o f Melrose, Dryburgh and Jedburgh dated 9 June, 1206 and 
finally, after the case had been brought before the king and a settlement concluded, a third 
mandate naming yet another panel o f judge delegates to retry the case according to canon law, 
dated 6 June, 1207.
Barrow, The Acts o f  William /, 440.
Ibid, no. 491 and notes. The dating o f  the charter is 20 May 1209x1211, probably 1210, 
which is later than the papal letters and the probable date o f the actual settlement. Barrow 
notes that there could have been two decisions, or a reiteration o f  the earlier decision contrary 
to the terms o f the papal letters.
St. Andrews Liber, 352. Also see Barrow’s notes after no. 491 in The Acts o f  William /, at 
448.
Ibid.
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goes on to comment that the ‘very thorough-going obliteration of the text may 
have been due to the canons’ indignation that the matter had been brought into 
the curia regis ‘contrary to the custom of the Scottish church
Barrow further notes that this charter should have been included in the printed 
edition of the St, Andrews Liber, but was not. He concludes, ‘in view of the 
date of this act, it must either represent a fresh decision of the curia regis, or 
reiterate the earlier decision contrary to the sense of the papal documents.
The second possibility seems preferable since Saher de Quincy is not given 
the title earl o f Winchester which he obtained 13 March, 1207.’^^
Lord Cooper reviewed this Leuchars case in his Select Scottish Cases o f  the 
Thirteenth Century, and noted that in addition to sending these mandates to 
three separate panels, the papacy expected the third mandate to result in what 
amounted to a court of review. The third panel of judges-delegate was to hold 
another proceeding, to review the actions taken by the king and the king’s 
court, and then determine the matter in accordance with Canon Law.
Ibid. On the other hand, it may be due to the fact that eventually, they got their way and 
thought that this previous, bad decision which no longer applied could be obliterated.
Ibid. Since the charter is in the manuscript o f the cartulary but no extant separate charter 
seems to have survived, it must be concluded that the obliteration took place sometime after 
the entry in the cartulary. On the other hand, it may be due to the fact that eventually, they 
got their way and thought that this previous, bad decision which no longer applied could be 
erased. Regardless o f  precisely why this occurred or the timing o f  the defacing o f the charter, 
it is a very clear example o f  the canons’ attempts to edit history.
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Although Cooper seemed to conclude that the Priory retained the right of 
patronage, there is no record of the third panel of judges delegate actually 
holding any sort of hearing or overturning the decision of the king’s court.
The incumbent presented by Saher de Quincy, a relative named Simon de 
Quincy, did in fact hold the living of the Church of Leuchars. Simon de 
Quincy, parson of Leuchars, was a witness to charters as late as 1217-1219.^^ 
It appears that the patronage of this church remained with the de Quincy 
family until after 1280.^^ A parallel situation involved the other donation of 
the de Quincys, that of the church of Lathrisk. Although there is no 
documentation to support this, the records concerning Lathrisk may shed light 
on Leuchars. There is a charter datable to 1257 where Roger de Quincy 
relinquished the right of patronage {ius patronatus) for Lathrisk to St. 
Andrews, but the charter makes clear that prior to that time, he had thought he 
had the right to present the living. While it does not discuss Leuchars, it is 
possible that something similar occurred with regard to that church as weli.^^ 
Thus, although Lord Cooper’s conclusion that the right of patronage was with
Cooper, Select Scottish Cases o f  the Thirteenth Century (London, 1944), 7-8. See also St. 
Andrews Liber, 254-257, for charters concerning Leuchars and listing Simon de Quincy as 
persona de louchres. At least two o f  these were after Saher de Quincy became Earl of 
Winchester, so after March 1207 and before he died In 1219; see also the papal bulls at 350- 
352; Gordon Donaldson and R. S. Morpeth, A Dictionary o f  Scottish History (Edinburgh, 
1977), 177.
See Ian B. Cowan, The Parishes o f  M edieval Scotland, SRS, Vol. 93 (Edinburgh, 1967), 
131, where he notes that ‘The patronage was claimed between 1206 and 1208 by Saher de 
Quincy, nephew of N ess and while this appears to have been resolved in favour o f  de Quincy, 
there are subsequent confirmations to the priory o f  certain teinds within the parish, which 
continued to be served by a parson in the late thirteenth century.
St. Andrews Liber, 336, 337. See also. Grant G. Simpson, An Anglo-Scottish Baron o f  the 
Thirteenth Century: The Acts o f  Roger de Quincy, Earl o f  Winchester and Constable o f  
Scotland, Unpublished thesis, (Edinburgh, 1965), 26-29. It is also possible that the canons 
used the Pope’s determination in the Leuchars case (not from the third mandate) as 
justification for asserting their right to present in Latherisk. But there is no extant charter 
concerning a decision by a papal court after the king’s judgment in favour o f de Quincy.
247
the pursuers (the Priory) in 1294 may be correct, it had not remained with 
them for most of the thirteenth century
The issue of jurisdiction takes centre stage again in the conflict between 
Melrose and the Earl of Dunbar. The course of this particular case shows that 
even though the lines were becoming more clearly drawn, and the Church 
more insistent upon its perceived rights o f jurisdiction, the outcomes did not 
always follow the rules.
Sorrowlessfield
The pursuit o f the Earl of Dunbar by the monks o f Melrose Abbey over the 
land called Sorrowlessfield is perhaps the most important in this entire series. 
The jurisdictional conflict is explicit, but the resolution is equivocal. By the 
end of the case, it is still not clear which jurisdictional claims reign supreme.^’
The dispute involving the Earl of Dunbar began sometime in the late twelfth 
century or early thirteenth with what appear to have been incursions by the 
earl’s animals and men into the area thought to be common pasture, but to
Cooper, Select Scottish Cases o f  the Thirteenth Century,, (London, 1944), 7-8. See also St. 
Andrews Liber, 254-257, for charters concerning Leuchars and listing Simon de Quincy as 
persona de louchres. At least two o f  these were after Saher de Quincy became Earl o f  
Winchester, so after March 1207 and before he died in 1219; see also the papal bulls at 350- 
352; Gordon Donaldson and R. S. Morpeth, A Dictionary o f  Scottish History, (Edinburgh, 
1977), 177.
By the end o f William I’s reign, the question still had not been finally resolved and there 
were cases where Jurisdiction was still an issue under Alexander II. See Ferguson, M edieval 
Papal Representatives, 187.
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which the monks of Melrose claimed exclusive right.^^ The chain of events 
suggests that the monks of Melrose, whose abbot had been one of the judges- 
delegate appointed by Pope Innocent III in the de Quincy case concerning 
Leuchars, may have felt that they would be treated more fairly if the matter 
were brought before an eeclesiastical tribunal rather than the king. But since 
the first attempt to litigate this matter oecurred after 1200, there is the 
possibility that the ehoiee o f venue was influenced by the very active Pope 
Innocent III and his response to the Leuchars matter. Less likely, but still a 
faetor since it was part of the current elimate concerning relations between the 
chureh and secular power, was Cutn Universi, which stated that matters in 
controversy should be decided either by Scots in Scotland or by direct appeal 
to the Pope.^^
Patrick earl of Dunbar was a powerful landholder and an intimate of William 
Ts, as was Saher de Quincy. The earl, along with the bishops of St. Andrews 
and Glasgow had been witnesses to the settlement agreement between de 
Quincy and St. A ndrew s.T hus, both parties in the Dunbar ease were 
intimately familiar with the chain of events in the Leuchars dispute. 
Considering the history of the de Quincy-Leuehars matter, it is not surprising 
that the monks of Melrose chose to proceed in a manner that was unlike their
Melrose Liber, no.lO l, ‘The Attestation o f Brice, Bishop o f  Moray’.
John Dowden, The M edieval Church hi Scotland, Its Constitution, Organisation and Law 
(Glasgow, 1910), 2 1 1, where he notes that ‘the Pope states that the citing o f the prior before 
the court o f  the king was "contra consuetudinem ecclesiae Scoticanae",' Any role Cum 
Universi played would have been indirect, but it should not be ignored as a potential 
influence.
William (Malvoisin), bishop o f St. Andrews, Walter, bishop o f Glasgow, and the earl.
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prior methods o f securing their property interests. Instead of pursuing the 
matter in the king’s court, as had been done in all previous cases concerning 
the determination of property rights, boundaries and claims, the monks 
appealed to the Pope, who mandated judges-delegate to handle the case.^^
Earl Patrick ignored the summons sent by the first panel of judges-delegate. 
Although they could have acted on Dunbar’s failure to respond to the 
summons, they failed to do so out of fear of reprisals by the earl. Instead, 
they placed the earl’s manors under ecelesiastieal interdiction. This caused 
the earl to respond by filing objections to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.^^ He 
based the objection on three grounds: that he was a layman, that this was a lay 
holding, and that the plaintiff ought to pursue in the forum of the subject 
matter.^^ Lord Cooper notes that, “ in claiming as he did the benefit of the 
common law (juris communis), the defender was doubtless indignant at the 
attempt of the monks to treat him differently from de Moreville and Alan, and 
even the “men of Wedale”, all of whom had been sued in civil courts.
The tribunal was not persuaded, and found that in those parts a layman could 
be called into an ecclesiastical court if the matter involved lands given in pure 
alms. The tribunal had sent to the Pope for advice on this point, and it is
The first panel o f  judges-delegates consisted o f the bishop o f  St. Andrews (probably 
William Malvoisin), the archdeacon o f  St. Andrews (Ranulf de Wat), Dean o f  Lothian 
(Probably Andrew o f Tyninghame), see D.E.R. Watt and A.L. Murray, Fasti Ecclesiae 
Scoticanae M edii Aevi A d  Annum 1638 (Edinburgh, 2003), 379,393,412.
Cooper, Selected Papers 1922-1954 (Edinburgh, 1957), 84.
M elrose Liber, no. 101, 88. 'Actor sequi debet forum r e i \
Cooper, Selected Papers 1922-1954, 84.
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implicit in his advice that he considered these lands to already have been 
given in pure alms, even though the earl was contending that they were lay 
holdings. Thus, the Pope had decided the main issue that formed the basis of 
the earl’s defence before the ease had proceeded even to proof.^^
The earl then objeeted to the jurisdiction of the tribunal based on the 
competence of the presiding bishop, who had treated the earl unfairly in 
another dispute involving the patronage of a c h u r e h . T h e  earl appealed to 
the Pope on that basis. The Pope essentially said that if these objections were 
valid, the earl had grounds to object, and nominated a second tribunal.
They were unable to resolve the dispute, and referred the case back to Rome, 
where a further hearing was scheduled to p r o c e e d . T h e  earl, although he 
was given time to appear, failed to do so. This hearing was set to proceed in 
April, 1207, It does not appear that the earl fully submitted to the papal 
court’s jurisdiction at any time.
At some point during this period, William Malvoisin, bishop of St. Andrews, 
had gone to Rome, and may have conferred with the Pope about this ease.
Melrose Liber, no. 101, 88. See also, Duncan, Scotland: The Making o f  the Kingdom, 288. 
Duncan notes that ‘to admit ecclesiastical jurisdiction meant admitting tenure in free alms’ 
which would mean losing the case to Melrose. Since there had been a 'recognitim i’ in at least 
one earlier case concerning patronage, there is no reason why this procedure could not have 
been done here as well, although that had been in a royal court, not ecclesiastical.
While it is tempting to connect this statement to the Leuchars case, there is no conclusive 
proof that it was that case to which Earl Patrick was referring, or precisely what the ‘unfair 
treatment’ was.
Melrose Liber, no. 101, 88. Members o f this second tribunal were Abbot o f Holyrood, 
Prior o f Inchcolm and the Rector o f Dunkeld.
Melrose Liber, no. 101.
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When the Pope issued a third mandate, this time it was to Brice, Bishop of 
Moray. This nomination may well have been at the suggestion of William 
M a l v o i s i n . The Pope’s orders to Brice were to settle the dispute, and to 
give each side 15 days in which to nominate a judge on their own behalf. 
Failing the nomination (which in fact occurred, since neither side nominated 
anyone), the Bishop was to settle the dispute himself. Brice did proceed on 
his own.
Although the dispute was undoubtedly settled, precisely how or even if Brice 
accomplished this is not known. The charter entry describing the 
proceedings, entitled “The Attestation of Brice, Bishop of Moray regarding 
the agreement between us and Earl Patrick about certain land which is called 
Sorrowlessfield, which he transferred to us by agreed judgement”, is very 
detailed as to the events up to the point of Brice giving the parties 15 days to 
nominate a judge on their own behalf. Then Brice simply indicated that 
neither had appointed a judge and related that Earl Patrick had conceded, in 
the presence of King William, his brother Earl David, and his honourable men 
and confirmed in his charter, that he had given all the arable land called
Marineli Ash, B.S., M.A., The Administration o f  the Diocese o f  St. Andrews, 1202-1238, 
Unpublished Thesis submitted for the degree o f  Doctor o f Philosophy, University o f  
Newcastle upon Tyne (1972), 15-16. She states that Malvoisin was in Rome in 1207, which 
would have been during the time o f these proceedings. Although there is no clear evidence 
that Malvoisin did in fact talk to the pope about this matter, jurisdiction was one o f the 
bishop’s prime concerns, as discussed throughout chapter 1 o f Dr. Ash’s thesis.
252
Sorrowlessfield, to God and the church of St. Mary of Melrose and the monks 
there.
There were no details about how the case ended up before King William and 
in his court, nor were there any details about how Brice got the parties to the 
point of agreement, if indeed it was Brice’s doing rather than the king’s. What 
did result from all this was a chirograph, which details exactly what the rights 
were for each side. There was also a confirmation charter, which was 
presented to the King, in his full court and before his honourable men. The 
terms of the agreement were set forth in Brice’s Attestation and a charter from 
Earl Patrick. Earl Patrick’s charter stated that Earl Patrick had given the 
disputed lands in pure alms for the good of his soul, and on behalf of himself 
and his son Patrick and his heirs, and included a warranty clause. William I 
confirmed this charter separately from the confirmation of the chirograph. The 
confirmation regarding Sorrowlessfield referred to the ""donacionenC of Earl 
Patrick.
The monks got their charters and presumably quiet title, but the earl seems to 
have had his way regarding jurisdiction as well, since all were confirmed by 
the King, in the king’s court. In looking at the terms o f the agreement(s), it is 
clear that each side retained certain rights, and neither side really lost, since
Melrose Liber, no. 101.
Melrose Liber, charters nos. 101 (Attestation), 102 (Chirograph), 103 (Confirmation o f the 
King), 104 (Charter o f  Earl Patrick about Sorrowlessfield [warranty]), and 105 (Confirmation 
o f the King on Sorrowlessfield, referring to this transaction as a donation). Barrow, Acts o f  
William /, nos 482 and 483.
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the earl could use the pasture and they both agreed not to build any sheepfolds 
or cattle pens, and not to build any houses or huts on the pasture.’
The royal charters granting the king’s peace to religious entities, ordering 
sheriffs to ‘do right’ regarding complaints from ecclesiastical parties, and the 
granting of royal confirmations of donations, settlements and judgements at 
the request of the Church may all be viewed either as ways in which secular 
authority asserted itself against encroachments on its power by the church, or 
alternatively as the king doing the Church’s b i d d i n g . H o w e v e r  one 
determines the motivation behind the various acts, this reciprocal relationship 
benefited both parties.
The Issues
Jurisdiction over cases involving property (including patronage) presents 
several issues. The first is who had it? When and to what extent? The 
second issue is whether a change in jurisdiction can be determined in the 
cases in the twelfth century and through to the end of William’s reign. The 
third issue, perhaps the most important, is, if no change in the exercise of 
jurisdiction in such cases can be identified, what did change that gave rise to 
Leuchars and Dunbar?
Melrose Liber, no. 101, p. 89-90.
Alan Harding, M edieval Law and the Foundations o f  the State (Oxford, 2002), 131. 
Harding characterises the relationship between the king and ecclesiastical landholders as one 
o f ‘public authority, not private lordship.’
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I. Who exercised jurisdiction?
Power is a fluid thing. It is never really ‘held’ by a n y o n e . I f  one conceives 
of power as something the whole of which is never localised in one place or 
one person, but a dynamic that shifts back and forth continually, then 
understanding jurisdictional issues in twelfth century Scotland becomes less 
problematic.
The subject of jurisdiction has been approached in a variety of ways by 
historians of both Scotland and England. Among those historians focusing on 
the twelfth century have been Hector MacQueen for Scotland and Warren 
Hollister and John Hudson for E n g l a n d . M a c Q u e e n ’s interpretation o f the 
motive behind the grants of jurisdiction is that these grants were not an 
expression o f power so much as a relinquishing of it. ‘[Rjoyal grants to both 
secular and ecclesiastical landholders of the right to hold courts confirm the 
absence of a desire to claim exclusivity for the king and his officers in the 
administration of law, although they do suggest the currency o f the idea of the
M. Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, in Power/Know ledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings 1972-1977, C. Gordon (ed.) (New York, 1980), 98. ‘[P]ower must be analysed as 
something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a 
chain. It is never localised here or there, never in anybody’s hands...Power is employed and 
exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its 
threads; they are always in the position o f simultaneously undergoing and exercising this 
power... [they] are the vehicles o f power, not its points o f application.’
These are not the only writers on the subject. A full historiographic analysis is not 
possible here, especially since so many have focused on other aspects o f jurisdiction, such as 
those mentioned earlier in the context o f ‘feudalism’. Most o f the authors that would be cited 
here are also cited elsewhere in this chapter; only a few are directly on point, and they will be 
discussed in detail, infra.
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king as the font of justice in his realm, especially when his right to correct 
failures of justice in the grantee’s court is asserted alongside the grant of 
jurisdiction’.”  ^ He points out that ‘[Rjoyal justice was nevertheless always 
ready to interfere with lords’ autonomy...’ implying that there was a certain 
element of friction between the king and his officials and the lords’ 
administration of justice.” ’
Hudson and Hollister have somewhat different view of the significance of 
grants of jurisdiction, to both the king and his men. They seem to be in 
agreement that the relationship between the king and his barons was less 
confrontational than MacQueen seems to be suggesting, and more cooperative 
in the administration of justice. Referring to the first part of the twelfth 
century in England, Hollister notes that there is a
community o f shared interests served by the exercise of royal power 
such as Henry Ts. The justice of the king’s vassals helped to maintain 
the peace of the realm; should that justice be contested or fail, the 
king’s justice could fill the breach: a royal writ ordering settlement in 
the shire court, a summons before a royal justice or court, or the 
visitation o f a royal sheriff. Such assertive royal action by Henry I 
produced no known outcry, much less a revolt, and testifies to the 
harmony that existed between Henry and his barons, who participated
Hector MacQueen, ‘Canon Law, Custom and Legislation: Law in the Reign o f  Alexander 
U’, in The Reign o f  Alexander II, 1214-49 ed. Richard D, Oram (Leiden, 2005), 221-251, 227. 
' ' ' Hector MacQueen, Common Law & Feudal Society in Medieval Scotland  (Edinburgh, 
1993), 42.
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in and benefited from the king’s strong judicial arm. In the history of 
the development of the English common law, these innovations from 
the first third of the twelfth century reveal an advancement toward 
coherent, centralized government, which challenges the long-standing 
assumption of a fundamental disjunction between the legal history of 
the reigns of Henry I and Henry 11.” ^
John Hudson points out that although some Normans had inherited sake and 
soke from their predecessors, ‘the Anglo-Norman kings made further grants, 
to the financial and judicial benefit of lords. No doubt kings emphasized that 
all such rights derived from royal grant, either specifically of sake and soke or 
perhaps as a concomitant of office.’’ ”  The consensus seems to be that there 
were reservations with regard to grants of jurisdiction. In Scotland as in 
England, a party could always appeal to the king for redress of an injustice, 
and the right to be the final word in this regard remained with the king.
As early as David I, Scottish kings were including sake and soke in their 
grants and confirmations.” '’ Both Malcolm IV and William I made grants 
including sake and soke, although not consistently, as Barrow points out.” ^
Hollister, C. Warren, Henry I  (New  Haven, 2001), 359.
John Hudson, The Formation o f  the English Common Law (London, 1996), 44. But he 
points out that another view ‘saw lords as deriving sake and soke from their very status.’
Barrow, The Charters o f  D avid  /, no. 6 (while still an Earl), nos 31, 32, 63, 73, 82,83,84, 
107,144, all o f them south o f what would now be the border between Scotland and England; 
It is not until Malcolm IV that there are extant royal charters to Scots laymen in the Scots 
kingdom which grant sake and soke. See Barrow, Acts o f Malcolm IV, no. 184; also, Acts o f  
William I, Introduction, 48-50 and nos. 84, 116, 125, for some o f the early grants to laymen.
Barrow, Acts o f  William /, 48.
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According to Hudson, speaking of the Anglo-Norman world, sake and soke 
were some o f ‘the most common judicial franchises enjoyed by lords’; by the 
end of the twelfth century, ‘sake means jurisdiction, that is court and 
justice’.” ^
These grants o f jurisdiction were delegations of power, not a complete 
surrender of it to the grantees. The practice o f reference back to the king for 
enforcement of rights, judgements, commands and settlements indicates that 
the king was not relinquishing all jurisdictional rights.* ”  The very fact that 
the king is granting the right to hold a court means that such a power is within 
his right and possession. What he grants he may rescind. And when he 
reserves the right to hear claims of failure to do justice, he is specifically 
retaining power over the administration of justice by those to whom he has 
granted such derivative power. Claim to ultimate authority over the 
administration of justice was attempted by Edward I with regard to Scotland, 
and it was ultimately unsuccessful.”  ^ Ecclesiastical claims to universal 
jurisdiction and then within kingdoms, specifically to jurisdiction over church 
property disputes really were an on-going issue. There are a number of 
property disputes that were clearly decided by judges-delegate.”  ^ It was not
Hudson, Formation o f  the English Common Law, 44-45.
Barrow, Acts o f  William I, nos. 6, 17, 24, 25, 27, 35, are only a few o f the charters where 
William I exercised his jurisdictional powers to enforce.
See generally, E.L. G. Stones, (ed. & trans.), Anglo-Scottish Relations 1174-1328, Some 
Selected Documents (London, 1965).
' Ferguson, M edieval P apal Representatives, 209-268. Glasgow Register, for example, has 
a number o f  charters indicating that disputes had been brought before judges-delegate.
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an exclusive jurisdiction, nor was it clear that before the papacy of Innocent 
III had there been any real disagreements over the jurisdictional aspects.
By the mid twelfth century, in Scotland there were grants of jurisdiction 
derived from the crown and ultimately referable back to the king for 
enforcement and any failure of justice. But Ferguson has noted there were 
increasing numbers of cases brought before papal judges-delegates under 
Kings Alexander II and III. Under William I, even with the activity of 
judges-delegate, practically speaking, ultimate jurisdiction held by the king 
seemed to bring a number of cases before the secular court on a frequent 
basis.
The cases discussed above show that the issue of jurisdiction was not raised as 
a contested issue until after 1198. Prior to that time, cases were brought 
before William I involving property rights including patronage, irrespective of 
who the parties were.’"* Examination of these cases indicates little basis for 
the claim by the Church in Dunbar v. Melrose, that under the common law of 
Scotland, cases involving disputes over property were heard only in 
ecclesiastical courts. To the contrary, often property disputes where both 
parties were church entities were heard before the king and his full court.’""
Ferguson, M edieval Papal Representatives, 189.
See cases cited above, and those in fn 53, above.
Barrow, The Acts o f  William /, nos. 35 (Balchristie), 105 (Durham v. Crowland), 249 
(Glasgow V. Roger de Valognes re; Church o f East Kilbride), 252 (Newbattle v. David Uviat 
re: Moorfoot), 260 (Glasgow v. Robert de Brus re: chirograph over several churches), 319 
(Kelso V. Robt. o f  Kent, et al re: Innerwick), 430 (Glasgow Cathedral & Bishop William v.
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The cases set out above are almost entirely found after 1170, some o f them 
indeed while the Church and the Scottish King were not in agreement on 
issues concerning the relationship between the two. But to assert, as Duncan 
does, that there were no cases where jurisdiction played a role unfortunately 
ignores both those that appear earlier than I I 78 and after the reconciliation 
between Pope Lucius and William 1.’^  ^Most of the cases discussed here in 
fact occurred after the reconciliation in the winter and spring of 1181-82.’"'* 
With regard to the cases discussed in detail as well as those mentioned in 
passing, it appears that jurisdiction was shared on a flexible basis throughout 
the twelfth century, with neither side making an issue of it with regard to 
propeity disputes. Even after the election of Innocent III, the evidence shows 
that jurisdiction ultimately lay with the king in many cases. This may be in 
part due to the ability to enforce the judgements. The extent to which the 
church was able to enforce its judgements was limited to ecclesiastical
William Cumin re: Muckcroft), 435 (St. Andrews Priory v. Eva, widow o f Wm de la Hay and 
his son David re: Falside), 440 (Kelso v. Melrose re: Bowden), 444 (confirmation o f  
proceedings held in the court o f  the prior o f  Coldingham), 477 (King William I v. Brice 
Bishop o f Moray v. Gilchrist earl o f Mar re: Aberehirder), plus those cases discussed herein.
See Barrow, The Acts o f  Malcolm IV, nos. 149,153,173,202,233,237,239,240.251,257, for 
what appear to be disputes between both lay and ecclesiastical parties. For William I, see 
Barrow, The Acts o f  William /, nos. 249(1182x1190, Glasgow v, Roger de Valognes re: East 
Kilbride), 477(18 Sept. 1203x1207; The King v. Brice, Bishop o f Moray v. Gilchrist earl o f 
Mar re: Aberehirder), 491 (20 May 1209x1211, prob. 1210; de Quincy v. St. Andrews Priory 
re: Leuchars), 562 (1202x1214; David de la Hay v. William Malvoisin, Bishop o f St. 
Andrews re: land o f  Ecclesdovenauin and patronage o f church o f Errol), all regarding 
patronage issues; for property disputes, see nos. 35 (1165x1171, Balchristie),38 
(1165x1171,Command to Earl Duncan, Justiciis et vicecomitibvs, that Dunfermline shall have 
all its lands),84 and comment (1165x1170, judgement to William de Vieuxpont against 
Delapre Abbey), 105 (1167x1170, Durham v, Crowland over toun and church o f Edrom),173 
( 1175x1178, St. Andrews v. nuns o f  Haddington re church o f  Haddington. There was a 
chirograph between the two confirmed by the king). Although not explored here, it could be 
argued that the king had the right to exercise jurisdiction in all matters concerning property 
within his kingdom. He certainly did so with regard to these cases, even thought one or both 
parties were the Church.
Duncan, Scotland: Making o f  the Kingdom, 272-273.
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censures (which were not to be dismissed lightly), whereas the king could 
actually do much more, and was sometimes called in to specifically enforce a 
judgement, as in the one rendered in the court of the Abbot of Coldingham.'"^
II. Is there evidence of change in jurisdiction in these cases?
The second issue that should be addressed is whether these cases illustrate a 
change in who or what entity held jurisdiction at any particular time.
Although Ferguson says that the judge-delegate forum was a court of choice, 
there clearly were instances where this was not so, such as the Leuchars and 
Dunbar c a s e s . I n  at least one case, there was a direct conflict of interest in 
going before an ecclesiastical tribunal. Duncan of Arbuthnott was called 
before the Synod of Perth in 1206 in a dispute with the Bishop of St.
Andrews, but two of the members of the synod were of St. Andrews. While it 
was a synod of the diocese, such a direct bias should have deserved some 
comment. It does not appear that Duncan objected to this. Since Duncan was 
the king’s tenant, it might have been a case where the king had indicated he 
would not support Duncan against the bishop of St. A n d r e w s . S i n c e  this 
case occurred at roughly the same time period as both Leuchars and Dunbar, 
it might simply have been a case of choosing which cases to support. Another
'^^Barrow, Acts o f  William /, no. 444 (8 July, c. 1203x1207, perhaps 1204).
The pursuer in those cases was Melrose Abbey, and it was the Abbey’s ehoiee, but as 
indicated above, jurisdiction has two parts; it is not just the choosing o f  jurisdiction, but the 
acceptance o f  it or recognition o f it that must be considered.
‘Decreet o f  the Synod o f  Perth, A.D. M CC VP, The Miscellany o f  the Spalding Chib v, 
(Vol. 24) ed. John Stuart, (Aberdeen, Spalding Club, 1852), 209-213.
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case, between Dunfermline and Philip de Mowbray, is slightly later than the 
main period here. It seems to have been resolved in the end before both 
ecclesiastical and secular entities, where the case started out before judges- 
delegate.'^^ While a composite body was not unusual, where a case had 
started before judges-delegate and ended up being settled before the king (or 
the Queen, as in the Mowbray case), it usually seems connected to the 
importance of the secular litigant.
Ferguson notes that there was an increase in the number o f cases brought 
before judges-delegate, but he does not take note of the earlier cases from 
both Malcolm IV and William I.'"^ Duncan remarked that this battle raged 
well into the thirteenth century, and as late as 1273, the Scottish king was 
receiving complaints from the Church for hearing patronage c a s e s . C o o p e r  
and Duncan seem more in agreement that whatever the legal basis was, the 
king, ‘at least in substance if not in principle’ remained the victor in the 
jurisdiction wars well after William I’s reign.'^'
The conclusion with regard to whether these cases show a change in who 
actually was deciding these disputes must be no. There was a change at least 
in attitude with regard to jurisdiction, however, especially in the last case,
Dunfermline Registrum, no. 211; Ferguson, case no. 24 and text at 181, Dunfermline v. 
Philip de Mowbray, regarding patronage and teinds o f  Inverkeithing.
Ferguson, 187-188, O f the 38 cases that could possibly be attributed to the reign o f  
William I or before, only 13 seem to have been between a church entity and laymen. 
Duncan, Scotland: Making o f  the Kingdom, 290.
Ibid.
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Melrose v. Dunbar. These changes may be attributed to the interplay of three 
factors: the effects of the Constitutions of Clarendon (or the lack of such a 
similar document), papal influence (including the agenda of Innocent III in 
extending the rights of the Church and the effect of Cum Universi, not so 
much as a direct influence, but as a factor in the climate of thought about the 
church’s claims to jurisdiction vis-à-vis the king’s), and the experiences of the 
ecclesiastics in the Leuchars matter.
III. What changed, giving rise to the contest in Leuchars and
Dunbar?
The potential significance of the Constitutions of Clarendon has already been 
discussed in some detail. It is sufficient here to note that while Scotland did 
not have such a document, the actual practice during the twelfth century 
reflected those in England both before and after 1164. Certainly several of 
the cases where William I presided were of property disputes between lay 
holders and ecclesiastics. It should be noted that even if William I had 
thought that the article in the Constitutions regarding disputes over property 
rights was a reflection of customary law and a good idea, he is not likely to 
have enacted a copy-cat statute.”  ^ Relations between William I and Henry II 
were at best tense during this period. Coupled with his subjection at the
MacQueen, ‘Canon Law, Custom and Legislation’ in Oram, (ed.), The Reign o f  Alexander 
II, 226. MacQueen notes that kings did legislate, ‘no doubt with the advice and assistance o f  
their counsellors, and that the resultant ‘assizes’ or ‘statutes’ were intended to and did have a 
general effect which might extend beyond the reigns in which they were created’.
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Treaty of Falaise, it could be argued alternatively that such legislation was 
unnecessary, and that it would be further proof of England’s lordship over 
Scotland. But it is clear that whatever the reasons, William I seems to have 
become more active in dispute resolution during the 1180s.
Cum Universi granted independence to the Scottish Church, and mandated 
that no one outside the realm of Scotland would decide disputes involving 
property claimed by the church, unless there was an appeal to Rome.*^^ With 
the ‘special privileges’ for the Scottish King, local jurisdiction was protected. 
But the Bull does not directly say that either forum should be the exclusive 
one with regard to property disputes between secular and religious parties. 
There were several earlier papal letters that either stated this directly, or 
implied it.’ "^^ The Scottish charters that can be dated to the period 1192-1214 
do not show any indication of a change in attitude towards Jurisdiction that 
can be attributed solely to this Papal Bull. Yet there was a change. O f the 
cases noted by Ferguson, out of the 13 that could be attributed to the period 
1214 or before and which involve laymen, only three are firmly datable to the
See Paul Ferguson, M edieval Papa! Representatives in Scotland: Legates, Nuncios, and 
Judges-Delegate, 7 /25-7256  (Edinburgh, 1997), 1-4 for a discussion o f this bull.
Robert Somerville, Scotia Pontificia (Oxford, 1982), no. 98, A d vestre discretionis,
(1175x1181) copy o f  a letter from Alexander III to the bishops o f Glasgow and Whithorn; 
no. 102, Tiia nos diixit, (1180x1181), indicating that tonsured clerics should be exempt from 
secular jurisdiction; 108, Cum de pastorum  (10 March 1182), letter to Bishop .locelin 
regarding presentation o f  rectors to a vacancy. 109, (11 March 1182), another letter to Jocelin 
confirming ‘the venerable custom observed in his church which provides that conflicts about 
patronage should be heard and Judged by the bishop.’ All o f  these occur during the dispute 
over St. Andrews between the king John and Hugh
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period before 1198.’^  ^ Even though the papal bull was important for the 
independence of the Scottish Church, it does not appear to have caused a 
change in actual practice with regard to jurisdiction. Its existence should not 
be ignored, however. It is an element in the political and social climate of that 
time, and would have had an influence on how the ecclesiastical community 
approached jurisdiction, especially after papal admonishments concerning 
resistance to secular jurisdiction. Such admonishments did not begin with 
Cum Universi, but had been part of the correspondence between the Papacy 
and various members of the Scottish Church since 1181.'^^ Even so, neither 
the earlier papal exhortations regarding jurisdiction nor Cum Universi actually 
had much of an effect on the actual jurisdictional aspects of the cases 
discussed above. Something else was involved.
Several historians have addressed the importance of the bull, but few have 
placed it in context with other factors in relation to the property disputes 
where jurisdiction became an i s s u e . H a n n a y  and A n d e r s o n e a c h  have an 
article on it, but the discussions are related almost entirely to whether the date
Ferguson, M edieval Papa! Representatives, 209-268. 3 are datable to the 1170s, one to 
1175x1199, one to 1183x1193/4, one to 1189x1209, and the rest to 1198 or later. O f these, 
three have been discussed in the text, and two o f  those were eventually resolved in the king’s 
court.
Robert Somerville, Scotia Pontificia, (Oxford, 1982), nos. 98,102, 108, 109. There were 
also several papal bulls complaining about the presumptuous secular power: nos. 100, 101 
(threatening King William with the pope’s withdrawal o f support for the independence o f the 
kingdom), 141,142, and letters o f support for ecclesiastical actions with regard to patronage, 
nos. 139, 143. Many o f  these occurred during the dispute over St. Andrews between the king, 
Bishop John and Bishop Hugh.
Ferguson, M edieval P apal Representatives, 1. Ferguson acknowledges that these were for 
the king, they certainly deal with issues o f  jurisdiction, but do not specifically state that the 
king shall have jurisdiction with regard to property disputes involving the church.
R.K. Hannay, ‘The Date o f  the Fi/ia Specialis Bull’, SHR, xxiii (1926), 171-177; A, 0 . 
Anderson, ‘The Bull Cinn Universi,' SHR, xxv (1928), 335-341.
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of 1188 and Pope Clement III are to be preferred to 1192 and Pope Celestine 
III as the origin of the document.
Ferguson has discussed the shift in the number of cases heard by judges- 
delegates versus the secular courts, as has C o o p e r . F e r g u s o n  takes issue 
with the conclusions put forth by Cooper suggesting that there was a falling 
off of cases before the papal judges-delegate and a concomitant increase in 
secular cases. Part of the reason for this is their different methodologies, with 
Cooper looking at cases ‘for which some resolution was known’ and Ferguson 
casting a larger net, to include calendars of papal registers and cases that 
might have involved judges-delegate in a settlement agreement. Another 
reason might well be the greater and better record keeping that is evident from 
the records of the later part of this period. A. A.M. Duncan has addressed the 
issue of jurisdiction, specifically over land disputes, but found that there was 
no evidence in the twelfth century; he speculated that the events after 1178 
may have had a chilling effect on ecclesiastical claims for at least a decade. 
This is not borne out by the catalogue of cases collected by Ferguson. There 
was no significant decrease in the number of cases from before 1178 to the 
period after, even though the king seems to have been more active during that 
period.
Ferguson, M edieval Papal Judges-Delegate in Scotland, 187-190; Cooper, Select Scottish 
Cases, introduction generally, and xxxvii-xli.
A.A.M. Duncan, Scotland: The Making o f  the Kingdom  (Edinburgh, 1975), 288.
266
Recently, A.D.M. Barrell,'"^^ Hector MacQueen,’"^  ^and Dauvit Broun*'^  ^have 
examined the importance o f the papal bull. They rightly focus on the main 
import of this document, which released the Scottish church from any claims 
by York for metropolitan status; none discusses in any detail, the effect on the 
ground with regard to jurisdictional issues in particular cases.
Barre 11 gives a thorough background to the political and ecclesiastical steps 
leading up to the issuance of the Bull. The actions of Henry II in the 
concessions he obtained from William I in the Treaty of Falaise were viewed 
by the Pope as ‘unwarranted interference in church affairs’. T h i s  was 
especially true considering the jurisdictional conflicts both before and as a 
result o f the Constitutions of Clarendon, and the Beckett affair. Although the 
Pope was able to regain some of the losses of jurisdictional power, propeity 
disputes between the church and laity over land not given in alms would still 
be heard by the king and his justices. Up until then, the situation in Scotland
*'*' A.D.M. Barred, ‘The Background to Universi: Scoto-papal relations, U 59-I192 , The 
Innes Review, Vol. 46 (1995), 116-138.
Hector L. MacQueen, 'Regiam Majestatem, Scots Law, and National Identity’, SHR, 
LXXIV, 1 (1995), 1-25; MacQueen, ‘Expectations o f the Law in 12'*' and 13**' Century 
Scotland’, Tijdschrift Voor Rechtsgeschiedenis LXX (2002), 279-290;and MacQueen, ‘Canon 
Law, Custom and Legislation: Law in the Reign o f Alexander IT, in The Reign o f  Alexander 
I I 1214-1249 ed. Richard D. Oram (Leiden, 2005), 221-251.
Dauvit Broun, ‘Whose Independence? Bishop Jocelin o f Glasgow (1175-99) and the 
Achievement o f  Ecclesiastical Freedom’, Chapter 5, in The Idea o f  Britain and the Origins o f  
Scottish Independence, (forthcoming).
*‘*'*1 am aware that there are some who will say that Cum Universi had no effect on disputes 
between the church and lay holders. But the evidence suggests otherwise, not so much in 
direct attribution, in other words, a claim o f jurisdiction based on this papal letter, but in 
actual practice and as part o f  the general milieu o f papal attitude expressed in the bulls during 
the period 1181-1192, culminating in Cum Universi. It is clear that the popes thought these 
cases should be decided in ecclesiastical courts, and supported efforts by the Scottish Church 
to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over these matters.
Barren, ‘The Background to Cum Universi', Innes Review, Vol.46, (1995), 116-38, 137.
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had been more amicable, with cases being heard by both the king and 
ecclesiastical tribunals. The Pope may have felt that the treaty, in placing the 
Scottish Churches under the metropolitan authority of York, and the fact that 
William I had acknowledged Henry II as his lord, would make it increasingly 
difficult for the Pope to exercise jurisdiction through his subordinates in 
Scotland. On the other hand, giving the Scottish church independence from 
England, and declaring that all property disputes should be decided by Scots 
and within the territorial jurisdiction of Scotland, indicates that the Pope was 
not really changing the jurisdictional ‘map’ with regard to these types of 
cases.
It seems more likely, considering the evidence, that it was the papacy of 
Innocent III that actually triggered an active change in attitude and had the 
most profound effect on jurisdictional matters between the secular and 
ecclesiastical courts. Innocent III was a much more energetic Pope when it 
came to protecting the rights of the Church, especially with regard to 
jurisdiction. Although he denied aspirations of a papal theocracy, with all 
earthly kings subordinate to him, his statements appear to contradict this.^ "^ ^
In both the Leuchars matter and the Melrose v. Dunbar case, Innocent III 
spent considerable energy trying to protect what he saw as the Church’s rights 
with regard to jurisdiction in these property disputes. He seems to have been 
more convinced of the validity of his position than the judges-delegate he
Brian Tierney, The Crisis o f  C hw ch and State 1050-1300 {Tovonto, 1999), 130.
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assigned to the c a s e s . T h e  biggest problem with regard to the pope’s 
assessment o f these cases is that he assumed that both involved lands actually 
given in alms when in fact, that was the issue to be decided. But the charter 
for Leuchars merely says iustis pertinentiis, it makes no mention of anything 
more specific.'"^® And there was no indication that the lands in dispute in 
Dunbar had ever been given in alms.*'*^
MacQueen has published several works touching on jurisdiction. In his 
article on ‘Expectations of the Law in 12^ '^  and 13*’^ Century Scotland’ he 
states that not only was the Church an important element in the formation of 
the Scottish common law, but that ‘the Church was a crucial formant of 
“expectations of the law”, not only because through its own canon law and 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction it was a provider o f law, but also because it was a 
spiritual and moral critic of, and threat to, secular law and jurisdiction which 
could not be ignored.’ This threat was an on-going one which became 
more acute during the papal reign of Innocent III. This made the struggles 
seen within these cases all the more important. Any expansion of jurisdiction 
by ecclesiastical courts caused a decrease in secular jurisdiction, especially 
with regard to property claims. This may have been Innocent’s intent.'^* For
St. Andrews Liber, 350-352/ ALelrose Liber, 100-102.
Barrow, The Acts o f  William I, 271; St. Andrews Liber, 287-289
149 Melrose Liber, nos, 101-105.
Hector MacQueen, ‘Expectations o f Law in 12**' and 13**' Century Scotland’, Tijdschrift 
Voor Rechtsgeschiedenis LXX (2002), 279-290, 279.
*^ * Tierney, Crisis o f  Church and State, 128-131.
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Scotland, the series of papal bulls leading up to Cum Universi, while all 
preceded Innocent’s tenure, may have helped to shore up the groundwork for 
assertions of temporal jurisdiction over these types of disputes of which he 
took full advantage.
The jurisdictional aspects o f both Leuchars and Dunbar show that this 
encroachment on the part of the Church was, at least in these two cases, 
justifiably resisted by both the litigants and the king. As indicated above, 
prior to Leuchars, Melrose had proceeded under secular jurisdiction with 
regard to the disputes involving land not previously given in alms, and 
proceeded against Alan son of Walter the Steward with regard to Mauchline 
before judges-delegate because those lands had been previously granted in 
free alms. In Leuchars, it seems to come down to a matter of construction. 
What precisely did the phrase justis pertinentiis entail? For that, there could 
easily have been a ‘recognition’ as described in the East Kilbride case. In any
MacQueen, ‘Expectations o f  Law in 12"’ and 13"’ Century Scotland’, 281.
Papal bulls regarding the dispute over the bishopric o f St. Andrews started in 1178x1180 
and continued for several years. See Somerville, Scotia Pontificia (Oxford, 1982), nos. 90, 
91, 92, all datable to 1178x1180 concern the dispute. But it is not until no, 98 (1175x30  
August 1181) that the pope says anything specific about jurisdiction. No. 98 is a letter to the 
bishops o f Glasgow and Whithorn about a privilege o f protection granted to Holm Cultram, 
and telling them that if there were any claims against Holm Cultram about their possessions, 
they should be decided judicially and under the examination o f these two bishops. It further 
admonished them not to allow the abbot or monks o f  Holm Cultram to be ‘dragged from an 
ecclesiastical court into a secular forum on issues about their possessions’. This may be 
related to a dispute between Walter o f Berkeley and Holm Cultram over the land o f  
Kirkgunzeon which had first been granted to Holm Cultram by Uhtred son o f Fergus, and 
then granted to Walter o f  Berkeley. The king held an inquest to determine who should hold 
the land. See Barrow, RES, ii, no. 256 and Barrow’s comment. He dates this charter to 
1180x1190. Thereafter, a flurry o f  papal letters reinforce the church’s right to exercise 
jurisdiction in several matters, including criminal matters (no. 102), filling vacancies (108, 
139), and conflicts about patronage (109, 143, 145). There were also the numerous papal 
letters concerning the controversy over St. Andrews, cited above.
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event, one must presume that both Saher de Quincy and the Earl of Dunbar 
were well informed of the consequences of acceding to the demands of their 
opponent to submit to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. It would mean, as Duncan 
points out, conceding the fundamental issue in the case.’ '^' While the Pope 
did not have his way with regard to these two cases, there was an increase in 
matters brought before papal judges-delegate after 1200. There were still 
contests over jurisdiction.
Dauvit Broun has examined the role Bishop Jocelin of Glasgow played in 
obtaining independence for the Scottish Church, He characterises Cum 
Universi as the ‘brainchild’ of Jocelin and places it in context with not only an 
independent Scottish church, but the independence of the kingdom as well.*^^ 
By comparing the events leading to the ‘special daughter’ status of Glasgow 
and then Scotland, with other exempt dioceses in Europe, Broun highlights 
the political aspects and implications of Jocelin’s actions. If an archbishopric 
at St. Andrews could not be obtained, independence of the Scottish Church 
could be (and was) used to bolster the independence of S c o t l a n d . ' I n  
discussing the Treaty o f Falaise, Broun notes that from the Pope’s 
perspective, the threat of Henry II exerting control over the Scottish Church
Duncan, Scotland: The Making o f  the Kingdom, 288, It should be noted that both o f these 
men had holdings in England, and were probably well aware not only o f  the Constitutions of 
Clarendon, but o f  its significance in similar cases.
Ibid, 288-290. Duncan details a number o f instances during the reign o f Alexander II. See 
also, MacQueen, ‘Canon Law, Custom and Legislation’, 232-233.
Dauvit Broun, ‘Whose Independence? Bishop Jocelin o f Glasgow (1 175-1199) and the 
Achievement o f Ecclesiastical Freedom’, ehapter 5 o f The Idea o f  Britain and the Origins o f  
Scottish Independence, forthcoming.
Ibid, 19. ‘the statue o f  the kingdom as a whole was at issue..’
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would have tipped the scales in favour of Jocelin’s p o s i t i o n . B y  extension, 
if Henry II had succeeded in the subordination of both the Scottish Chruch 
and the kingdom to England, there is no doubt that the customary procedures 
that had been formalised in the Constitutions o f Clarendon and followed 
informally in Scotland before and after 1164, would have been overtly 
adopted in Scotland. As it was, it took at least a decade and the papacy of 
Innocent III to assert the jurisdictional claims of the Church with regard to 
property disputes of various types in Scotland. Although the Church had 
always taken the position of superior jurisdiction, in Scotland there is no 
evidence that such a position was ever forcefully asserted with regard to 
disputes as it came to be under Innocent III. Indeed, even with the series of 
papal bulls exhorting the Scottish church not to submit to secular jurisdiction 
sent before Cum Universi, there is no evidence that the Scottish clerics 
actually changed their practice until after 1200. Neither these papal letters nor 
Cum Universi can be credited with being the sole cause or even a major cause 
of this change. They did, however, provide a background to the jurisdictional 
claims asserted by the pope in Leuchars and Dunbar. The position o f the 
papacy in general and the continued assertion of exclusive jurisdiction in 
these earlier letters may have had its own momentum, so to s p e a k . I n  other 
words, if something is said often enough, and with enough authority,
Ibid, 25.
There is also the argument that the popes in this period were attempting to counter-act the 
effects o f royal legislation such as in the Constitutions o f Clarendon. Pope Alexander 111, in 
the bull Super anxietatibus asserted that kings and princes had no right to arrange 
ecclesiastical matters, and warned Henry II not to force obedience from the Scottish Church 
to York, even though prior popes had demanded it, and it was the official position o f the 
papacy that the Scottish church was under the metropolitan jurisdiction o f  York.
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eventually it will be accepted. Coupled with a pope such as Innocent III, it 
was added ammunition in asserting ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and may be the 
basis for the language regarding the ‘customs in those parts’ in Leuchars and 
Dunbar.
There remains to be discussed whether the chain of events in the Leuchars 
case may have influenced the steps taken in Melrose v. Dunbar. As indicated 
above, up until Dunbar, all cases regarding boundaries and property rights 
involving lay holders were pursued by Melrose in the secular court. All of 
these matters were resolved before the king, including the quitclaim by Alan 
son of Walter regarding Blainslie. So what prompted Melrose to pursue 
Dunbar before judges-delegate? Leuchars had not yet been resolved, indeed it 
continued from 1205 until 1207, with the royal charter not issued until 
sometime between May 1209 and 1 2 1 It is not clear precisely when the 
Dunbar case started. Cooper places it at 1206-1208, while Ferguson dates the 
controversy from 1198% 1207.*^' Whichever case concluded first, it seems 
likely that they impacted each other. Since the monks of Melrose had 
seemingly been comfortable before the king on earlier matters concerning 
lands between the Gala and Leader, there is no reason for them to have taken 
Dunbar to an ecclesiastical court unless they were influenced by something 
else. The three possibilities are: the papal bull giving the Scottish church
160 Barrow, Acts ofWUUam  /, 491.
Cooper, Select Cases, 9; Ferguson, M edieval Papal Representatives, 217-218. It should be 
noted that the earliest mandate was issued to the Bishop o f St. Andrews, with Ferguson 
questioning whether it was William Malvoisin, whose tenure was from 1202-1238. If it was 
indeed William, then the case must be no earlier than 1202.
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more independence and supporting its potential claims to jurisdiction vis-à-vis 
property, (this had had no effect for almost a decade before the earliest 
possible date of Dunbar); the papacy of Innocent III, which was remarkably 
active with regard to jurisdiction; or the experience of other ecclesiastic 
parties before the king. Since the Abbot o f Melrose was one of the judges- 
delegate in the second panel of judges-delegate named in the 9 June 1206 
mandate in the case against Saher de Quincy, it seems reasonable that Melrose 
was very aware of the actions o f the king in the Leuchars case. This makes 
even more sense if Melrose petitioned the Pope after that date in the Dunbar 
case.'^ ^
There are several possibilities for the change in attitude as well as practice 
with regard to jurisdiction seen in these cases. None can be viewed in 
isolation, either from each other or from the events of the day. Coupled with 
the drive for independence for both the Church in Scotland and Scotland 
itself, account must be taken of the customary procedures which changed, 
partly due to conflict with England, partly due to the success of the Church in 
first, making jurisdiction an on-going issue where before it does not seem to 
have been, and secondly, obtaining strong papal support (again, perhaps as a 
counter-weight to the aspirations of England). While Cum Universi cannot be 
said to have directly influenced the jurisdictional battle played out in these 
cases, it was a supporting factor in ecclesiastical claims to jurisdiction. Even
This is possible if  the issuance o f the first mandate to Bishop o f St. Andrews and the 
archdeacons o f  St. Andrews and Lothian is dated towards the end o f the possible initial period 
o f 22 Feb. 1198x 17 Sept. 1207 set out in Ferguson, M edieval Papal Representatives, 217.
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so, ecclesiastical aspirations were not fulfilled completely: cases where the 
king refused to recognise the church’s claim with regard to property disputes 
continued well after the mid-thirteenth century. The twelfth century cases as 
well as the thirteenth century disputes demonstrate one salient element: 
jurisdiction is about many things, identity, authority, autonomy, the right to 
‘speak the law’, but above all, it is about power.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
An examination of disputes and the means of preventing them in twelfth and 
early thirteenth century Scotland necessarily includes other subjects, including 
the use o f writing and increasing formulaic approaches with regard to the 
legal process. The trajectory towards the use o f writing and systématisation 
has been discussed by many, but how well is the interface between these 
topics understood? The approach by most historians and by lawyers has been 
linear and progressive. But this one-dimensional perspective is inadequate, 
unsatisfactory and risks becoming teleological. With any linear, progressive 
narrative, there is a risk o f focusing on those elements and events that 'fit' and 
discarding anything that appears anomalous. If these anomalies are 
discussed at all, there is a tendency to either treat them as oddities, evidence 
of a single instance of precocity, or to downplay their significance by 
consigning them to the odd bin without further exploration or discussion.
But these apparent aberrations should be seen in a wider context, as part of a 
number o f options for the managing of disputes in use during this period. 
However small and narrow they may be, these documents are still windows 
through which the present may glimpse the past. The narratives and charters
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that form the core evidence in this investigation show that, rather than a shift 
from a lack o f systematic approach towards the more familiar legal system 
seen in the later thirteenth centuiy documents, there were recognised norms 
and customs by which disputes were either prevented or resolved, motivated 
by an underlying concept o f justice. For most of this period, and indeed, 
beyond, there was no single predominant and exclusive system. Examples 
range from the colourful and biased narrative of communal dispute resolution 
seen in Kirkness, to the early (for Scotland) but very clear evidence that 
David made procedural and evidentiary decisions that could affect the 
outcome of a dispute as seen in Horn dean.
Complexity theory allows us to analyse these cases within the parameters of 
the process of decision-making rather than within the structured framework of 
a legal system. It is within this replicating, self-referencing process that we 
see a systematic approach at work within the variety of cases documented 
from this period. It also emphasises that the result, increasing use of the 
written word and a predominant, essentially exclusive system, was neither 
smooth nor predestined. Rather, it was dynamic and unpredictable.
Approaching the records from this perspective presents challenges to the way 
we have traditionally viewed the past. Instead of examining the legal past as a 
progression from lesser to fully mature system, it becomes more of a synthesis 
of a variety of systems to one that is at once inclusive of the array of methods
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to resolve disputes, but exclusive with regard to the power and authority to 
control the process. In other words, power and authority became increasingly 
hierarchical and concentrated, while the spectrum of mechanisms was 
incorporated within this administrative hierarchy.
Complexity theory highlights the disjunct between the perception of a need 
for a single, fixed system and the reality of choices of access to justice 
operating in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. But there was a 
fundamental change during this period, in the expectations and perceptions of 
those who were affected by and sought justice through one or more of these 
avenues. What fueled this change, more than any other factor, was the use of 
writing. The essential integrity of the basic concept of justice, which had 
always been present, found in the increasing use of writing, a medium which 
enabled it to expand and become more clearly defined. The simple act of 
writing something down lends weight, authority and power to words. 
Although words have power in and of themselves, the written word has a 
lasting impact that surpasses the constraints of time. When the terms of an 
agreement or the judgement by one perceived to have power and authority to 
dispense justice are memorialised in writing, expectations for future justice 
become crystallized. Thus, the crucial development during this period was not 
a fixed legal system where none had existed before (although there was a shift 
to a more systematic, formulaic approach), nor even the increased use of the 
written word, which has been thoroughly explored, but the change in the idea
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and expectation o f justice. This led to real changes in how the law 
functioned. Understanding how these perceptions and expectations changed 
requires us to examine the actions and words o f those individuals involved in 
the particular disputes, and how documents were uses and incorporated into 
the process.
These records not only portray the underlying events concerning particular 
transactions or disputes, but a whole host of attitudes towards concepts of 
justice, law, power and identity. Since the world of the twelfth century was 
still very much an oral based society, the texts should be read not only for the 
details of the transactions, but taking into consideration the oral mentality of 
the society which is evident in the phases used and the descriptions o f the 
procedures. Especially with regard to the earlier, less formalistic documents, 
the descriptions of what the participants did and said provides a window onto 
the way twelfth century Scotland thought about these concepts. The evidence 
from these case studies also points to a conclusion about the importance of the 
prevention and resolution procedures themselves: whether in the more 
horizontal framework of the communal decisions by the judices as seen in the 
Kirkness dispute, or the more hierarchical and centrally focused efforts by 
William I to settle disputes, these matters were a vital part of the life of the 
community. The records memorialising these transactions became just as 
important to the life of the community. Although not necessarily so at the 
beginning of the period under study, by the mid-thirteenth century, a charter
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granting certain property rights became the symbol of those rights.
The shift in the perceptions and expectations of justice are most evident in the 
shift in the conceptualisation of disputes, due in part to the increase in the use 
o f writing, which also affected the processes of dispute prevention and 
resolution. There was an increasing abstraction concerning the transfer of 
property, which may be seen in the evolving role of the charter itself. Early in 
this period, the charter more often than not reflected the res being transferred 
and was used as a record o f the transaction, then as proof of the transfer itself, 
and again as proof of the rights asserted over the property. In effect, the 
charter itself became not just the symbol of the property transferred, in a 
sense, it became the property transferred, without which the owner (or one 
claiming to be) could not assert rights in that property.
There was a concurrent evolution towards concrétisation of the rules by which 
such transfers were conducted and any disputes concerning them were 
resolved. Susan Reynolds has discussed the trend toward formalism, which 
she noted could not really take place without written records. Without a 
record of a prior transaction or ruling, precedent has little meaning.
Customary law relied almost entirely upon memories of spoken words and the 
traditions of the community. Once custom was written down, memories were 
perforce aligned with the records of prior actions. To deviate from the past 
violated tradition and invited censure. But conforming to prior methods
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bolstered the authority and weight of current actions, and made them more 
acceptable. This is reinforced in the records by the ubiquitous references to 
prior charters, earlier assises, and to custom itself.
The records show that there were a number of individuals involved in any 
transaction. Even the most basic transfer of rights in property would have at 
least three entities participating: the donor/grantor, the donee/grantee, and the 
one(s) who witnessed the transaction. Most often there were these three, plus 
any additional witnesses and those from whom one or more of the primary 
parties sought confirmation of the transaction. All of these participants served 
a role in the prevention of future disputes over the property transferred.
Should a dispute arise, each would again play a significant role in the 
resolution of the contested matter, although not always in the same capacity. 
There would, however, be an additional participant, the decision maker, who 
may actually have been involved in the initial transaction as either a witness 
or a confirmer. It is in this role of decision maker that the evolutionary 
process occurring during the twelfth centuiy in the approach to resolving 
disputes is highlighted. At the beginning o f the twelfth century, the one who 
made the decision was perceived as one of a group of those learned in the law. 
While they may have had substantial positions in their communities, they 
were more often local figures rather than leaders of the wider realm. With the 
advent of David I and the administrative changes he initiated or effected, the 
decision maker was also an office holder who, by virtue of the office, held a
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substantial position in the local community. Thus, the decision maker became 
a permanent fixture who was seen as a part of, yet separate from others in the 
community who might come before him to resolve a dispute. The power and 
influence of these offices extended beyond the immediate locality as well. 
Positions such as sheriff or justiciar were local, but also positions within the 
king’s administrative hierarchy. Their duties included involvement in 
disputing processes, but were not limited to them. Any decisions they made 
could be ‘corrected’ by an appeal up the chain of these administrative offices, 
to the king himself. While there always seems to have been the ability to 
appeal to the king for justice, with David I’s rule, the records show an 
increasingly formal procedural approach to seeking redress of a prior 
decision.
This should not be taken to be a radical or rapid change, however. While 
there was a shift to a more vertical, hierarchical system, the horizontal 
elements remained. This is seen most clearly in the role of the judices. 
Although the duties changed over time, they were not replaced outright. The 
role of the king likewise saw evolutionary changes, although probably more 
in the detail described in the documents than substantively. The roles of 
sheriff and justiciar show less evolution than the other officials, in part 
because these were imported offices that were already well defined and were 
used in much the same capacity in Scotland as elsewhere.
282
The same uneven, inconsistent evolution can be seen when examining the 
proceedings and the rules followed in conducting them. Although formal rules 
of procedure and evidence can be dated to the mid-thirteenth century, there is 
some evidence that as early as David Ts reign, hearings were conducted 
according to recognised customs. These customs were not entirely consistent; 
rather they appear to have been mutable and varied at least in some details, 
although serving the same general purpose, such as the administration of the 
oath of the witnesses and jurors. There are also documents that reflect a more 
pragmatic and reasoned approach to what was considered adequate proof of a 
claim in property, and what was not. And the rules for transferring property 
rights as set out in Glanvill can be found early in the twelfth century in the 
charters of David I, and even before.
Approximately half of the charters granting property in alms indicate some 
kind of assent, consent or acknowledgement from the heir(s) of the donor. 
Whether this was a requirement must remain undetermined since the evidence 
can be, and has been, read to support either conclusion. But there were 
requirements concerning consent of the heir under certain circumstances, 
notably when it was a death-bed gift, or when the gift may have invaded the 
patrimony o f the heir. There is no conclusive evidence that there was an 
absolute rule but there is evidence that there were consequences when consent 
o f the heir was not obtained. The de Frivill case is the clearest example of 
this.
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Barrow has a different interpretation of the consent clause with regard to King 
David I and his son Henry. His theory is that this was evidence of a joint 
kingship, joint government. While the argument is attractive, it is less 
persuasive when all the factors are considered. There are only three charters 
that refer to a joint gift from David and Henry, all in some way connected to 
St. Andrews, and all apparently drawn up by or at the behest of Bishop 
Robert. The other charters to which Barrow points for support of a joint 
kingship are gifts and confirmations of gifts to the Church. There are no 
documents concerning acts of government, which are joint acts of the king 
and his son. There are no grants to laymen in exchange for military service 
that have the consent o f the heir. And the charters that do concern grants to 
religious entities that include some indication of consent on the part of the 
heir seem to be, for the most part, granting lands south o f the Forth. The 
exceptions to this are the three charters concerning grants to St. Andrews and 
the gift of Balchrystie to Dunfermline. These can be explained by the fact 
that both David and Henry were present and it might simply have been more 
economical to draft one charter rather than two. More important than the act 
of jointly donating the property is that these charters do not reflect 
governmental acts. They are donations for the personal benefit of the donors, 
for the welfare of their souls.
Whether there was a hard and fast rule that was followed in Scotland
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regarding the consent of the heir when donating lands to the Church may 
never be clearly answered. But that there were customs and norms, and 
potential consequences if the norms were not followed is clear.
The most complex issue that pervades the records concerning disputes from 
the twelfth century is perhaps jurisdiction. Many of the disputes involved 
competing claims to property rights by both lay and ecclesiastical holders. 
Often these property rights involved patronage, as well as cases over the 
payment o f teinds. Fundamental to the claims to the right of advowson was 
the question of who had been presenting the living before the dispute arose? 
In England, two causes of action dealt with these issues, the assise utrum and 
darrein presentment. There were no such causes of action so called in 
Scotland. But there were procedures remarkably similar in detail to those in 
England that were used in Scotland to decide these issues. Up until 1198, 
these cases were often brought before the king in spite of the many papal 
letters and admonishments to Scottish ecclesiastics to assert the church’s 
jurisdiction over disputes involving property rights affecting the Church. 
With the papacy of Innocent III, however, the church became more insistent 
on exercising jurisdiction in any cases perceived to affect its property rights.
Jurisdiction meant much more than which court would hear particular cases. 
Issues of power, independence of the Scottish kingdom and the Scottish 
church from England, identity, and secular versus ecclesiastical control of
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litigants were all at stake in the struggle for jurisdictional rights during the 
twelfth century. These were issues that had been present before and would 
continue to play a role in the relations between the Scottish king, the Scottish 
Church and the papacy. The cases discussed here merely highlight some of 
these issues and how attitudes changed with regard to them during this period.
As noted above, one of the most important shifts concerning disputes and 
their prevention or resolution was the change in the use of the written word, 
both in describing the transactions and in the increasing acceptance of written 
documents as integral elements in exchanges of property rights. The 
influence of writing is pervasive and informs all other topics. It changed how 
the participants proceeded to finalise their transactions, prove or contest 
property rights, record such transactions and finally how such records would 
be used in future. Documents became synonymous with identity, in the same 
way that property was. A person was the property he or she held. And 
charters, to a great extent, were the tangible, portable proof o f that property.
Complexity theory does not offer a cure for the lack o f records that plagues 
Scottish historians and lawyers. Nor should it be seen as the only way of 
viewing the legal past. But it does offer a different perspective o f the records 
we do have, and an explanation for those anomalous records that heretofore 
have no 'fit'. It also challenges lawyers and historians to look inward when 
examining the past. If there is a lesson to be learnt from applying complexity
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theory to twelfth century records concerning disputes over property rights, it 
is that historians must continually remind themselves that their perceptions of 
the past and interpretations are continually informed by their own milieu. All 
o f their perceptions, ideation and conclusions are filtered through that 
particular prism. Complexity theory, however inexactly applied, highlights 
the mutable, non-linear and to a greater or lesser extent, the long-term 
unpredictable nature of legal decision making. It is this unpredictability that 
the imposition of the rule of law seeks to minimise. While it is more or less 
effective in the short term, circumstances change, people and their perceptions 
change. And the application o f past rules to present conditions will 
continually change.
Some questions remain. Was the inquest of Glasgow really just a tallying of 
property? Or was it a 'friendly dispute', designed to clearly set out the 
boundaries between ecclesiastical and royal properties so that David could 
make grants for military service without infringing on the Church's rights? 
Why are there assent or consent clauses in most of the donations in alms south 
of the Forth, while so few appear in those donations north of the Forth? And 
why were the royal assent and consent clauses so rare after the early years of 
Malcolm IV's reign? Other issues that come to mind as a result of this 
investigation but have not been fully explored include how our perceptions of 
the legal past inform our own expectations of justice and how the advent of 
new media technology such as the internet impact the concept of justice. At
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the very least, complexity theory should raise these questions whenever we 
examine the application of rules to facts in the rendering of justice.
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